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Abstract
This thesis addresses challenges in elicitation and aggregation of crowd information for set-
tings where an information collector, called center, has a limited knowledge about information
providers, called agents. Each agent is assumed to have noisy private information that brings a
high information gain to the center when it is aggregated with the private information of other
agents. We address two particular issues in eliciting crowd information: 1) how to incentivize
agents to participate and provide accurate data; 2) how to aggregate crowd information so that
the negative impact of agents who provide low quality information is bounded. We examine
three different information elicitation settings.
In the ﬁrst elicitation setting, agents report their observations regarding a single phenomenon
that represents an abstraction of a crowdsourcing task. The center itself does not observe
the phenomenon, so it rewards agents by comparing their reports. Clearly, a rational agent
bases her reporting strategy on what she believes about other agents, called peers. We prove
that, in general, no payment mechanism can achieve strict properness (i.e., adopt truthful
reporting as a strict equilibrium strategy) if agents only report their observations, even if they
share a common belief system. This motivates the use of payment mechanisms that are based
on an additional report. We show that a general payment mechanism cannot have a simple
structure, often adopted by prior work, and that in the limit case, when observations can take
real values, agents are constrained to share a common belief system. Furthermore, we develop
several payment mechanisms for the elicitation of non-binary observations.
In the second elicitation setting, a group of agents observes multiple a priori similar phenom-
ena. Due to the a priori similarity condition, the setting represents a reﬁnement of the former
setting and enables one to achieve stronger incentive properties without requiring additional
reports or constraining agents to share a common belief system. We extend the existing mech-
anisms to allow non-binary observations by constructing strongly truthful mechanisms (i.e.,
mechanisms in which truthful reporting is the highest-paying equilibrium) for different types
of agents’ population.
In the third elicitation setting, agents observe a time evolving phenomenon, and a few of them,
whose identity is known, are trusted to report truthful observations. The existence of trusted
agents makes this setting much more stringent than the previous ones. We show that, in the
context of online information aggregation, one can not only incentivize agents to provide
informative reports, but also limit the effectiveness of malicious agents who deliberately
misreport. To do so, we construct a reputation system that puts a bound on the negative
iii
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impact that any misreporting strategy can have on the learned aggregate.
Finally, we experimentally verify the effectiveness of novel elicitation mechanisms in commu-
nity sensing simulation testbeds and a peer grading experiment.
Key words: Game theory, Mechanism design, Incentive schemes, Peer prediction, Reputation
systems, Online learning, Crowdsourcing, Community sensing, Peer grading
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Résumé
Cette thèse aborde les déﬁs posés par l’obtention et l’agrégation de l’information de groupe
(crowd information) dans les cas où un collecteur d’information, appelé centre, n’a qu’une
connaissance limitée des fournisseurs d’information, appelés agents. Nous supposons que
chaque agent dispose d’une information privée impure, qui apporte un fort gain d’infor-
mations au centre lorsqu’elle est agrégée avec l’information privée d’autres agents. Nous
aborderons deux cas particuliers de l’obtention de l’information de groupe : 1) comment
motiver les agents à participer et à fournir des données précises ; 2) comment agréger l’infor-
mation du groupe aﬁn que l’impact négatif des agents fournissant une qualité d’information
inférieure soit limité. Nous examinerons trois cas différents d’obtention de l’information.
Dans le premier cas d’obtention d’information, les agents rapportent leurs observations d’un
phénomène unique, qui représente une abstraction d’une tâche de production participative.
Le centre n’observe pas lui-même le phénomène, mais récompense les agents en comparant
leurs rapports. À l’évidence, un agent rationnel rapportera ses observations selon une stratégie
basée sur ce qu’il pense des autres agents, appelés pairs. Nous prouverons qu’en général, il
n’existe pas de mécanisme de paiement satisfaisant la propriété d’amélioration rigoureuse
(c’est-à-dire garantissant l’adoption d’un rapport véridique comme stratégie d’équilibre) si les
agents rapportent seulement leurs observations, même s’ils partagent une croyance commune.
Ce résultat motive l’utilisation de mécanismes de paiement qui soient basés sur un rapport
additionnel. Nous montrerons qu’un mécanisme de paiement général ne peut pas avoir une
structure simple, pourtant souvent utilisée dans les travaux de recherche précédents, et que,
dans le cas limite, lorsque les observations peuvent prendre des valeurs réelles, les agents
sont contraints de partager une croyances commune. De plus, nous développerons plusieurs
mécanismes de paiement pour l’obtention d’observations non binaires.
Dans le deuxième cas d’obtention d’information, un groupe d’agents observent plusieurs phé-
nomènes a priori similaires. Grâce à cette condition de similarité, ce cas représente une amé-
lioration du cas précédent, et nous permet d’obtenir des propriétés de motivation plus fortes,
sans exiger de rapports additionnels, ni forcer les agents à partager une croyance commune.
Nous étendrons les mécanismes existants aux observations non binaires en construisant des
mécanismes fortement véridiques (à savoir des mécanismes dans lesquels rapporter la vérité
constitue l’équilibre offrant la plus grande récompense) pour différents types de population
d’agents.
Dans le troisième cas, les agents observent un phénomène évoluant en fonction du temps, et
v
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certains d’entre eux, dont l’identité est connue, sont chargés de rapporter des observations
véridiques. L’existence d’agents dignes de conﬁance rend ce cas nettement plus rigoureux que
les cas précédents. Nous montrerons que, dans le contexte d’un agrégateur d’information en
ligne, il est non seulement possible de motiver les agents à donner des rapports informatifs,
mais également de limiter la portée des faux rapports délivrés par des agents malintentionnés.
À cette ﬁn, nous construirons un système de réputation qui imposera une limite à l’impact
négatif que peut avoir n’importe quelle stratégie trompeuse sur l’information agrégée.
Finalement, nous vériﬁerons expérimentalement l’efﬁcacité de nouveaux mécanismes d’ob-
tention de l’information dans une simulation de détection en communauté et dans une
expérience d’évaluation par les pairs.
Mots clefs : Théorie des jeux, Théorie des mécanismes d’incitation, Mécanisme incitatif, Pré-
diction par les pairs, Systèmes de réputation, Apprentissage en ligne, Production participative,
Détection communautaire, Évaluation par les pairs
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1 Introduction
Involving many stakeholders in a decision making process is beneﬁcial as it ensures that
the reached decision is preferred by the majority of the individuals affected by it. Therefore,
it comes as no surprise that modern systems rely on collective intelligence formed by ag-
gregating information from multiple sources. The most notable example of such systems is
the participatory web, where dynamic contents are created by engaging users in the design,
thus enabling them to share their knowledge and experience. MTurk1, TripAdvisor2, or Pre-
dictWise3, are only some of many examples on the modern web that strongly rely on crowd
intelligence.
The participatory web is often guided by the wisdom of the crowd approach [Sur05]: correct-
ness is obtained by aggregating contributions from many non-expert individuals, as it is in
product reviewing, opinion polling, crowdsourcing or community sensing. This approach,
however, fails to provide correct aggregates in certain cases, when participants provide false or
incorrect information either because [Gho13, LRSH11, HPZ06]:
1. obtaining accurate information requires effort;
2. participants have ulterior motives;
3. participants are biased towards their prior information.
These sources of inefﬁciencies imply that one of the key challenges is to solicit accurate infor-
mation owned by the crowd, while limiting the negative inﬂuence of crowd participants with
ulterior motives. The problem becomes even more challenging when reported information
cannot be directly veriﬁed by a party that elicits it.
To obtain quality data, an elicitation mechanism can incentivize participation using rewards
that may come in different forms but have a proper structure, so that the participants receive
1www.mturk.com
2www.tripadvisor.com
3www.predictwise.com
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Chapter 1. Introduction
the highest rewards for providing the most accurate data. In general, without a possibility of
directly verifying elicited data, rewards have to be based on comparison of reported values.
In other words, a participant’s reward depends on what others report, which induces a game
among participants from a game theoretic point of view. Therefore, the presented information
elicitation scenario can be modeled using standard game theory tools, where individuals are
represented by self-interested agents who reveal their private information only if that is in
their best interest [MRZ05]. The goal of an elicitation mechanism is to construct a game, i.e.,
a mechanism, in which participants are incentivized to invest effort and reveal their private
information.
This approach has been tried with success on crowdsourcing platforms such as MTurk. [Har11]
considered the task of screening resumes for a job description. A scheme where payments
depended on the agreement of answers with those of a human resources expert provided
signiﬁcant improvements in accuracy. [SCH11] tested a large variety of payment mechanisms
using a task of classifying the type of content present on a web site, and found that the mecha-
nisms based on consistency of reports had the best performance. Giving rewards for agreeing
with another participant has also been used in the very successful ESP game [vAD04], where
players were rewarded for assigning the same label as a peer to an image. [KH12] proposed to
reward crowd workers based on the comparison of their answers with the aggregate obtained
from the crowd. [HF13b] investigated reward based on a consistency with a peer using a task
of counting nouns in a list of 30 English words. Crowd workers were rewarded with a bonus
whenever their answer agreed with that of a single, randomly chosen peer. They found that
this increases accuracy more than comparing against a gold standard. The same authors also
showed that the social pressure can further increase accuracy [HF13a]. [FPTJ14] designed a
peer consistency mechanism that allows the answer distribution to be biased, and showed
that it can correct anchoring bias in a counting task on MTurk. Furthermore, [GF14] compared
this mechanism to prediction markets [Han03, CP07] — information aggregators that perform
well in practice [PLGN01, NRTV07]. They found that the peer consistency mechanism can
achieve a similar performance.
Motivated by these results, we consider two important objectives in elicitation and aggregation
of crowd information from a game-theoretic perspective:
1. how to incentivize participants to invest effort in acquiring accurate information and
truthfully reveal it;
2. how to limit the negative inﬂuence that participants with ulterior motives might have
on the aggregated information.
Incentive mechanism design
There are two main directions in the incentive mechanism design: gold standard mechanisms
and peer consistency mechanisms. The former is based on the existence of gold standards to
2
design scoring rules, typically, for elicitation of distribution properties or predictions [Han03,
GR07, LPS08].
We focus on peer consistency mechanisms, where incentives are formed by comparing values
reported by different participants — agents. Since these mechanisms do not rely on gold
standards, they are applicable even in scenarios when the ground truth is not possible to deﬁne
(as for subjective information) or when it becomes known in a distant future. There are two
basic types of peer consistency mechanisms, the peer prediction [MRZ05] and the Bayesian
truth serum [Pre04], that differ in the amount of knowledge they have about agents’ beliefs
and the amount of information they elicit from agents. The peer prediction is a minimal
mechanism, in a sense that it elicits only targeted information, but it assumes a certain
knowledge about agents’ beliefs. Contrary to the peer prediction, the Bayesian truth serum
is a knowledge-free mechanism, but it elicits additional information, in particular, it elicits
agents’ beliefs. Notice that both mechanisms are dependent on agents’ beliefs, which are
formed through agents’ belief systems that model how agents reason about each other’s private
information.
Considerable amount of literature has been devoted to making these mechanisms more
robust, often achieving better properties only for binary information structures [JF09, WP12b,
WP12a, DG13]. For example, robustness of the Bayesian truth serum in terms of the size of
agents’ population has been analyzed in [WP12b], while [DG13] substantially improves the
properties of the peer prediction by modifying the classical peer prediction setting. These
mechanisms, however, do not completely generalize to elicitation scenarios with non-binary
information structures, often requiring additional restrictions on how agents form their beliefs.
This resembles a common pattern in game theory that two signiﬁcantly differs from three or
many4. Therefore, in this thesis, we address the following challenge:
Challenge 1: Designing robust knowledge-free incentive mechanisms applicable to elicitation
of non-binary information.
Information aggregation
In certain cases, incentives for quality might not be sufﬁcient to prevent low quality reports in
the elicited data sets. This happens when participants do not respond to incentives, either
because they have ulterior motifs, as is the case for malicious participants, or because they are
spammers who provide random data.
A common way of addressing this issue is by using statistical inference methods for noise
reduction in the elicited data sets [RYZ+10, KOS11, LPI12, KOS13, VVV13]. However, these
methods are not designed for an online information fusion scenario where the reported
data has to be processed on the ﬂy, as it is in real time community sensing.5 A particular
4For example, the famous Arrow’s impossibility theorem [Arr70] requires a non-binary outcome space.
5While one could potentially apply the mentioned methods repeatedly in batch mode, we are more interested
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algorithm suitable for this type of an online setting is the inﬂuence limiter algorithm [RS07],
ﬁrst proposed for recommender systems. The algorithm places a reputation mechanism on
top of a predeﬁned information fusion component: its reputation updating rule and inﬂuence
limitation procedure make it provably resistant to a wide range of manipulation strategies.
However, the algorithm does not scale very well with the number of participants, so it is
impractical for many crowdsourcing scenarios. Hence, the second challenge we address in
this thesis is:
Challenge 2: Designing a robust online aggregation method suitable for large scale crowdsourc-
ing.
Our contributions
We develop our results systematically, by considering three different elicitation settings and
providing for each of them mechanisms with provable elicitation properties.
Setting 1: Single-task elicitation
The ﬁrst setting we consider is the classical peer consistency setting where participants have
private information about a single object, which we refer to as a phenomenon or a task. We start
by establishing the necessity of eliciting additional information in knowledge-free elicitation.
In particular, we show that there does not exist a strictly proper knowledge-free minimal
mechanism unless agents’ belief systems are highly constrained. Remarkably, even for non-
minimal mechanisms whose structure is decomposable (in a sense that they separately score
targeted and additional information), a condition that agents share a common belief system6
does not sufﬁce to allow truthful elicitation of private information. This explains why the
Bayesian truth serum [Pre04] and its robust version for small population [WP12b] do not fully
extend to more general elicitation scenarios that simultaneously allow small populations and
non-binary private information, without putting additional restrictions on how agents form
their beliefs. In addition to the common belief condition (i.e., agents sharing a common belief
system), we deﬁne a mild constraint for which we construct a strictly proper mechanism called
the multi-valued robust Bayesian truth serum. This shows that decomposable mechanisms
are strictly more general than minimal mechanisms.
To further push the limits of possibility results in terms of the type of elicited information, we
investigate the realm of non-decomposable mechanisms. In cases where agents with similar
private information also have similar beliefs, it is possible to construct a strictly proper multi-
report mechanism. One such mechanism is the divergence-based Bayesian truth serum in
which agents with similar private information are penalized if their beliefs are substantially dif-
in a design that also includes incentives for informed reporting.
6A common belief system means that the agents acquire their beliefs in the same way. In particular, if two
agents have the same private information, they should also have the same beliefs.
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ferent. The mechanism can be adopted for the elicitation of real-valued information. We refer
to the modiﬁed mechanism as the continuous Bayesian truth serum. Like the prior Bayesian
truth serums, it requires agents’ to have a common belief system, but it does not put any
additional restrictions on the agents’ beliefs. Furthermore, we show that without the common
belief condition, any mechanism fails to elicit truthful real-valued information, thus proving
the generality of the divergence-based Bayesian truth serum in its setting. Using a community
sensing simulation testbed, we quantitatively demonstrate the importance of mechanisms
designed for the elicitation of information with a non-binary structure. Furthermore, we dis-
cuss the design of a Bayesian truth serum type of mechanism called the competitive Bayesian
truth serum, which is a building block of a contest for eliciting subjective information.
Setting 2: Multi-task elicitation
To address the issue of the common belief condition, we consider a variation of the basic
peer consistency setting in which agents provide their private information about multiple
phenomena. This is a common case in micro-task crowdsourcing where, for example, a worker
solves several micro-tasks and reports a set of answers, each answer being associated to
a different task. With such an information structure, we design a strictly proper minimal
elicitation mechanism that allows agents to have private (uncommon) belief systems; we call
it the minimal peer prediction with private priors. The mechanism assumes that the agents
are homogeneous in a way they acquire their private information. Furthermore, if additionally
the population of agents is large, we show how to make truthful reporting the highest paying
strategy proﬁle using the logarithmic peer truth serum. We say that the logarithmic peer
truth serum is strongly truthful.
We then focus on heterogeneous population of agents. As we show with our impossibility
results, the transition from homogeneous to heterogenous population is not trivial, so as
a compromise between the two ends of the spectrum, we developed the robust peer truth
serum. The mechanism allows limited heterogeneity of agents’ population under a mild
restriction on the agents’ beliefs. As its variant for homogeneous populations (the logarithmic
peer truth serum), the robust peer truth serum makes the truthful reporting the most proﬁtable
strategy proﬁle (i.e., it is strongly truthful), but it requires smaller number of peers (per task) to
evaluate contributions, and, thus is numerically more stable. Due to its incentive properties
and relatively simple structure, we advocate the use of the robust peer truth serum in peer
grading and community sensing, which we also support by experiments and simulations.
Setting 3: Elicitation with trusted agents
Finally, we consider a setting that is more stringent than the previous two, as some agents
are trusted to provide truthful information. However, the existence of trusted agents enables
us to address Challenge 2. We consider a reputation based framework, suitable for ﬁltering
out low quality reports. We ﬁrst show that a simple reputation based approach, often used
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in practice, fails to limit the negative inﬂuence of malicious agents, even when they adopt
relatively simple misreporting strategies. Second, we prove that the inﬂuence limiter [RS07]
is not directly applicable to a large scale crowdsourcing due to its computational complexity.
To overcome the drawback of the inﬂuence limiter, we modify its reputation updating rule
and its inﬂuence limitation procedure. The novel algorithm is called the stochastic inﬂuence
limiter, and, just like the original inﬂuence limiter, it is resistant to manipulative behaviour.
We evaluate the algorithm on a community sensing simulation testbed and empirically verify
that it outperforms a state of the art reputation system for sensing.
Summary of the most important contributions
To summarize, the most important contributions of the thesis are:
• Two impossibility results highlighting the need for non-minimal peer consistency mech-
anisms and a more sophisticated design of these mechanisms. The formal results are
presented in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
• A general positive result regarding the non-minimal strictly proper elicitation, knowledge-
free of agents’ common belief system. The result is presented through two novel mech-
anisms — the divergence-based BTS and the continuous BTS — and their incentive
properties, stated in Theorem 4, Corollary 2, Theorem 5 and Theorem 6.
• Two positive results regarding the strongly truthful elicitation in the multi-task setting,
for acquiring large amount of data from a homogeneous population of agents and
for eliciting information from a heterogeneous population of agents whose beliefs
satisfy the self-predicting condition. The results are respectively presented through two
novel mechanisms — logarithmic PTS (log-PTS) and the robust PTS (RPTS) — and their
incentive properties, stated in Theorem 9, Theorem 10, Theorem 11, and Theorem 12.
• A modiﬁed version of the inﬂuence limiter algorithm, called the stochastic inﬂuence
limiter (SIL), suitable for large scale crowdsourcing. The stochastic inﬂuence limiter
is provably resistant to myopic misreporting strategies (Theorem 14 and Theorem 15),
while having low computational complexity (Theorem 13) and incentivizing strategic
agents to provide informative reports (Theorem 16).
• Quantitative validations of the developed mechanisms in community sensing testbeds
and an empirical study on the performance of peer consistency methods in peer grading.
Figure 1.1 provides classiﬁcations of peer consistency methods according to different criteria,
thus, relating the contributions of this thesis to other peer consistency methods.7 Note that
7For the deﬁnition of strict properness and strong truthfulness, and the explanation of informed truthfulness,
we refer the reader to Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Targeted information is elicited through an information report,
while an agent’s posterior belief is elicited through a prediction report.
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not all of the peer consistency methods are included in the ﬁgure. More thorough comparison
can be found in the related work sections of the following chapters. Furthermore, Table 1.1
shows quantitative studies on incentive mechanism design that are (most) related to our work.
Full knowledge 
Knowledge about  
agents’ beliefs 
Partial knowledge 
Knowledge-free 
Related work: [MRZ05]  Related work: [Pre04, WP12b, DG13, 
WP13b, KSM+15, KS16b] 
 
This thesis: Divergence-based BTS,  
Log-PTS, Robust PTS 
Related work: [FPTJ14, SAFP16]  
Single task 
Number of a priori 
similar tasks 
Multiple tasks 
Large number of tasks 
Related work: [Pre04, MRZ05,  
WP12b, FPTJ14] 
 
This thesis: Divergence-based BTS  
Related work: [WP13b, KSM+15,  
KS16b] 
 
This thesis: Log-PTS, Robust PTS 
Related work: [DG13, SAFP16]  
Information report 
The amount of  
elicited information 
from an agent 
Information reports 
 for multiple-tasks 
Information and prediction  
reports Related work: [MRZ05, WP13b,  
FPTJ14, KSM+15] 
 
This thesis: Log-PTS, Robust PTS 
Related work: [Pre04, WP12b] 
 
This thesis: Divergence-based BTS 
Related work: [DG13,  
SAFP16, KS16b]  
Small number of  
peer/reference agents 
Number of peer/ 
reference agents 
Related work: [MRZ05, WP12b,  
FPTJ14, DG13, SAFP16, KS16b] 
 
This thesis: Divergence-based BTS  
Related work: [Pre04] 
 
This thesis: Log-PTS 
Related work: [WP13b, KSM+15] 
 
This thesis: Robust PTS 
Large number of peer/reference  
agents per task 
Small number of peer/reference  
agents per task 
Strict properness 
Incentive property 
Informed truthfulness 
Strong truthfulness 
Related work: [Pre04, MRZ05,  
WP12b, WP13b, FPTJ14] 
 
This thesis: Divergence-based BTS  
Related work: [DG13, KSM+15,  
KS16b] 
 
This thesis: Log-PTS, Robust PTS 
Related work: [SAFP16]  
Figure 1.1 – Classiﬁcations of peer consistency mechanisms according to different criteria
Table 1.1 – Quantitative studies
Type of study Related work This thesis
Experimental
Crowdsourcing ([SCH11, Har11, HF13a,
HF13b, FPTJ14, GMCA14]), Opinion polling
([GF14]), Surveys ([PS06, JLP12, WP13a])
Peer grading
Simulation based
Peer grading ([SP16a, SP16b]), Community
sensing ([FLJ14])
Community sensing
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Organization of the thesis
In Chapter 2, we start by explaining one of the basic building blocks that we use throughout
the thesis: strictly proper scoring rules. Furthermore, Chapter 2 also contains the justiﬁcation
of why we need strict incentives that make truthful reporting strictly optimal strategy. Chapter
3 discusses peer consistency mechanisms designed for an elicitation scenario where a group of
participants provides information about a single object. This is the classical peer consistency
setting, often used for modeling acquisition of subjective information. Chapter 4 describes
peer consistency mechanisms that are developed for a typical crowdsourcing scenario where
a group of workers solves multiple a priori similar tasks. Naturally, these mechanisms achieve
stronger incentive properties than those discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 considers the issue
of aggregating elicited information and discusses reputation based incentives for limiting the
negative inﬂuence of participants who deliberately misreport their information. The focus is
put on mechanisms designed for an online information fusion. We conclude the thesis with
Chapter 6 that provides ﬁnal remarks and directions for future work.
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2 Preliminaries
Incentives for quality are based on functions that assign quality scores to the information
content of the reported data. In this chapter, we provide a short survey of scoring functions
that assign quality scores to probabilistic estimates. These are called proper scoring rules and
they play a crucial role in the development of the results presented in the following chapters.
Furthermore, we outline the importance of having strict incentives that reﬂect the quality
of the reported data, and we show their use in motivating participants to provide accurate
information, even when its acquisition is costly.
2.1 Proper scoring rules
One of the main tools for elicitation of probability distribution function is a class of mecha-
nisms called strictly proper scoring rules. Suppose that a respondent is asked to report her
probabilistic prediction F regarding an event that can be modeled as a random variable X ,
and whose outcome x eventually becomes known to the elicitation mechanism. For example,
in a weather forecast, prediction F is a probability distribution function over possible weather
conditions, while x is the realized weather condition. If the quality of F is determined by a
proper scoring rule S(F,x), the expected score is maximized for the optimal choice of F , i.e.,
the one that corresponds to the true distribution of X , denoted by Pr (X ). We focus on strictly
proper scoring rules for which Pr (X ) is the unique maximizer ofEX (S(F,X )).
There is a wide variety of strictly proper scoring rules, such as the logarithmic, quadratic, and
spherical scoring rules. We describe in more details the logarithmic and quadratic scoring
rules since these two are the most relevant to the elicitation mechanisms that we develop in
this thesis. For an extensive overview of proper scoring rules, we refer the reader to [GR07].
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2.1.1 Logarithmic scoring rule
For a random variable X that takes values in a ﬁnite discrete set and a fully mixed forecast F
(i.e., F (x)> 0 for all values of x), the logarithmic scoring rule is deﬁned as [Goo52]:
SL(F,x)=α · ln(F (x))+β (2.1)
where α and β are scaling parameters. Although the logarithmic scoring rule is not bounded,
from a practical point of view this is almost never a problem. Namely, the lower bound on
possible values of F (x) is usually not hard to estimate, so by using scaling parameters α and β,
one can easily ﬁt scores to an arbitrary interval. For simplicity, we set α= 1 and β= 0 in the
remaining text.
To see why the logarithmic scoring rule is strictly proper, let us examine the expected value of
the score for report F , when the true distribution is Pr (X ):
EX (SL(F,X ))=
∑
x
Pr (X = x) · ln(F (x))=∑
x
Pr (X = x) · ln(Pr (X = x))
−
(∑
x
Pr (X = x) · ln(Pr (X = x))−∑
x
Pr (X = x) · ln(F (x))
)
=EX (SL(Pr,X ))−KL(Pr ||F )
where KL(Pr ||F ) is a Kullback-Leibler divergence between Pr and F . From the properties of
the KL divergence (e.g., see [Bis06]), it follows that KL(Pr ||F ) is non-negative and is equal to 0
if and only if F = Pr . Since the expected score depends on F only through KL(Pr ||F ), we can
conclude that it is strictly maximized for F = Pr .
Notice that the deﬁnition (2.1) extends to continuous domains as well. In particular, when
X takes values in R and F is a probability density function, the logarithmic scoring rule
SL(F,x)= ln(F (x)) is strictly maximized for F = p, where p is the true probability density of X .
In that case, KL divergence between p and F is equal to KL(p||F )=∫R p(x) · ln p(x)F (x)dx.
2.1.2 Quadratic scoring rule
For a random variable X that takes values in a ﬁnite discrete set, the quadratic scoring rule (or
Brier score) is deﬁned as [Bri50]:
SQ (F,x)=α ·
(
F (x)− 1
2
·∑
z
F (z)2
)
+β (2.2)
where α and β are scaling parameters, which we set to α= 1 and β= 0 in the remaining text.
In this case, the quadratic scoring rule takes values in [−12 , 12 ].
As done for the logarithmic scoring rule, we can inspect the expected value of the quadratic
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scoring rule to obtain:
EX (SQ (F,X ))=
∑
x
Pr (X = x) ·
(
F (x)− 1
2
·∑
z
F (z)2
)
=∑
x
Pr (X = x) ·F (x)−∑
x
Pr (X = x) · 1
2
·∑
z
F (z)2
=∑
x
Pr (X = x) ·F (x)− 1
2
·∑
z
F (z)2
=∑
x
Pr (X = x) ·F (x)− 1
2
·∑
z
F (z)2+∑
x
Pr (X = x)2−∑
x
Pr (X = x)2
=∑
x
Pr (X = x)2− 1
2
·∑
x
Pr (X = x)2
− 1
2
·
(∑
x
Pr (X = x)2−2 ·∑
x
Pr (X = x) ·F (x)+∑
x
F (x)2
)
=EX (SQ (Pr,X ))− 1
2
·D(Pr ||F )
where D is the squared euclidian distance between probability vectors Pr and F , and it
represents the Bregman divergence associated to the quadratic scoring rule. Clearly, D(Pr ||F )
is always positive and equal to 0 only if F = Pr . Therefore, the expected score is strictly
maximized when F = Pr . The quadratic score can also be deﬁned for a real-valued random
variable X , in which case prediction F , that is represented with a probability density function,
is scored with:
SQ (F,x)= F (x)− 1
2
·
∫
R
F (z)2dz (2.3)
and the associated divergence function is equal to D(p||F )=∫R(p(x)−F (x))2dx.
Notice that the other strictly proper scoring rules S also have the corresponding Bregman
divergences. We will abuse our notation and denote a divergence of a generic strictly proper
scoring rule by D(||).
2.2 Strict incentive mechanisms
The simplest form of incentives assigns equal rewards to participants without inspecting
the quality of reported data. The drawback of such a simple design is that it does not take
into account respondents’ valuation of different reports. For example, data acquisition typ-
ically requires some effort, which means that the best option for a participant is to provide
uninformative reports, instead of accurate information. Another example would be when a
participant has privacy concerns, so that truthful reporting is worse off for the participant as it
reveals substantial amount of private information.
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2.2.1 Binary participation choice
We can generally model the valuation of a participant in providing a certain information by
using a cost function c(R) that incorporates all aspects of revealing value R to the mechanism.
We adopt the conventional model of elicitation (e.g., [DG13, SAFP16]), in which the cost
function depends on the participant’s binary choice on how to acquire her information or,
alternatively, what type of information she will report. In particular, report R can be informed
or uninformed. An informed report is based on the private information of a participant, and
can be honest (the participant reveals her private information) or dishonest (the participant
misreports her private information). An uninformed report is an outcome of a heuristic
reporting strategy where a participant does not base her reporting decision on her private
information. An example of such a report is a randomly reported value. It is reasonable to
assume that the informed reports result are more costly than the uninformed reports because
one does not need to acquire any data for the latter case.
2.2.2 Design goal
The goal of an elicitation mechanism can now be cast to the problem of designing a payment
rule τ(R) such that the proﬁt of a participant for reporting R, i.e., τ(R)− c(R), is maximized
when the participant provides high-quality information. Notice that c and τ are functions that
map reports to positive numbers that respectively represent costs and payments. Furthermore,
R can also model the action of not participating, for example, by setting R =, τ()= 0 and
c()= 0. This means that our design goal includes the individual rationality condition, which
states that the participants should not engage in interaction with the system unless they expect
to positively proﬁt from it.
From the perspective of a participant, the value of τ(R)− c(R) is not known in advance, since
it does not only depend on report R. In particular, payment rule τ(R) is not only dependent
on R, but also on other variables whose values might not be known to the participant. For
example, if a participant provides a prediction about a future event, payment rule τ could
be a proper scoring rule that depends on the participant’s prediction and the true outcome.
A rational participant would in that case aim to maximize expectation E (τ(R)−c(R)) that
is conditioned on her private information. Therefore, one can relax the design goals of an
elicitation mechanism, and require that τ(R)− c(R) is maximized in expectation for a high-
quality report.
Scaling incentives
Suppose now that there exists a certain mechanism τ0 that rewards a high-quality report of a
participant, denoted by Rhonest , with strictly higher expected payoff than any other report R:
E(τ0(R
honest ))>E(τ0(R)),∀R =Rhonest
12
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Let us consider a scaling parameter α:
α>max
R ′
max
(
0,c(Rhonest )−c(R ′))
E(τ0(Rhonest ))−E(τ0(R ′))
(2.4)
and a meta-mechanism τ1, such that:
τ1(R)=α ·τ0(R)
The expected proﬁt for reporting Rhonest in the meta-mechanism is then equal to:
E
(
τ1(R
honest )−c(Rhonest )
)
=E
(
α ·τ0(Rhonest )−c(Rhonest )
)
=E
(
α ·
(
τ0(R
honest )−τ0(R)
))
+α ·E(τ0(R))−c(Rhonest )
>max
R ′
max
(
0,c(Rhonest )−c(R ′))
E(τ0(Rhonest ))−E(τ0(R ′))
·E
(
τ0(R
honest )−τ0(R)
)
+α ·E(τ0(R))−c(Rhonest )
≥ c(R
honest )−c(R)
E(τ0(Rhonest ))−E(τ0(R))
·
(
E(τ0(R
honest ))−E(τ0(R))
)
+α ·E(τ0(R))−c(Rhonest )
=α ·E(τ0(R))−c(R)=E (τ1(R)−c(R))
for all R = Rhonest . The ﬁrst inequality comes from (2.4) and the fact that E(τ0(Rhonest ))−
E (τ0(R)) is strictly positive, while the second inequality is due to the fact that R might not
maximize the lower bound on α. Therefore, using the described scaling technique, one
can convert any mechanism that satisﬁes the same property as τ0 into a meta-mechanism
that satisﬁes our objective. The technique requires an appropriate choice of α, which can
be estimated empirically [DG13] or elicited from participants using an auctioning protocol
[RF16a].1 This means that we can further relax our design goal: it sufﬁces to ﬁnd a payment
function τ(R) that is in expectation maximized for a good quality report.
Finally, we can also relax the condition that τ(R) should produce positive payments. Namely,
if τ0(R) is a payment rule with minimal payments equal to τmin , then a payment rule τ1(R)=
α ·τ0(R)+β satisﬁes the aforementioned conditions for β = −α ·τmin and an appropriate
choice of α. τmin can be determined by the theoretical lower bound of payment rule τ(R) or
empirically (which is convenient if τ(R) does not have a theoretical lower bound).
We see that, in designing incentives for quality, the focus can be put on ﬁnding a payment
rule τ that maps reports to real numbers and results in maximum expected payoff for high-
quality reports. In the following chapters, τ is deﬁned as a function on a set of reported
values coming from different participants. This induces a game among participants, which
means that a rational participant conditions her reporting strategy on what she believes about
other participants. We start with a minimum requirement on a payment mechanism that a
participant strictly maximizes her payoff by reporting truthfully whenever other participants
are honest.
1[RF16b] show how to make a better separation between payments for high and low quality reports.
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3 Single-task peer consistency mecha-
nisms
In this chapter, we discuss an elicitation scenario with a single information acquisition task
in which crowd participants observe a single phenomenon and report their observations.
The scenario we consider represents a very general peer consistency setting where a reward
mechanism does not inspect the phenomenon, but instead utilizes the correlations among
reported observations to reward participants.
3.1 Formal setting
We investigate a formal setting that can be described by a group of agents that observe a
certain phenomenon and report their observations to an entity called center. An agent a
observes a signal Xa = xa , updates her prior belief Pr (Xp ) regarding the observation of another
agent p to her posterior belief Pr (Xp |Xa = xa), and reports her observation xa to the center
through an information report Ya = ya . Moreover, the center might also ask agent a to
submit a prediction (forecast) Fa about the frequencies of signal values in the population,
.i.e., her belief Pr (Xp |Xa = xa). In order to obtain truthful observations, the center provides
agents with rewards that are calculated by comparing the reported observations (the center
does not sample the phenomenon so it cannot directly verify the observations). In this
chapter, we investigate mechanisms that incentivize an agent to report honestly whenever
the other agents submit truthful reports. The formal setting is depicted by Figure 3.1, and
we call the illustrated process sensing to emphasize that the agents observe (measure) the
phenomenon. This abstracts an elicitation process in crowd work, in particular, how crowd
participants acquire their private information and form beliefs about each other’s information.
Thus, a phenomenon can represent a crowdsourcing task, a real physical phenomenon, or a
model of how subjective information is formed, while observations are answers to the task,
measurements, or opinions, respectively.
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Phenomenon Center
Agent a
Agent p
Agent r
xa
xp
xr
Pr(xp,r|Xa=xa)
1. Observe phenomenon
2. Update belief
3. Report observation
4. Reward agent
Figure 3.1 – Single-task peer consistency setting
3.1.1 Elicitation model
We consider a group of agentsA that make observations of a certain phenomenon, and report
their observations to an entity called center. A generic agent inA is denoted by a. With each
agent a, we associate k peer agents fromA \{a} whose reports are used in assessing the quality
of agent a’s report. A generic peer of agent a is denoted by p. In the case when several agents
a or peers p are put in the same context, we put subscripts, e.g., ai and pi , j . The number of
agents N in groupA is bounded from below by 2, meaning that N = |A | ≥ 2, while each agent
a has k ∈ {1, ..., |A |−1} peers.
The agents observe a phenomenon, and their observations are modeled as random variables
X that take values in an observation setX . The observation of each agent a, Xa , is private so
neither the center nor the other agents know of its realization. The observation of a peer p
is denoted by Xp , while the observation proﬁle of k peers is denoted by Xp = (Xp,1, ...,Xp,k).
Generic values inX are represented by x, y , and z, and the set of all probability distribution
functions over X by P . Unless indicated differently, X is a ﬁnite discrete set, and, for
simplicity, we describe the setting by assuming that this indeed holds.
An agent a has a probabilistic belief about how agents acquire their observations. The agent’s
belief system Ba is not known to the center and consists of:
• prior belief regarding her own observation Pr (Xa) ∈P ;
• prior belief regarding peers’ observations Pr (Xp ) ∈P k , and similarly for any subset of
peers, e.g., for a single peer, we denote Pr (Xp ) ∈P ;
• posterior belief regarding peers’ observations Pr (Xp |Xa) ∈ P k , and similarly for any
subset of peers, e.g., for a single peer, we denote Pr (Xp |Xa) ∈P .
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We assume that two basic conditions are satisﬁed in Ba :
• all the probability distribution functions in Ba are fully mixed, meaning that they assign
strictly positive probabilities to each outcome;
• posteriorPr (Xp |Xa) is stochastically relevant, meaning thatD(Pr (Xp |Xa = x)||Pr (Xp |Xa =
y)) > 0 for ∀x = y , where D(||) is the Bregman divergence of a strictly proper scoring
rule.
The second condition indicates that the posterior distribution regarding Xp conditioned on
Xa is different for different realizations of Xa [MRZ05]. The belief proﬁle of group of agents
A is denoted by BA = (Ba1 , ...,BaN ), and when it is needed to distinguish between the beliefs
of different agents ai , we put subscript Prai (if there is no subscript, Pr denotes agent a’s
beliefs).
Once she observes the phenomenon, agent a is asked to submit a report Ra that contains:
• information report Ya ∈X , which represents agent a’s reported observation;
• additionally, she might be asked to submit a prediction report Fa ∈P , which represents
agent a’s prediction regarding the frequencies of signal values in the overall population.
When agents are honest, this report corresponds to agent a’s posterior belief Pr (Xp |Xa).
Therefore, the structure of report Ra , denoted byR, can be of the formR =X orR =X ×P ,
indicating that agent a’s report is Ra = Ya or Ra = (Ya ,Fa), respectively. For an agent a’s
peer, the notation is Yp , Fp and Rp , and the report proﬁles of agent a’s peers are denoted by
Yp = (Yp,1, ...,Yp,k ), Fp = (Fp,1, ...,Fp,k ) and Rp = (Rp,1, ...,Rp,k ).
The center rewards the agents based on the quality of the information they provide, and the
quality is estimated by comparing their reports. That is, a payment mechanism τ does not
only depend on the report of the agent that is being rewarded, but also on the reports of
other agents, her peers. In this chapter, we investigate single-task payment mechanisms τS ,
which are formally deﬁned as τS :×ki=0R→R. Depending on the information structure that
the agents report, the payoff of an agent a is either a function of information reports alone,
i.e., τS(Ya ,Yp1 , ...,Ypk ) for R =X , or a function of information and prediction reports, i.e.,
τS(Ya ,Fa ,Yp1 ,Fp1 , ...,Ypk ,Fpk ) forR =X ×P .
Finally, each agent is assumed to be rational and risk-neutral, and her utility is reﬂected
through the reward given by the mechanism. Thus, an agent’s objective is to maximize the
payments provided by the center through mechanism τS . This further implies that an agent is
inclined to strategize on what to report to the center, which means that payment mechanism
τS should incentivize truthful revelation of private information, as further discussed in Section
3.1.6.
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3.1.2 Beliefs about peers
The mechanisms we are investigating are based on comparing reports that different agents
make about the same phenomenon. Clearly, there are cases in which such comparisons
do not make sense. For example, if agents all interpret the phenomenon differently, or use
different scales for measurement, their reports cannot be compared directly. Furthermore,
what matters is not the true situation, but what agents believe about their peers: to provide the
right incentives, it is sufﬁcient that they believe their peers to be comparable to themselves,
even if in reality that might not be the case.
Therefore, we introduce a notion of belief constraint set C , whose elements are conditions C
that specify:
• how belief systems of different agents relate,
• how observations are acquired,
• how priors are updated to posteriors.
The set of admissible belief proﬁles under constraint setC is denoted byB(C ), and it contains
belief proﬁles Ba that satisfy conditions in C . In the following subsections, we deﬁne belief
conditions C important for developing the formal results of this chapter.
3.1.3 Relational constraints
Relational constraints describe how agents’ belief systems relate to each other, that is, how
much agents’ belief systems differ from each other. We identify two conditions: common belief
condition and divergence-based condition.
Common belief condition
The simplest constraint and arguably the most stringent condition is the one that states that
agents share a common belief system. We will, therefore, use this condition as a baseline
in exploring impossibility results. In particular, we would like to at least be able to design a
mechanism that elicits truthful observations for the case when all of the agents share the same
belief system.
Deﬁnition 1. A belief proﬁle BA satisﬁes the common belief condition CCB if ∀a1,a2 ∈A :
Ba1 =Ba2 .
Divergence-based condition
A particular property of the common belief condition CCB is that agents who have the same
observations should also have the same posterior belief about their peer agents. A possible
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relaxation of this condition would be to say that two agents should have more similar posterior
beliefs when they have equal observations than when their observations are different. More
formally:
Deﬁnition 2. A belief proﬁle BA satisﬁes the divergence-based condition CDB if there exists
Θ≥ 0 such that ∀a1,a2 ∈A ∧∀x = y:
D(Pra1 (Xp1 |Xa1 = x)||Pra2 (Xp2 |Xa2 = x))≤Θ<D(Pra1 (Xp1 |Xa1 = x)||Pra2 (Xp2 |Xa2 = y))
where D(||) is the Bregman divergence of a strictly proper scoring rule.
3.1.4 Acquisitional constraints
Acquisitional constraints model belief assumptions on how agents reason about the acquisi-
tion of their private information, in particular, their observations.
State model condition
We deﬁne an acsquisitional constraint based on a state model that is similar to the ones
introduced in [Pre04, MRZ05, WP12b].
Deﬁnition 3. Consider a random variable Ω taking values inR. A belief proﬁle BA satisﬁes
the state model condition CSM if each belief system Ba is constrained with the following set of
assumptions:
• observations Xa1 and Xa2 of any two different agents a1 and a2 in A are conditionally
independent givenΩ;
• agent a’s prior belief regardingΩ is a probability density function pa(Ω) that takes strictly
positive values;
• for all agents ai inA , probabilities Pra(Xai |Ω) are strictly positive.
Notice that Pra(Xai |Ω) and Pra′(Xai |Ω) (and similarly pa(Ω) and pa′(Ω)) are allowed to be
different for two different agents a and a′. However, we often drop the subscript a from
Pra(Xai |Ω) (and pa(Ω)) to simplify the notation.
Gaussian state model condition
We also consider a reﬁnement of the state model condition CSM that speciﬁes the probability
distribution functions of agents’ belief systems. We are particularly interested in Gaussian
state model condition CGSM that is deﬁned for observations that take values in R and for
which the parameters of agents’ belief systems, i.e., probability density functions, are Gaussian
distributions.
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Deﬁnition 4. Consider observation space X =R. A belief proﬁle BA satisﬁes the Gaussian
state model condition CGSM if it satisﬁes the state model condition CSM in which:
• the observation values Xa are generated by a Gaussian distribution pa(Xa)∼N (μΩ,σ),
where σ is ﬁxed (given);
• μΩ deﬁnes state Ω and is distributed according to a Gaussian distribution pa(μΩ) ∼
N (μ0,σ0).
As it is the case for the state model condition CSM , we often drop the subscript a from pa(Xa)
and pa(μΩ) when it is clear that we are referring to agent a.
3.1.5 Updating constraints
The updating constraints describe conditions about the strength of agents’ beliefs. The more
conﬁdent an agent is in her observation, the more likely it is (by her beliefs) that her peer
observes the same value.
Self-dominant condition
The strongest condition we consider is the self-dominant condition, where an agent a believes
that the value x she observes is also the most likely value observed by her peer p.
Deﬁnition 5. A belief proﬁle BA satisﬁes the self-dominant condition CSD if for the posterior
belief of each Ba:
Pr (Xp = y |Xa = x)< Pr (Xp = x|Xa = x),∀y = x (3.1)
A general class of cases where the self-dominant condition holds is when agents believe that
they observe the exact same signal only perturbed by an unbiased noise.
Self-predicting condition
As many settings do not satisfy this condition, we introduce a weaker condition, called the
self-predicting condition. Here, an agent a believes that she is most likely to observe a certain
value x when another agent p observes the same value.
Deﬁnition 6. A belief proﬁle BA satisﬁes the self-predicting condition CSP if for the posterior
belief of each Ba:
Pr (Xa = x|Xp = y)< Pr (Xa = x|Xp = x),∀y = x (3.2)
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By applying Bayes’ rule, we obtain an alternative form of the self predicting condition:
Pr (Xp = y |Xa = x)
Pr (Xp = y)
< Pr (Xp = x|Xa = x)
Pr (Xp = x)
,∀y = x (3.3)
This form is important for the next chapter, where we redeﬁne the self-predicting condition
for a multi-task setting.
A general class of cases where the self-predicting condition holds is when agents believe
that they observe different samples drawn from the same random distribution, but with the
condition that these samples are categorical [SAFP16], so that observing value x reduces
an agent’s belief that her peer observes another value y = x [JF11]. Notice, however, that
unlike the described categorical case, the self-predicting condition allows (limited) correlation
between different observation values x and y .
Self-correlated condition
Arguably, the weakest condition that we consider is a self-correlated condition, which states
that an agent a should believe that observing a certain value x only increases the chances that
her peer observes the same value. More formally:
Deﬁnition 7. A belief proﬁle BA satisﬁes the self-correlated condition CSC if for the posterior
belief of each Ba:
Pr (Xp = x|Xa = x)> Pr (Xp = x),∀x ∈X (3.4)
The self-correlated condition holds whenever agents observe the same phenomenon in a
similar way. In particular, it holds in the state models of standard peer consistency methods
[Pre04, MRZ05, WP12b].
Relative self-dominant condition
Finally, we consider a condition that is a combination of relational and updating constraints.
It states that the difference between Pra(Xp = x|Xa = x) and Pra(Xp = y |Xa = x) of an agent a,
be it greater or smaller than 0, is always strictly greater than the expected difference between
Praj (Xpj = x|Xaj ) and Praj (Xpj = y |Xaj ) of another agent aj . Notice that this condition is
similar to the self-dominant condition, but it only requires that self-dominance is satisﬁed
relative to the beliefs of other agents. Therefore, we call it relative self-dominance.
Deﬁnition 8. A belief proﬁle BA satisﬁes the relative self-dominant condition CRSD if for the
posterior beliefs any two agents, a1 and a2, we have that:
Pra1 (Xp1 = x|Xa1 = x)−Pra1 (Xp1 = y |Xa1 = x)
>EXa2
(
Pra2 (Xp2 = x|Xa2 )−Pra2 (Xp2 = y |Xa2 )|Xa1 = x
)
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for all x = y.
3.1.6 Reporting strategies
As a rational agent, agent a aims to maximize the reward obtained from the center, and
in the case of uncertainties, she is assumed to maximize her expected reward. To decide
which information to provide to the center, agent a should estimate the rewards expected for
different reports. Notice that she has no knowledge about what her peers have reported, so her
best reporting strategy depends crucially on the agent’s beliefs about the reports of her peers.
In this chapter, we assume that agent a believes her peers are honest. Given that, agent a faces
a choice between two basic strategies:
• honest: observe the phenomenon to obtain evaluation Xa = x, and report honestly
Ya = x (and Fa = Pr (Xp |Xa = x)). We denote honest report by Rhonesta .
• dishonest: observe the phenomenon to obtain evaluation Xa = x, but report Rdi shonesta =
Rhonesta .
To incentivize truthful revelation, payment mechanism τS should satisfy the property called
strict properness (e.g., see [SAFP16]), which we deﬁne for the setting of this chapter as follows.
Deﬁnition 9. We say that a singe-task payment mechanism τS is proper under the set of belief
constraints C if for all BA ∈B(C ), a ∈A , and Ra ∈R\{Rhonesta }, we have that:
EXp
(
τS(R
honest
a ,R
honest
p )|Xa
)
≥EXp
(
τS(Ra ,R
honest
p )|Xa
)
(3.5)
If the inequality is strict, then τS is strictly proper.
The deﬁnition of strict properness states that truthful reporting is a strict equilibrium of
mechanism τS . In particular, when the set of belief constraints consists of the common belief
condition and the state model condition (i.e., C = {CCB ,CSM }), mechanism τS has a form of
a Bayesian game (e.g., see [SLB08]), and the strict properness property implies that truthful
reporting is a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium, irrespective of the parameters of agents’
common belief system.1 In general, agents might not have a common belief system, in which
case the strict properness property implies that truthful reporting is a strict ex-post subjective
equilibrium (see [WP12a]), with the admissible set of belief proﬁles deﬁned byB(C ).2 Notice
that the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a special case of the ex-post subjective
equilibrium concept, obtained for the set of belief constraints equal to C = {CCB ,CSM }.
1As argued by [Wit14, SAFP16], one can adopt a correlated equilibrium concept instead.
2The (original) deﬁnition of the ex-post subjective equilibrium concept is based on admissible belief types that
categorize agents’ belief systems [WP12a], but using a reasoning similar to [FW16], one can deﬁne it viaB(C ).
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One might wonder why the strategy space of an agent does not include a possibility of the
agent not inspecting the considered phenomenon. The following proposition shows, however,
that we can, without loss of generality, constrain the strategy space of the agents to honest and
dishonest strategies. Namely, strategies in which an agent does not observe the phenomenon
do not represent the best response to the honest behaviour of the other agents whenever the
considered mechanism is strictly proper. On the other hand, to establish strict properness,
one only needs honest and dishonest reporting strategies.
Proposition 1. Consider an agent a that has not yet made an observation and suppose her
peers are honest ( Rp =Rhonestp ). For any strictly proper payment mechanism τS, agent a’s payoff
is expected to strictly increase if she decides to adopt honest reporting strategy (Ra = Rhonesta )
instead of a reporting strategy in which she does not make an observation.
Proof. Since mechanism τS is strictly proper, we know that the expected payoff of agent a
when she observes the phenomenon is maximized for report Rhonesta . Consider now the
situation before the agent observes the phenomenon. The expected payoff for reporting Ra is
equal to:
EXp
(
τS(Ra ,R
honest
p )
)
= ∑
x∈X
Pr (Xa = x) ·EXp
(
τS(Ra ,R
honest
p )|Xa = x
)
< ∑
x∈X
Pr (Xa = x) ·EXp
(
τS(R
honest
a ,R
honest
p )|Xa = x
)
where the inequality comes from the fact that: τS is strictly proper, the best response (Rhonesta )
is dependent on Xa , and Pr (Xa) is fully mixed. Since the right most part in the expression is
the expected payoff for honest reporting (calculated prior to the observation), we obtain that
agent a is expected to strictly increase her payoff when observing the phenomenon.
Remark 1. In this chapter, we do not analyze collusion properties of the developed mech-
anisms. As it turns out, even achieving strict properness is not trivial for the single-task
elicitation setting. We note that there are many practical scenarios where truthfulness, if
an equilibrium strategy proﬁle, is a focal point, since other reporting strategy proﬁles might
require more unnatural coordination among agents. These include opinion polling or human
computation tasks in which workers do not frequently interact with each other. For example,
the study of [FPTJ14] did not appear to have a problem with collusion. On the other hand, a
susceptibility to collusion might be problematic if agents repeatedly and frequently interact
with a peer consistency mechanism, as experimentally shown in [GMCA14] and further argued
in [SP16a]. We refer the reader to [KS16a] on how to extend some of the results of this chapter
to be more robust to collusive behaviour.
3.2 Related work
Gold standard mechanisms are the simplest design of incentives for quality. They assume that
the center has access to gold standards, such as test tasks in crowdsourcing, and use these
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to score agents based on how accurate their reports are [OSL+11, Har11]. The more complex
designs of gold standard mechanisms allow agents to also express conﬁdence in their answers
[SZP15, SZ15] or are suitable for the elicitation of accurate aggregates [FCK15, UDG15]. In
this type of mechanisms, we can also include proper scoring rules [Sav71, GR07], prediction
markets [Han07, CP07], and scoring rules for elicitation of averages, medians and modes of an
unknown quantities [LS09].
As our setting precludes the center from having the access to the gold standard, we focus on
peer consistency techniques, which are based on the comparison of reports. One of the most
basic peer consistency mechanisms is the output agreement [vAD04, vAD08] that rewards
agents if their reports agree. In a more general sense, agents can be rewarded by how close
their reports are, measured by a predeﬁned distance function, and in this case, the output
agreement is shown to elicit common knowledge rather than agents’ private information
[WC13, WC14]. We show in this chapter a condition under which the mechanism is strictly
proper.
In order to deal with a potential bias towards prior information, the peer prediction method
[MRZ05] scores agents’ posterior beliefs for a reported value. The main idea behind the
mechanism is to extract an agent’s posterior belief from her reported value and score it using
a proper scoring rule and a report obtained from her peer agent. Due to the reliance on
strictly proper scoring rules, the mechanism is strictly proper. However, it assumes that agents
have a common belief system, known to the mechanism. Several modiﬁcations of the peer
prediction method were investigated in the literature. Instead of applying proper scoring rules,
[JF06a, JF06b] construct budget minimizing payment schemes using automated mechanism
design. They prove that if an agent is scored on the comparison of several reports rather than
just one, the minimum budget required to achieve incentive compatibility decreases. The
results also indicate that small deviations of agents’ beliefs from the common belief system
may lead to large increases in payments. [JF09] and [KSL16] investigate how to make collusive
strategies less proﬁtable in the peer prediction framework.
The collective revelation [GRP09] elicits individual predictions and aggregate estimates. It
has a setting similar to the peer prediction mechanisms, with the common belief system
known to the mechanism, and agents that may make multiple observations, generated from a
distribution of a particular form (e.g., Bernoulli distribution).
In the group of knowledge-dependent mechanisms, we can also include mechanisms that
require knowledge regarding agents’ prior belief, but instead of assuming common belief
system, they put conditions on how agents update their beliefs. These include the shadowing
method [Wit14]3 and the peer truth serum [JF11, FPTJ14]. A full overview of these mechanisms
can be found in [FW16], where it is shown how these mechanisms relate to the partitioning of
the probability simplexP .
3We refer to the shadowing method as the one in which the shadowing approach transforms a known prior to a
posterior using an agent’s report.
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Weakly truthful mechanisms do not necessarily provide strict incentives [LS08] or may not
necessarily be proper [JF08, JF11]. The latter mechanism is the peer truth serum that rewards
agents using an estimate of the agents’ prior, as opposed to the exact one. The estimate is
obtained with a public statistic. If the statistic is close to the prior, the mechanism is strictly
proper, otherwise, it is helpful in a sense that it drives the statistics toward the agents’ prior.
Except for the output agreement, none of the mentioned mechanisms ﬁts in the setting of this
chapter, either because they require knowledge about agents’ beliefs or because they are not
strictly proper. The mechanisms that have a formal setting closest to ours are called Bayesian
truth serums.
The (original) Bayesian truth serum (BTS) [Pre04] assumes a setting similar to the one used in
the peer prediction method, but does not require a common belief system to be known to the
mechanism. Instead, agents are obliged to provide two reports: the information report (their
observation) and the prediction report (the prediction of what other agents have observed).
BTS is strictly proper for large populations of agents. The robust Bayesian truth serum (RBTS)
of [WP12b] corrects the main drawback of BTS: its inadequacy to operate on small populations.
RBTS is strictly proper for small populations, but requires additional belief constraints when
observations are non-binary [Wit14]. The minimum truth serums of [Ril14] aim to minimize
the number of reported values in BTS type of mechanisms by exploiting the common structure
of agents’ beliefs. The mechanism requires that the number of agents is at least as large
as the observation space. [KS16a] builds on our work, presented in the following sections,
to improve the properties of the BTS design in terms of collusion resistance. Finally, four
interesting empirical results relate to the BTS mechanisms: [PS06] describe how to use the
BTS mechanism in order to obtain the ground truth even when the majority is wrong, while
[SCH11, WP13a, JLP12] demonstrate that the BTS mechanism rewards truthful responses and
has a positive effect in quality control. We study the application of a BTS type of mechanism
to a small scale community sensing setting, and provide a complementary approach to the
existing knowledge-dependent elicitation mechanisms proposed for community sensing
[FLJ14]. Furthermore, we provide an application based BTS result that relates to the design of
contests that optimize user involvement [GR14].
For completeness, we also mention the mechanisms which operate in a setting that separates
time before the observations are made from the time after the observations are made. In this
case, it is possible to exploit the temporal structure to elicit binary observations even when
the beliefs are private and subjective [WP12a]. The key idea is that the agents ﬁrst report their
private prior belief about what the other agents will observe, then observe a binary signal,
and after the observation report their signal values. In this group, we can also include the
knowledge-free mechanism of [ZC14], which establishes temporal separation by creating two
step reporting protocol. The mechanism relies on a common belief system and asks agents to
ﬁrst submit their information report, after which they report their prediction report knowing
the information report of another agent (this information is revealed to them).
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3.3 Single-report mechanisms
We begin our analysis with the mechanisms that elicit only the observed values, meaning
that reports take values in R =X . In other words, an agent a is asked to provide only her
information report Ya .
Since the center has no knowledge of the agents’ beliefs, we can expect that there does not
exist a strictly proper mechanism under arbitrary belief constraints. However, we show in this
section that this is true even if the agents’ beliefs are constrained to be common or satisfy the
self-predicting condition, i.e., C ⊆ {CSB ,CSP }.
Before formalizing the statement, let us take a closer look at single peer payment mechanisms.
Deﬁnition 10. A payment mechanism τS is 1-peer if it can be written as a function τS :R×R→
R of an agent a’s report and the report of one of her peers, i.e., τS(Ra ,Rp ).
As it is stated in the setting section, we consider scoring functions that depend on the reports
of k peers, which in the case of a single report have form τS(Ya ,Yp,1, ...,Yp,k). On the other
hand, 1-peer payment mechanisms represent a restricted version of general scoring function
as they only consider an agent having one peer. In the case of a single report, 1-peer payment
mechanisms have form τ(Ya ,Yp ). Nevertheless, their structure simpliﬁes the theoretical
analysis while keeping the obtained results general enough.
The following lemma shows that for proving impossibility results, it sufﬁces to examine 1-peer
payment mechanisms: if strict properness is required for a relatively general, yet constrained
enough belief proﬁle Ba that satisﬁes the common belief condition CCB or the self prediction
condition CSP , it is enough to consider 1-peer payment mechanisms. 4
Lemma 1. Suppose that agents provide only their information report, i.e.,R =X . If there exists
a strictly proper payment mechanism under the set of belief constraints C ⊆ {CCB ,CSP }, then
there exists a 1-peer payment mechanism that is strictly proper under the same belief constraint.
Proof. Let τS be a strictly proper payment mechanism. If k = 1 (agent a has only one peer),
the statement follows immediately. Let us now consider k > 1.
Provided that all her peer agents are honest, the expected score of an agent a who observes x
for reporting y is equal to:
∑
x1,...,xk
Pr (Xp1 = x1, ...,Xpk = xk |Xa = x) ·τS(y,x1, ...,xk )
=∑
x1
(Pr (Xp1 = x1|Xa = x)·
· ∑
x2,...,xk
Pr (Xp2 = x2, ...,Xpk = xk |Xa = x,Xp1 = x1) ·τS(y,x1, ...,xk ))
4However, Lemma 1 does not imply that it is enough to consider 1-peer payment mechanisms in order to
achieve strict properness when additional restrictions are put on agents’ belief systems.
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=∑
x1
Pr (Xp1 = x1|Xa = x) · τ˜(y,x1)
where we put τ˜(y,x1) = ∑x2,...,xk Pr (Xp2 = x2, ...,Xpk = xk |Xa = x,Xp1 = x1) · τS(y,x1, ...,xk)).
Notice that τ˜(y,x1) depends on Pr (Xp2 = x2, ...,Xpk = xk |Xa = x,Xp1 = x1). However, the
original mechanism is strictly proper under any belief proﬁle Ba that satisﬁes C ⊆ {CCB ,CSP },
so it must be strictly proper when the updating process keeps Pr (Xp2 = x2, ...,Xpk = xk |Xa =
x,Xp1 = x1) ﬁxed, but alters Pr (Xp1 = x1|Xa = x). This implies the existence of a 1-peer
payment mechanism that is strictly proper under C ⊆ {CCB ,CSP } because τ˜ is strictly proper
for arbitrary beliefs Pr (Xp1 = x1|Xa = x) that satisfy C ⊆ {CCB ,CSP }.
Using the lemma, we now show the main result of this section: even under a relatively con-
strained beliefs, in particular, agents having a common belief system, no single-report peer
consistency technique is strictly proper. Notice that the setting of this chapter assumes that
the center has no knowledge about the agents’ belief systems. Clearly, the knowledge regarding
the structure of the agents’ belief systems plays a crucial role in the elicitation process. Thus,
the knowledge-free elicitation comes at a certain price, either through the structure of elicited
information or the restrictions imposed on agents’ belief systems.
Theorem 1. Suppose that agents report only their information report, i.e. R =X . There exists
no strictly proper payment mechanism under the set of belief constraints C ⊆ {CCB ,CSP }.
Proof. Let us assume that there exists a strictly proper payment mechanism τS for C ⊆
{CCB ,CSP }. Due to Lemma 1, we restrict our attention to 1-peer payment schemes. Let
agents’ have a common belief system, with arbitrary beliefs denoted by px = Pr (Xp |Xa = x),
py = Pr (Xp |Xa = y), pz = Pr (Xp |Xa = z), etc., and let these beliefs satisfy the self-predicting
condition. In particular, we set py (y) > px(y) > px(x) > py (x) and pz(z) > pz ′(z) for all
z,z ′ ∈X ,z = z ′. Due to the strict properness, we know that the expected payoff for reporting
x when x is observed should be strictly greater than the expected payoff for reporting some
other value. Similarly we obtain for another value y . The posterior belief when x is observed is
equal to px , while for observation y is equal to py . Therefore, the strict properness implies:∑
z∈X
px(z) ·τS(x,z)>
∑
z∈X
px(z) ·τS(y,z)
∑
z∈X
py (z) ·τS(y,z)>
∑
z∈X
py (z) ·τS(x,z)
which can be rearranged to:
px(x) · [τS(x,x)−τS(y,x)]+px(y) · [τS(x, y)−τS(y, y)]+
+ ∑
z∈X \{x,y}
px(z) · [τS(x,z)−τS(y,z)]> 0
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py (x) · [τS(y,x)−τS(x,x)]+py (y) · [τS(y, y)−τS(x, y)]+
+ ∑
z∈X \{x,y}
py (z) · [τS(y,z)−τS(x,z)]> 0
To simplify the notation, let Δz = τS(x,z)−τS(y,z). The above expressions are then equal to:
px(x) ·Δx +px(y) ·Δy +
∑
z∈X \{x,y}
px(z) ·Δz > 0
−py (x) ·Δx −py (y) ·Δy −
∑
z∈X \{x,y}
py (z) ·Δz > 0
Let us now consider a new set of beliefs p
′
x , p
′
y , pz , etc., where: p
′
x(x)= py (y), p
′
x(y)= py (x),
p
′
y (x)= px(y), p
′
y (y)= px(x), p
′
x(z)= py (z) and p
′
y (z)= px(z) for z = x, y . Notice that the new
set of beliefs satisfy the self-predicting condition. Since the incentive compatibility also has to
hold for the new posterior beliefs, we have:
py (y) ·Δx +py (x) ·Δy +
∑
z∈X \{x,y}
py (z) ·Δz > 0
−px(y) ·Δx −px(x) ·Δy −
∑
z∈X \{x,y}
px(z) ·Δz > 0
The last 4 inequalities give us:
(px(x)−px(y)) · (Δx −Δy )> 0 (3.6)
(py (y)−py (x)) · (Δx −Δy )> 0 (3.7)
Because we set py (y)> px(y)> px(x)> py (x), it cannot be that both (3.6) and (3.7) are satisﬁed.
That is, we have a contradiction.
The signiﬁcance of Theorem 1 is that it motivates the use of mechanisms with an additional
report. Namely, as we show in the next sections, under the same set of belief constraints, there
exists a mechanism that requires an additional report but is strictly proper.
3.3.1 Output agreement
An alternative approach would be to examine stricter conditions regarding agents’ belief
systems. It sufﬁces to use the self-dominant condition CSD in order to allow strict properness
among minimal knowledge-free mechanisms. This leads us to a very well known mechanism
called the output agreement (OA) [vAD04].
Output Agreement. Consider an agent a and her peer p. The output agreement mechanism
rewards an agent a with 1 if her report matches the report of her peer. Otherwise, the reward
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of agent a is equal to 0. That is, for reporting y , the agent obtains reward:
τS(y,Yp )=1Yp=y (3.8)
where 1 is an indicator variable.
Proposition 2. The output agreement mechanism is strictly proper under the self-dominant
condition, i.e., C = {CSD }.
Proof. Consider an agent a that observes Xa = x and suppose her peer agent p is honest. If
agent a aims to maximize her expected payoff in the OA mechanism, she will choose to report:
argmax
z
E(τS(z,Xp ))= argmax
z
Pr (Xp = z|Xa = x)= {x}
where the last equality is due to the self-dominant condition CSD . Hence, we proved the
statement.
3.4 Multi-report mechanisms
We now turn to mechanisms that ask an agent to additionally provide her prediction report F ,
which represents her posterior belief about the reports of her peers. This means that the set of
possible reports is equal toR =X ×P .
3.4.1 Decomposable payment mechanisms
In general, a payment mechanism depends on all of the reported values, i.e., τS(Xa ,Fa , ...). In
this subsection, we consider a speciﬁc class of payment mechanisms τS that have a decompos-
able structure, meaning that they separately score an agent a’s information report from her
prediction report.
Deﬁnition 11. Suppose that agents provide both their information reports and prediction
reports, i.e.,R =X ×P . We say that payment mechanism τS is decomposable if an agent a’s
total payment is calculated as the sum of her information score and her prediction score, where
the information score does not depend on the agent’s prediction report and the prediction score
does not depend on the agent’s information report. More precisely:
τS(Ra ,Rp )= τY (Ya ,Rp )︸ ︷︷ ︸
information score
+ τF (Fa ,Rp )︸ ︷︷ ︸
prediction score
(3.9)
Having a decomposable structure, where an agent’s information score is independent of her
prediction report and her prediction score is independent of her information report, simpliﬁes
the analysis of the incentives as they do not inﬂuence each other. Notice that the robust
Bayesian truth serum of [WP12b] is an example of a decomposable payment mechanism. For
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the limit case when the number of agents approaches inﬁnity, the original Bayesian truth
serum [Pre04] converges to a decomposable payment mechanism since a single agent does not
have large impact on the frequencies of information reports nor on the average of prediction
reports.
The structure of decomposable mechanisms allows us to analyze information and prediction
scores separately. The prediction score elicits an agent’s belief about what other agents have
reported. Since the outcome is known to the mechanism (the mechanism knows what the
other agents have reported), truthful elicitation of the prediction report can be achieved using
proper scoring rules. Therefore, when proving impossibility results of decomposable payment
mechanisms, one can focus on information scores.
Lemma 2. There exists a decomposable payment mechanism that is strictly proper if and only
if there exists an information score τY such that the expected valueEXp (τY (Ya ,R
honest
p )|Xa) is
strictly maximized for Ya = Xa.
Proof. Consider the following score:
τF (Fa ,R
honest
p )= S(Fa ,Yp )
where S is a strictly proper scoring rule and Yp is the information report of a randomly chosen
peer p. Provided that the peer agents are honest (Yp = Xp ), the (strictly) best strategy for
agent a is to report her true posterior belief regarding what her peers have observed, i.e.,
Fa = Pr (Xp |Xa).
Since there exists a payment rule that elicits honest prediction reports regardless of the belief
constraints C , the existence of a decomposable strictly proper payment mechanism depends
only on the existence of an information score that complies with the conditions of the lemma.
Therefore, we proved the statement.
We keep the notion of 1-peer payment mechanisms from the previous section, i.e., 1-peer
payment mechanisms represent a restricted version of a general scoring functions and have
a form τS(Ra ,Rp ). Notice that Deﬁnition 10 includes the payment functions with prediction
reports. The following lemma shows the generality of 1-peer payment mechanisms in proving
impossibility results.
Lemma 3. If it is possible to construct a decomposable payment mechanism that is strictly
proper under the set of belief constraintsC ⊆ {CCB ,CSC }, then it is possible to construct a strictly
proper 1-peer decomposable payment mechanism.
Proof. Due to Lemma 2, we restrict our analysis to the information score. Let τS be a payment
mechanism that satisﬁes the condition of the statement in Lemma 2, i.e., an agent a’s best
response to truthfulness of her peer agents is to report her honest information score. If k = 1
(agent a has only one peer), the statement follows immediately. Let us now consider k > 1.
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The expected information score of an agent a who observes Xa = x for reporting y , provided
that her peers are honest, is equal to:
∑
x1,...,xk
Pr (Xp1 = x1, ...,Xpk = xk |Xa = x) ·τY (y,Xp1 ,Prp1 , ...,Xpk ,Prpk )
=∑
x1
(Pr (Xp1 = x1|Xa = x)·
· ∑
x2,...,xk
Pr (Xp2 = x2, ...,Xpk = xk |Xa = x,Xp1 = x1) ·τY (y,Xp1 ,Prp1 , ...,Xpk ,Prpk ))
=∑
x1
Pr (Xp1 = x1|Xa = x) · τ˜(y,Xp1 ,Prp1 )
where we put τ˜(y,Xp1 ,Prp1 )=
∑
x2,...,xk Pr (Xp1 = x1, ...,Xpk = xk |Xa = x,Xp1 = x1) ·
·τY (y,Xp1 ,Prp1 , ...,Xpk ,Prpk ). Notice that τ˜(y,Xp1 ,Prp1 ) depends on Pr (Xp2 = x2, ...,Xpk =
xk |Xa = x,Xp1 = x1). However, the original mechanism is strictly proper under any belief
proﬁle that satisﬁes C , so it must be strictly proper when the belief updating process of agent
a keeps Pr (Xp1 = x1, ...,Xpk = xk |Xa = x,Xp1 = x1) ﬁxed, but alters Pr (Xp1 = x1|Xa = x). This
implies the existence of a 1-peer payment mechanism that is strictly proper under constraints
C because τ˜ is strictly proper for arbitrary beliefs Pr (Xp1 = x1|Xa = x).
As in the previous section, we ﬁrst provide the impossibility result: one cannot design a
strictly proper decomposable payment mechanism under the common belief condition C =
{CCB }. The proof of the formal result requires that the observation space is non-binary. If
the observations were binary, then the self-predicting condition CSP would hold under a
relatively weak assumption that the same observation values are positively correlated, in
particular, under the self-correlated condition CSC . We show this in the proof of Corollary 1,
while the following theorem provides the formal statement of the claim from the beginning
of the paragraph presented in a more general form, that is, the one in which the set of belief
constraints is any subset of {CCB ,CSC }.
Theorem 2. There exists no strictly proper decomposable mechanism under the set of belief
constraints C ⊆ {CCB ,CSC } when agents’ observations take more than two values, i.e., |X | > 2.
Proof. Let us assume that there exists a strictly proper payment mechanism τS , and due to
Lemma 3, we can assume that it is a 1-peer payment mechanism. Furthermore, because of
Lemma 2, we restrict our attention to its information score.
Let px = Pr (Xp |Xa = x), py = Pr (Xp |Xa = y), pz = Pr (Xp |Xa = z), etc., be some arbitrary
distribution functions that deﬁne agents’ common belief. Using the same arguments as in the
proof of Theorem 1, we obtain that the strict properness of τS implies:
px(x) · (τY (x,x,px)−τY (y,x,px))+px(y) · (τY (x, y,py )−τY (y, y,py ))
+ ∑
z∈X \{x,y}
px(z) · (τY (x,z,pz)−τY (y,z,pz))> 0
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py (x)(τY (y,x,px)−τY (x,x,px))+py (y) · (τY (y, y,py )−τY (x, y,py ))
+ ∑
z∈X \{x,y}
py (z) · (τY (y,z,pz)−τY (x,z,pz))> 0
This gives us:
(px(x)−py (x)) ·Δx(px)+ (px(y)−py (y)) ·Δy (py )
+ ∑
z∈X \{x,y}
(px(z)−py (z)) ·Δz(pz)> 0 (3.10)
where Δz(pz)= (τY (x,z,pz)−τY (y,z,pz)). Since the mechanism should be strictly proper for
arbitrary distribution functions, it should also be strictly proper for the following two cases:
1. When px(x) = py (x)− , px(z) = py (z) for z = x,z ′, and px(z ′) = py (z ′)+ , where  > 0
and << 1. We denote this distribution by p−x .
2. When px(x) = py (x)+ , px(z) = py (z) for z = x,z ′, and px(z ′) = py (z ′)− , where  > 0
and << 1. We denote this distribution by p+x .
Note that due to the stochastic relevance condition (see Section 3.1.1), we cannot put px = py .
From (3.10) and px(z ′)−py (z ′)= (1−∑z∈X \{z ′} px(z))−(1−∑z∈X \{z ′} py (z))=∑z∈X \{z ′}(py (z)−
px(z)), we obtain:
− · (Δx(p−x )−Δz ′(pz ′))> 0
 · (Δx(p+x )−Δz ′(pz ′))> 0
In other words:
Δx(p
−
x )<Δz ′(pz ′)
Δx(p
+
x )>Δz ′(pz ′) (3.11)
Let us consider a new p++y equal to: p++y (x) = py (x)+ 2, p++y (z) = py (z) for z = x,z ′, and
p++y (z ′)= py (z ′)−2. By applying the previous steps on p++y , we obtain:
Δx(p
+
x )=Δx(p++−x )<Δz ′(pz ′) (3.12)
Δx(p
+++
x )>Δz ′(pz ′)
Hence we have a contradiction (expressions (3.11) and (3.12)). Therefore, there exists no
decomposable payment scheme that is strictly proper even if the common belief condition
CCB holds. All that is left to be shown is that that there exist distributions py = Pr (Xp |Xa = y),
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pz = Pr (Xp |Xa = z), etc., such that posteriors py , pz , ..., p−x , p+x , p++y , p++−x , and p+++x , satisfy
the self-correlated condition CSC . To do so, let us ﬁx py and let a fully mixed prior Pr (Xp )
be such that Pr (Xp = x) = py (x)−2 ·  and Pr (Xp = y) = py (y)− . Furthermore, let pz(z) >
Pr (Xp = z) for all z = x, y . Then, the beliefs in the ﬁrst part of the proof do satisfy the basic
properties of the setting and, moreover, the self-correlated condition CSC . Hence, we proved
the statement.
The impossibility result obtained by Theorem 2 is quite surprising. Even though the center
elicits agents’ posterior beliefs, which are formed from a common belief system, it still requires
additional constraints to achieve strict properness. Nevertheless, decomposable payment
mechanisms are strictly more general than single-report mechanisms in terms of elicitability.
Clearly, if we can elicit truthful observations using a single-report mechanism, then one
can construct a decomposable mechanism for which agents are truthful as well: one simply
applies the single-report mechanism as its information score, which by Lemma 2 implies
the existence of a strictly proper decomposable mechanism. To show that decomposable
payment mechanisms require strictly less restrictions, it sufﬁces to construct a decomposable
mechanism that is strictly proper under belief constraints C = {CCB ,CSP }. Namely, Theorem 1
tells us that under these constraints, a single-report payment mechanism cannot be strictly
proper. This leads us to a decomposable payment mechanism called the multi-valued robust
Bayesian truth serum.
Multi-valued Robust Bayesian Truth Serum. The multi-valued RBTS mechanism has the
following steps:
• Each agent a is asked to provide two reports:
– information report Ya , which represents agent a’s observed value;
– prediction report Fa , which represents agent a’s prediction about the frequencies
of reported values in the overall population.
• Each agent a is linked with one peer agent p and is rewarded with a score:5
τS(Ya ,Fa ,Yp ,Fp )=
1Yp=Ya
Fp (Ya)︸ ︷︷ ︸
information score
+ S(Fa ,Yp )︸ ︷︷ ︸
prediction score
(3.13)
where 1 is an indicator variable and S is a strictly proper scoring rule.
The multi-valued RBTS mechanism is an example of a strictly proper decomposable payment
mechanism for the set of belief constraints equal toC = {CCB ,CSP }. The direct consequence is
a strict generality of decomposable payment schemes over single-report payment mechanisms.
More formally:
5To avoid large information scores for small values of Fp , one can multiply the information score by miny (Fp (y))
and set the information score equal to 1 if Fp (Ya )= 0.
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Theorem 3. Suppose that there are N ≥ 2 agents and each agent has k ≥ 1 different peers.
Then, the multi-valued RBTS mechanism is strictly proper under the set of belief constraints
C = {CCB ,CSP }.
Proof. Consider an agent a and suppose her peer agent p is honest. Since the prediction score
is a strictly proper scoring rule, agent a strictly maximizes it by reporting her true posterior
belief as her prediction report. Therefore, it is enough to examine the properties of the infor-
mation score.
Suppose that agent a observes x and reports y . Since peer p is honest, her prediction report
Fp is equal to Fp = Prp (Xpp |Xp = z), where z is peer p’s observation and pp is the peer of
p. Since belief systems are common, Prp (Xpp |Xp = z) = Pra(Xp |Xa = z). This means that
Fp = Pra(Xp |Xa = z), so the expected value of the agent’s information score is equal to:
E(τY (y,Yp ,Fp ))=
Pra(Xp = y |Xa = x)
Prp (Xpp = y |Xp = y)
= Pra(Xp = y |Xa = x)
Pra(Xp = y |Xa = y)
By taking into account the self-predicting condition, i.e., Pra(Xp = z|Xa = x) < Pra(Xp =
z|Xa = z),∀z = x, we get that the expected value of the information score is (strictly) maxi-
mized for:
argmax
y
E(τY (y,Yp ,Fp ))= argmax
y
Pra(Xp = y |Xa = x)
Pra(Xp = y |Xa = y)
= {x}
Therefore, the strict maximum of the information score is achieved when the agent reports
her true observation. This completes the proof.
An interesting implication of Theorem 3 is that the multi-valued RBTS is strictly proper pro-
vided that agents’ common belief system satisﬁes the self-correlated condition, while their
observations are binary signals. Namely, in the case of binary observations, the self-correlated
condition implies the self-predicting condition, which means that the set of belief constraints
corresponds to the one in Theorem 3.
Corollary 1. Suppose that there are N ≥ 2 agents and each agent has k ≥ 1 different peers.
Then, the multi-valued RBTS mechanism is strictly proper under the set of belief constraints
C = {CCB ,CSC } when the observation space is a binary set, i.e., |X | > 2.
Proof. By Theorem 3, it sufﬁces to show that the self-correlated condition CSC implies the
self-predicting condition CSP whenever X is a binary set. Suppose that the self-correlated
condition CSC holds. Then, for all x ∈X there exists x > 0 such that Pr (Xp = x|Xa = x) =
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Pr (Xp = x)+x . Therefore:
Pr (Xp = x|Xa = x)
Pr (Xp = x)
= Pr (Xp = x)+x
Pr (Xp = x)
> 1> 1−Pr (Xp = x)−x
1−Pr (Xp = x)
= 1−Pr (Xp = x|Xa = x)
1−Pr (Xp = x)
= Pr (Xp = y |Xa = x)
Pr (Xp = y)
which means that the self-predicting condition holds. Hence, we proved the statement.
Notice that the robust BTS of [WP12b] represents a similar possibility results for a binary obser-
vation space: the setting it operates in satisﬁes the conditions of Corollary 1. Its generalization
for non-binary observations requires an additional belief condition, different than and not
comparable to the self predicting condition [Wit14].
3.4.2 Divergence-based Bayesian truth serum
The impossibility result of Theorem 2 motivates us to examine a broader class of scoring func-
tions than that of the decomposable payment mechanisms. In this subsection, we investigate
mechanisms which are composed of information and prediction scores, but the information
score is no longer independent of the prediction report.
As it is common in all of the BTS mechanisms, the prediction score is a strictly proper scoring
rule applied on the prediction report of an agent a and the information report of her peer p.
However, the information score is intuitively different: it penalizes the agent if her information
report agrees with that of her peer while their prediction reports are signiﬁcantly different.
Disagreement between prediction reports is characterized by the condition that the divergence
between the reports is larger than a thresholdΘ.
Divergence-based Bayesian Truth Serum. The divergence-based BTS has the following steps:
• Each agent a is asked to provide her information report Ya and her prediction report Fa .
• Each agent a is linked with a peer agent p and is rewarded with:
τS(Ya ,Fa ,Yp ,Fp )=−1Ya=Yp∧D(Fa ||Fp )>Θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
information score
+ S(Fa ,Yp )︸ ︷︷ ︸
prediction score
where 1 is an indicator variable, S is a strictly proper scoring rule, D(||) is the divergence
associated to a strictly proper scoring rule, andΘ is a parameter of the mechanism.
The intuition behind the penalty of the divergence-based BTS is that honest agents will not
have inconsistent prediction reports and consistent information reports. This is certainly
the case if agents have a common belief system, but the mechanism also allows deviations
35
Chapter 3. Single-task peer consistency mechanisms
from this condition. The following theorem shows the condition on the belief systems and the
choice of parameterΘ that make this intuition true.
Theorem 4. Suppose that there are N ≥ 2 agents and each agent has k ≥ 1 different peers. Then,
the divergence-based BTS mechanism is strictly proper under the divergence-based condition,
i.e., C = {CDB }, forΘ that satisﬁes:
D(Pra(Xp |Xa = x)||Prp (Xpp |Xp = x))≤Θ<D(Pra(Xp |Xa = x)||Prp (Xpp |Xp = y))
(3.14)
for all x = y, where we denoted a peer of p by pp.
Proof. Consider an agent a who observes x and believes that her peer agent is honest. Fur-
thermore, suppose thatΘ satisﬁes the conditions of the theorem.
Due to the properties of the strictly proper scoring rules, agent a’s prediction score is in expec-
tation maximized when she reports Fa = Pra(Xp |Xa = x), and because stochastic relevance
holds, this is a strict optimum.
If agent a’s prediction report is Fa = Pra(Xp |Xa = x), then we conclude from condition (3.14)
that the maximum of her information score is achieved when she reports x, and is equal to 0.
Since the optimal value of the information score is equal to 0 and the prediction score is
maximized for Fa = Pra(Xp |Xa = x), it follows that Ya = x and Fa = Pra(Xp |Xa = x) is agent
a’s best response.
We still need to prove that this is the strictly optimal response. Since Fa = Pra(Xp |Xa = x) is
the strictly optimal response for the prediction score, and Ya = x achieves the optimal value
of the information score, it is enough to show that agent a’s information score is negative in
expectation for Ya = x and Fa = Pra(Xp |Xa = x). Due to condition (3.14) and the fully mixed
posteriors, the expected score for reporting y = x and Fa = Pra(Xp |Xa = x) is:
Pra(Xp = y |Xa = x) · (−1D(Pra (Xp |Xa=x)||Fp )>Θ)
= Pra(Xp = y |Xa = x) · (−1D(Pra (Xp |Xa=x)||Prp (Xpp |Xp=y))>Θ)=−Pra(Xp = y |Xa = x)< 0
where we used the fact that peer p is honest, and, thus, Fp = Prp (Xpp |Xp = y). Putting it all
together, the divergence-based BTS is strictly proper.
The direct consequence of Theorem 4 is that the divergence-based BTS is strictly proper under
the common belief condition CCB with an appropriate choice of parameterΘ.
Corollary 2. Suppose that there are N ≥ 2 agents and each agent has k ≥ 1 different peers. Then,
the divergence-based BTS withΘ= 0 is strictly proper under the common belief condition, i.e.,
C = {CCB }.
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Proof. The common belief condition CCB is a special case of the divergence based condition
CDB in which D(Pra(Xp |Xa = x)||Prp (Xpp |Xp = x)) = 0 for all x ∈X , and due to stochastic
relevance D(Pra(Xp |Xa = x)||Prp (Xpp |Xp = y))> 0 for all y = x. Therefore, we can setΘ= 0 to
satisfy the conditions of Theorem 4, which then implies the claim.
A convenient feature of the divergence-based BTS is that it allows a population of agents to
have different belief systems, as long as the agents’ posteriors are more similar when they
observe the same value than when their observations are different. This is exactly what
condition (3.14) states, and is realistic if agents indeed have similar observations. Notice
that we formalized similarities between posteriors of two different agents using parameter
Θ. Although we have assumed that the center knowsΘ, it is possible to make the divergence-
based BTS a non-parametric method.
Non-parametric Divergence-based Bayesian Truth Serum. To make the divergence-based
BTS a non-parametric method, we change its second step. In addition to a peer agent p, the
modiﬁed method also uses another peer agent pˆ, and the overall score for agent a becomes:
τS(Ya ,Fa ,Yp ,Fp ,Ypˆ ,Fpˆ )=−1Yp=Ya∧Ypˆ =Ya∧D(Fa ||Fp )>D(Fa ||Fpˆ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
information score
+ S(Fa ,Yp )︸ ︷︷ ︸
prediction score
Theorem 5. Suppose that there are N ≥ 3 agents and each agent has k ≥ 2 different peers. Then,
the non-parametric divergence-based BTS mechanism is strictly proper under the divergence-
based condition, i.e., C = {CDB }.
Proof. Consider an agent a who observes Xa = x, and suppose her peer agents p and pˆ are
honest. Due to the divergence-based condition, D(Fa ||Fp )<D(Fa ||Fpˆ ) holds whenever agent
a reports her true observation x and her true prediction Fa = Pra(Xp |Xa = x). In that case, the
information score achieves the optimal value. Because the prediction score is a strictly proper
scoring rule, agent a strictly optimizes it by reporting her true prediction Fa = Pra(Xp |Xa = x).
What is left to be shown is that the information score is also strictly optimal. This can be done
using the same reasoning as in Theorem 4. If agent a reported y = x and Fa = Pra(Xp |Xa = x),
she would in expectation receive negative information score:
Pra(Xp = y |Xa = x) · (−1D(Pra (Xp |Xa=x)||Fp )>D(Pra (Xp |Xa=x)||Fpˆ ))
≤ Pra(Xp = y,Xpˆ = x|Xa = x) · (−1D(Pra (Xp |Xa=x)||Prp (Xpp |Xp=y))>D(Pra (Xp |Xa=x)||Prpˆ (Xppˆ |Xpˆ=x)))
=−Pra(Xp = y,Xpˆ = x|Xa = x)< 0
where we denoted peers of p and pˆ by pp and ppˆ , respectively. The ﬁrst inequality comes
from the fact that we focus on the case when Xpˆ = x. In that case, Fp = Prp (Xa |Xp = y)
and Fpˆ = Prpˆ (Xa |Xpˆ = x) because peers p and pˆ are honest. Therefore, agent a is better off
reporting x instead, which completes the proof.
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Remark 2. The divergence-based BTS asks agents to report full posterior beliefs regarding
their peers’ observations. Provided that the stochastic relevance condition and the divergence-
based condition hold for coarser-grained observations as well, i.e., for posterior beliefs that
could indicate probabilities of a peer observing a strict subset of possible observations, then
one can minimize the size of the prediction report without affecting the incentive properties.
Namely, in that case, one could ask agents to report a binary prediction on whether their peers
observe a particular strict subset of possible observations, instead of asking them to report
the full frequency proﬁle of reports. The strict subset can be randomly chosen, but one can
also use a domain speciﬁc knowledge to select a strict subset that maximizes the difference
between the expected payoffs for honest reporting and inaccurate reporting.
Remark 3. The penalty of the divergence-based BTS can be controlled by how much predic-
tions of an agent and her peer differ. For example, if the penalty condition is satisﬁed, then the
agent could get a penalty equal to −D(Fa ||Fp ) instead of −1. This way, more severe deviations
would lead to greater penalties.
3.4.3 Continuous Bayesian truth serum
The structure of the divergence-based score can be extended to allow observations that are
real numbers. Now, the elicitation mechanism has to take into account that perfect matching
of agents’ reports, as done in the information score of the divergence-based BTS mechanism,
would not produce sensible incentives since we are dealing with continuous observations.
The trick is to consider two observations similar if they are no more than d away from each
other, where d is a randomly chosen parameter. Then, we can apply the principle of the
divergence-based BTS mechanism: similar observations should lead to similar posterior
beliefs.
Continuous Bayesian Truth Serum. Consider observations Xa taking continuous values, in
particular,X =R. The continuous BTS mechanism has the following steps:
• For each agent a, the mechanism samples a number da from a uniform distribution on
interval (0,1)6, i.e., da = r and((0,1)). The continuous domainX =R is then uniformly
discretized with the discretization interval of a size da and the constraint that value Ya
is in the middle of the interval it belongs to. We denote the interval of a value Ya = y by
I ay . The constraint can then be written as y =
max I ay −min I ay
2 .
• Finally, an agent a is scored using a modiﬁed version of the divergence-based BTS score:
τS(Ya ,Fa ,Yp ,Fp )=−1Yp∈I ay ∧D(Fa ||Fp )>da ·Θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
information score
+ S(Fa ,Yp )︸ ︷︷ ︸
prediction score
6In general, one can use interval (0,b), where b > 0, and a non-uniform distribution that has a full support on
that interval.
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where D(||) is the divergence of a strictly proper scoring rule, and S is a strictly proper
scoring rule.
ParameterΘ of the continuous BTS reﬂects how close the posteriors of two similar signals are.
For example, when agents are fully conﬁdent in the correctness of their objective observations,
Θ should be big because posteriors of two similar signals can be signiﬁcantly different. On
the other hand, when agents make mistakes, the posteriors of two similar signals are close
to each other, making the lower bound on Θ smaller. In certain applications, this fact can
be used to set the appropriate value of Θ. For example, in crowd sensing, the center could
assume that every crowd sensor is worse than some accurate sensor, so the center can adjust
Θ according to the speciﬁcs of the accurate sensor. For a value ofΘ parameter such that da ·Θ
never underestimates the divergence D(||) of agents posteriors that observe similar values, the
continuous BTS is strictly proper under the common belief condition CCB .
Theorem 6. Suppose that there are N ≥ 2 agents and each agent has k ≥ 1 different peers.
ConsiderX =R, and supposeΘ ∈ (0,∞) is such that ∀x ∈X ,da ∈ (0,1),z ∈ I ax :
D(p(Xp |Xa = x)||p(Xp |Xa = z))≤ da ·Θ (3.15)
where p(Xp |Xa) denotes agent a’s posterior belief. Then, the continuous BTS mechanism is
strictly proper under the common belief condition, i.e., C = {CCB }.
Proof. Suppose agent a observes x and believes that her peer p is honest. Since peer p is
honest, from the common belief condition CCB , we conclude that Fp = pp (Xpp |Xp = z) =
p(Xp |Xa = z) when peer p’s observation is Xp = z (notice that pp is a peer of p). Therefore, if
agent a reports x and Fa = p(Xp |Xa = x), her information score is equal to 0, because (3.15)
holds. The prediction score is a strictly proper scoring rule, so in expectation the optimal
choice for the prediction report is agent a’s posterior Fa = p(Xp |Xa = x) - this is a strict
optimum due to stochastic relevance. Therefore, reporting Ya = x and Fa = p(Xp |Xa = x)
results in the maximum payoff. As it was the case with Theorem 4, we need to show that agent
a’s information score is in expectation strictly negative for any information report Ya = x,
provided that she reports the strictly optimal prediction report, i.e., Fa = p(Xp |Xa = x).
Let Ya = y = x. Consider da1 such that x ∉ I a1y . From stochastic relevance, we know that there
exists > 0 such that:
∀z ∈ I a1y : D(p(Xp |Xa = x)||p(Xp |Xa = z))>  (3.16)
Now, consider da2 ≤min(da1, Θ ). Since I a2y ⊆ I a1y , inequality (3.16) implies:
∀z ∈ I a2y : D(p(Xp |Xa = x)||p(Xp |Xa = z))> ≥ da2 ·Θ
Notice that Pr (da ≤ da2)> 0, because da is chosen uniformly at random from (0,1). Moreover,
Pr (Xp ∈ I a2y |Xa = x)=
∫
z∈I a2y p(Xp = z|Xa = x)dz > 0 due to the fully mixed posteriors. Since
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Fp = p(Xp |Xa = z) when peer p’s observation is Xp = z, we have that for information report
Ya = y = x and prediction report Fa = p(Xp |Xa = x), the expected information score of agent
a is strictly negative. Therefore, the continuous BTS is strictly proper.
z
D(p(Xp|Xa=x)||p(Xp|Xa=z))
x=2
b|z-x| b|z-x|
Figure 3.2 – The divergence of posteriors as a function of a peer’s report.
It remains to see how to set the parameter Θ. Consider D(p(Xp |Xa = x)||p(Xp |Xa = z)) as a
function of z for a ﬁxed x = 2. Condition (3.15) simply states that one can ﬁnd a coefﬁcient b
such that b · |z−2| ≥D(p(Xp |Xa = 2)||p(Xp |Xa = z)) for z ∈ (1.5,2.5). As shown in Figure 3.2,
this corresponds to the divergence being bounded by two lines. More formally:
Proposition 3. Consider X =R. If ∀x ∈R, D(p(Xp |Xa = x)||p(Xp |Xa = z)) is a continuously
differentiable and bounded function of z ∈ (x− 12 ,x+ 12 ), then:
Θ>max
x
max
z∈(x− 12 ,x+ 12 )
∣∣∣∣∂D(p(Xp |Xa = x)||p(Xp |Xa = z))∂z
∣∣∣∣
satisﬁes condition (3.15) of Theorem 6.
Proof. Consider a function f (z) = Θ · |z − x| −D(p(Xp |Xa = x)||p(Xp |Xa = z)) deﬁned for a
speciﬁc value of x on interval z ∈ (x− 12 ,x+ 12 ). For z = x, the function is equal to f (x)= 0. Let
us consider z ′ ∈ (x,x+ 12 ). We have:
f (z ′)=Θ · |z ′ −x|−D(p(Xp |Xa = x)||p(Xp |Xa = z ′))
=
∫z ′
x
(
Θ− ∂D(p(Xp |Xa = x)||p(Xp |Xa = z))
∂z
)
dz =
∫z ′
x
g (z)dz
where g (z)=Θ− ∂D(p(Xp |Xa=x)||p(Xp |Xa=z))∂z . Due to the condition of the proposition, we know
that g (z)> 0 for all z ∈ (x,x+ 12 ). Therefore, f (z ′) strictly increases as |z ′−x| increases. Similarly,
we obtain that the same holds for z ′ ∈ (x− 12 ,x). By combining these results with f (x)= 0, we
obtain the claim.
The continuous BTS is a parametric mechanism, so the center needs to set the parameterΘ.
Notice that the only restriction for strict properness is that the center setsΘ to a big enough
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value. However, there is a tradeoff between the value ofΘ and the expected value of margin
difference of the information score between truthful and non-truthful reporting. That is, the
larger Θ is, the smaller the expected punishment is for an agent who deviates from truthful
reporting.
If the divergence function D(p(Xp |Xa = x)||p(Xp |Xa = z)) increases as |z− x| increases, it is
possible to make the continuous BTS a non-parametric method.
Non-parametricContinuousBayesianTruthSerum. Tomake the continuous BTS a parameter-
free method, we introduce another peer agent pˆ and change the score to:
τS(Ya ,Fa ,Yp ,Fp ,Ypˆ ,Fpˆ )=−1|Yp−Ya |<|Ypˆ−Ya |∧D(Fa ||Fp )>D(Fa ||Fpˆ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
information score
+ S(Fa ,Yp )︸ ︷︷ ︸
prediction score
Proposition 4. Suppose that there are N ≥ 3 agents and each agent has k ≥ 2 different peers.
LetX =R. If ∀x, y,z ∈R:
|y −x| < |z−x| =⇒ D(p(Xp |Xa = x)||p(Xp |Xa = y))<D(p(Xp |Xa = x)||p(Xp |Xa = z))
where p is agent a’s posterior belief, then the non-parametric continuous BTS is strictly proper
under the common belief condition, i.e., C = {CCB }.
Proof. The commonbelief condition implies that pp (Xpp |Xp = y)= p(Xp |Xa = y) and ppˆ (Xppˆ |Xpˆ =
y) = p(Xp |Xa = y), where pp and ppˆ are peers of p and pˆ, respectively. Therefore, for
agent a who observes x and honest agents p and pˆ, D(Fa ||Fp )<D(Fa ||Fpˆ ) holds whenever
|Yp −Xa | < |Ypˆ −Xa | and agent a reports truthfully. In that case (or if |Yp −Xa | > |Ypˆ −Xa |), the
information score achieves the optimal value. Furthermore, the prediction score is a strictly
proper scoring rule, so agent a’s best response is to report Ya = x and Fa = p(Xp |Xa = x).
Similarly to how it is done in Theorem 6, we can show that reporting truthfully is agent a’s best
response. First of all, the prediction score achieves its strict optimum for Fa = p(Xp |Xa = x)
due to the stochastic relevance condition. In other words, we only need to show that for any
information report Ya = x, agent a’s information score is in expectation strictly negative when
she provides prediction report Fa = p(Xp |Xa = x).
Suppose that the agent reports Ya = y = x. Furthermore, suppose that |Yp−x| < |Ypˆ < x|, while
|Ypˆ − y | < |Yp − y |. Due to the fully mixed beliefs, this happens with probability strictly greater
than 0, which implies that the expected information score is strictly smaller than 0. Since 0
is the optimal value of the information score, agent a’s best response to truthful reporting of
other agents is to report truthfully.
Remark 4. One might be wondering how efﬁcient is the elicitation of continuous variables in
terms of the number of reported values. For practical considerations, agents’ beliefs can often
be modeled using a parametric density distributions. For example, an agent a’s posterior belief
could be modeled with a Gaussian distributionN (μx ,σx), whose parameters depend on the
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agent’s observation x. In this case, reporting the posterior belief comes down to reporting two
parameters μx and σx , so the whole report consists of only three scalar values. We investigate
in the following subsection a possible belief model that complies with these conditions.
Importance of the common belief condition
Unlike the divergence-based BTS mechanism, which allows agents to have limited difference
in their belief systems, the continuous BTS mechanism requires agents to share the same
belief system. In this subsection, we further investigate the importance of the common belief
condition CCB for elicitation of real-valued observations.
Let us consider a natural belief system based on the Gaussian state model condition CGSM in
which the parameters are Gaussian distribution functions. More precisely, the observation
values Xa are generated by a Gaussian p(Xa)∼N (μΩ,σ), where σ is ﬁxed (given), while μΩ
deﬁnes stateΩ and is distributed according to Gaussian distribution p(μΩ)∼N (μ0,σ0).
Now, suppose that agent a observes value Xa = x. From the Bayesian updating of Gaussian
distributions [Bis06], it follows that agent a’s posterior belief regarding peer p’s observations
is a Gaussian p(Xp |Xx = x)∼N (μx ,σx) with the parameters equal to:
μx =
μ0
σ20
+ x
σ2
1
σ20
+ 1
σ2
, σ2x =
1
1
σ20
+ 1
σ2
+σ2 (3.17)
The KL divergence of two normal distributionsN (μ1,σ1) andN (μ2,σ2) is equal to [Iha93]:
log
σ2
σ1
+ σ
2
1
2σ22
+ (μ1−μ2)
2
2σ22
− 1
2
(3.18)
From the expressions (3.17) and (3.18) it follows that the KL divergence between agent a’s
posterior belief when she observes x and her posterior when she observes z is:
D(p(Xp |Xa = x)||p(Xp |Xa = z))= σˆ · (x− z)
2
2σ2
where σˆ = σ
2
0
σ20+σ2
σ20
2σ20+σ2
. Using Proposition 3, we obtain Θ that satisﬁes the conditions of
Theorem 6:
Θ≥max
x
max
z∈(x−1/2,x+1/2)
∣∣∣∣σˆ · 2 · (x− z)2 ·σ2
∣∣∣∣
≥ σˆ · 1
2 ·σ2 (3.19)
The center does not need to know parameters σ and σ20: it is sufﬁcient to overestimate
(3.19). We often have that σ0  σ, and hence σˆ ≈ 12 . In that case, the center only needs
to underestimate the value of σ. For example, if the agents are crowd sensors with accuracy
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below a certain threshold, the center can infer the minimal value of σ. Furthermore, the
KL divergence between two Gaussian posteriors satisﬁes the conditions of Proposition 4,
which means that one can also use the non-parametric continuous BTS. Considering that
the divergence-based BTS allows agents to have differences in their belief systems, one might
wonder if it is possible to relax the common belief condition when observations take values
inR. The following theorem shows that this is not possible under the Gaussian state model
condition G = {CGSM }. The intuition is that one can deﬁne two belief models Ba1 and Ba2
that have the same posterior for two different observations xa and ya . The strict properness
condition, however, requires that only one information report results in optimal payment.
Theorem 7. No mechanism τS is strictly proper under the Gaussian state model condition
G = {CGSM }. In particular, consider an agent a and suppose her peers have a common belief
system satisfying condition CGSM. If a mechanism τS strictly incentivizes agent a to report
honestly when she adopts the common belief system, then it does not strictly incentivize her to
report honestly when she adopts an alternative belief system that differs from the common one
in parameter μ0.
Proof. Due to Lemma 3, we can, without loss of generality, focus on mechanisms in which
agents report both information and prediction reports. Let us assume the opposite, i.e., there
exists a mechanism τS that incentivizes agents to report honestly under the conditions of the
theorem. Suppose that agent a observes value xa and adopts a common belief system. Let us
denote the expected payoff of agent a by τ¯a . Strict properness of τS implies:
∀z = xa : τ¯a(xa ,Fa)> τ¯a(z,Fa) (3.20)
where Fa = (μxa ,σxa ). Consider an alternative belief system deﬁned by μ0 =μ′a0 =μa0 and an
alternative observation ya = σ2σ20 (μ
a
0 −μ′a0 )+ xa . From expression (3.17), we know that in this
case agent a’s posterior is the same as for the previous case, i.e., μxa = μ′ya and σxa = σ′ya .
However, from (3.20) it follows that the best response of agent a is to report xa , not ya . That is,
τS cannot incentivize both agent a, who has the same belief system as her peers p, and agent
a, who has a different belief system than her peers p, to report honestly.
3.5 Applications
We investigate two applications of the mechanisms presented in this section. First one is
community sensing, where we consider a sensing scenario in which a relatively small number
of sensors provide their measurements to the center. We demonstrate the importance of
having robust mechanisms designed for the elicitation of non-binary information. As the
second application, we study the design of a BTS type of mechanism in elicitation of subjective
information through a contest and we present our preliminary work on eliciting emotions
across the EPFL campus.
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3.5.1 Community sensing
In a community sensing scenario, private mobile devices equipped with sensors acquire
information about a spatially distributed phenomenon, such as air pollution or weather, and
report it to the center [BEH+06, ASC+10, KHKZ08]. Since sensing induces a cost due to the fact
that sensing modules need to be installed and maintained, the party interested in monitoring
the physical phenomenon needs to incentivize the crowd to incur this cost and provide quality
data.
We investigate a community sensing setting in which the center has no control over sensing
devices, nor does it have a way of directly verifying the correctness of the obtained data. There-
fore, to compensate for the cost of sensing, the center applies a peer consistency approach in
rewarding sensors. One of the peer consistency methods proposed for information elicitation
in community sensing setting is the mechanism from [FLJ14]. In this section, we provide a
complementary approach that does not require the center to know participants’ beliefs, but
is rather based on participants reporting their beliefs. In particular, we compare the rewards
of the continuous BTS with those produced by the output agreement and the RBTS for small
population as presented in [WP12b]7, and demonstrate the importance of proper mechanisms
that allow non-binary observations.
As an example of a community sensing scenario, we consider an air-quality monitoring over
an urban area. Each sensor is assumed to be a rational agent that measures air pollution at its
location and reports its measurement to the center.
Simulation setup
Our community sensing test-bed is based on a real dataset containing levels of UFP (ultra
ﬁne particles) over Zurich urban area — the full description of the dataset can be found in
[HSW+14] — and a region based Gaussian Processes model that incorporates the spatial
features of the terrain, as described in [JLF14]. One chunk of data contains aggregated mea-
surements over the period of two weeks for 200 locations. In total, we have 22 chunks of data,
2 for each of 11 different months. Half of the data is used for training the GP model and the
other half for testing purposes.
The 200 locations are unevenly distributed and concentrated on the main tram lines in the
city of Zurich, as shown in Figure 3.3. Therefore, we investigate the use of peer consistency
techniques designed for a single-task scenario. We show in the next chapter how to design
more robust incentives provided that measurement locations are more evenly spread across
an urban area, while sensors report more frequently.
We consider a group of 10 sensors whose initial locations are obtained by randomly sampling
10 out of 200 regions in the ﬁrst month. Since regions differ from month to month, we take the
7[Wit14] shows how to extend this mechanism to a non-binary domain.
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(a) The map of sensor measurements collected in
one week; the colors denote different sensor nodes
(nodes are placed on trams) [JLF14]
????????? ????????? ????????? ????????? ????????? ????????????????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
(b) Sensing locations of one of 11 months; the colors
show the intensity of pollution in the number of
particles per cm2
Figure 3.3 – Sensing locations in the Zurich dataset
closest available region to the current location of a sensor as its consecutive location. Sensors
are assumed to be rational agents and their beliefs are modeled with the GP model. For each
sensor, we run a separate evaluation process in which the other sensors report truthfully, while
the considered sensor reports according to one of the ﬁve strategies:
• honest: report truthfully its measurement;
• low: report a low level of pollution, deﬁned by 7500;
• high: report a high level of pollution, deﬁned by 22500;
• shift: report its measurement shifted by 2000 in the direction of 15000, for example, if
the measurement is 12000, the sensor reports 14000;
• random: report randomly according to its prior belief, deﬁned as a prior probability
distribution of a peer’s measurement obtained from the GP model.
In all of the cases, sensors report their beliefs honestly if they are asked to provide them.
Furthermore, all of the numerical values express the number of particles per cm2. We ﬁrst
determine the total payoff of each sensor in the period of 11 months, which then gives us the
basic statistics of the sensors’ payoffs: mean, minimum, 1st quartile, median, 3rd quartile
and maximum. Since the payoffs depend on randomly chosen parameters, such as the initial
locations of the sensors, we repeat the process 50 times to obtain the average statistics.8
8This ensures that the averages have statistical signiﬁcance for best-response strategies. In particular, t-tests
show that the continuous BTS payments for truthful reporting are statistically different than the continuous BTS
payments for other reporting strategies, with p-values smaller than 0.01. The same holds for the best-response
strategies of the output agreement and RBTS.
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Simulation results
We compare the payoffs of three different reward mechanisms: the continuous BTS, the output
agreement and the RBTS for small population.
In the continuous BTS mechanism, a sensor provides its real valued measurements and its
prediction regarding the measurement of the closest peer sensor. The prediction report
contains the parameters of a Gaussian distribution obtained from the GP model. To score a
sensor a, we select another two peers, p and pˆ, closest to the peer for which the sensor reports
its prediction. This way we ensure that sensors a, p and pˆ provide the prediction about the
same event: the measurement of the peer closest to sensor a. In scoring prediction reports we
use the logarithmic scoring rule deﬁned by expression (2.1) with α= 0.01 and β= 1, while in
the information scores we use KL divergence.
In the output agreement mechanism, sensors provide only their measurements. To score a
sensor a, we select its closest peer and the payoff is equal to 1 if their reports do not differ by
more than 2000 (particles per cm2), and otherwise it is 0.
In the RBTS mechanism, sensors provide their real valued measurements, but in scoring
sensors, these are discretized to binary values using a predeﬁned threshold. In particular, if
the provided measurement is less than 15000, the associate binary value is equal to 0, and
otherwise it is equal to 1.9 Apart from their measurements, sensors also provide their predic-
tion regarding the discretized measurement of their closest peers. We follow the description
presented in [WP12b], with two peers being selected as in the continuous BTS mechanism.
The prediction score of RBTS is scaled with α= 0.01 (β= 0).
The statistics of the average payoffs for the continuous BTS, the output agreement, and RBTS,
are shown in Table 3.1, Table 3.2, and Table 3.3, respectively. As noted in the preliminaries,
these payoffs can be scaled so that they take values in an arbitrary interval.
The simulation results imply that continuous BTS is strictly proper for the considered set of
strategies: all of the indicators, such as mean or median, are maximized for truthful reporting.
This is not the case for the output agreement nor the RBTS mechanism. For the former one,
the shift strategy maximizes most of the indicators, including mean and median. Namely, the
strategy tends to shift the result towards the mean of the data set (15179), which for normally
distributed data represents the most likely value. Therefore, it is important to correct the bias
towards prior information, but this cannot be achieved unless the bias is known or it is elicited
from sensors (agents), as is done in the continuous BTS.
The RBTS mechanism assigns the highest payoffs to the low strategy, implying that the binary
discretization is too coarse-grained for the considered sensing scenario. This shows the
importance of robust mechanisms that allow non-binary observations — even a simple
9By inspecting the data set, one can calculate that the mean of all observation values is 15179, which is very
close to the selected threshold.
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Table 3.1 – Average payoffs — continuous BTS
Strategy mean min max median 1st quartile 3rd quartile
honest 7.869 4.352 9.659 8.042 7.112 8.778
low 7.075 2.581 9.602 7.408 5.671 8.358
high 6.145 1.183 9.464 6.242 4.346 7.673
shift 7.389 3.895 9.476 7.645 6.342 8.287
random 6.773 3.699 9.101 6.543 5.702 7.657
Table 3.2 – Average payoffs — output agreement
Strategy mean min max median 1st quartile 3rd quartile
honest 4.114 0.68 7.78 3.76 2.18 5.1
low 0.34 0.0 1.28 0.14 0.0 0.32
high 0.794 0.0 2.74 0.26 0.1 0.84
shift 4.378 1.12 7.72 4.1 2.9 5.12
random 3.176 1.04 5.68 2.86 2.06 3.76
misreporting strategy often achieves better payoffs than honest reporting when a mechanism
does not take into account the complexity of reported information.
Table 3.3 – Average payoffs — RBTS [WP12b]
Strategy mean min max median 1st quartile 3rd quartile
honest 15.95 8.524 22.14 15.545 12.848 18.127
low 18.087 9.647 24.256 18.333 14.544 20.683
high 10.717 7.211 14.987 10.294 8.978 11.457
shift 15.13 8.104 20.958 14.863 12.22 17.149
random 15.103 8.863 20.58 14.757 12.493 16.734
3.5.2 Elicitation of subjective information10
One of the most basic applications of peer consistency methods is to solicit subjective judge-
ments or answers to hypothetical questions, in which case there is no well deﬁned criteria for
evaluating the quality of the obtained report. In this section, we investigate an application
of the BTS mechanisms in eliciting the reports of emotional states from crowd participants
located in an area of interest, in our case, EPFL. This approach can be considered complemen-
10This subsection is based on the semester project ’EmoMap: Emotion Sensing of the EPFL campus’, which was
completed by Natalija Gucevska, under the supervision of Goran Radanovic and Boi Faltings.
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tary to traditional opinion polling, which is typically performed periodically, and thus does
not completely reﬂect the emotion proﬁle of people at different time periods. Since emotional
states carry not only information about respondents, but also their surroundings, the elicited
information can be linked to different events, such as courses, and further used to provide
emotion-based recommendations.
(a) Report structure (b) Selecting emotions (c) Selecting location
Figure 3.4 – Predictemo application
Motivated by the success of games with purposes, such as the ESP game [vAD04, vAD08], we
propose an approach that has a form of a contest for subjective information and uses a BTS
type of mechanism to evaluate contributions of contestants. The contest was implemented as
an Android11 application Predictemo that has two modes: anonymous mode, in which users
anonymously provide their emotions and current locations, and game mode, in which users
play the Predictemo game logged in with their Facebook12 account. To achieve a good quality
control of reported information, the underlying reward mechanism in the Predictemo game
should be such that it incentivizes users to use the application in the non-anonymous (game)
mode.
Figure 3.4 shows a screenshot of the Predictemo application. When a user decides to make a
report, she selects one of the 20 available emotions from Geneva emotion wheel categories
[Sch05, KSMP14] (Figure 3.4b) and her approximate location, i.e., one of the EPFL buildings
(Figure 3.4c). Aside from reporting her emotion, a user can also see the emotions reported
by other users at different locations, but this information does not contain the most recent
emotions, since these are used for scoring users in the Predictemo game.
Figure 3.5 depicts the structure of the Predictemo game. When submitting a report, a player
selects her emotion and location, and additionally a prediction about what her opponent
reports (Figure 3.5a). The prediction constitutes of selecting the most likely emotion of the
opponent and ones conﬁdence in this prediction. Once the opponent accepts the challenge,
the Predictemo game calculates the scores of players and updates the ranking list shown in
11www.android.com
12www.facebook.com
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(a) Report structure (b) Reported emotions (c) Ranking
Figure 3.5 – Predictemo game
Figure 3.5c. The total scores in the ranking list are scaled so that they only take positive values.
Players also have access to historical data, such as the list of emotions of other players at
different time periods (Figure 3.5b). Notice that the data does not include the most recent
emotions which are used in the scoring mechanism.
The underlying mechanism of the Predictemo game has a form of the optimal contest for
simple agents, introduced in [GR14]. We focus in this section on one of its crucial components
— procedure for evaluating the quality of players’ contributions, i.e., the scoring mechanism.
The detailed design of the Predictemo contest can be found in Section A.1 of the appendix.
Evaluating reports
The information structure that participants report in the Predictemo game consists of infor-
mation and prediction reports, so an appropriate method for evaluating contributions could
have a BTS structure. Instead of using the traditional BTS design, we rearrange the information
and prediction scores in order to obtain a structure of the score that is easier to explain to
the participants. In particular, we score an agent by how well she predicts her peer’s emotion
minus how well her peer predicts her emotion. However, the quality score of each prediction
includes the difﬁculty of predicting ones emotion. Such a scoring rule induces a competition
among agents, so we call the novel mechanism the competitive BTS, or simply co-BTS.
Competitive Bayesian Truth Serum. Consider two agents a1 and a2 that are matched with
each other, and let p denote other agents, i.e., their peers. We assign the quality scores to their
information and prediction reports using the following mechanism:
• The quality of agent a1’s prediction report is measured w.r.t. the information report of
agent a2, and is deﬁned as:
qa1 (Fa1 ,Ya2 )= SQ (Fa1 ,Ya2 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
accuracy of Fa1
+ 1−xa1,a2 (Ya2 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
difﬁculty of predicting Ya2
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where SQ is the quadratic scoring rule (2.2) with α= 1 and β= 0, i.e.:
SQ (Fa1 ,Ya2 )= Fa1 (Ya2 )−
1
2
· ∑
z∈X
Fa1 (z)
2
and xa1,a2 is a normalized histogram of reports from agentsA \{a1,a2}:
xa1,a2 (x)=
1
N −2 ·
∑
p∈A \{a1,a2}
1Yp=x
Intuitively, the quality of agent a1’s prediction depends both on how accurate the agent
a1 is and how hard it is to predict the observation of agent a2. Similarly we deﬁne the
quality of agent a2’s prediction as:
qa2 (Fa2 ,Ya1 )= SQ (Fa2 ,Ya1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
accuracy of Fa2
+ 1−xa1,a2 (Ya1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
difﬁculty of predicting Ya1
• The score of agent a1 is deﬁned by how much better (or worse) her prediction is com-
pared to the prediction of agent a2:
τa1 (Ya1 ,Fa1 ,Ya2 ,Fa2 ,Rp )= qa1 (Fa1 ,Ya2 )−qa2 (Fa2 ,Ya1 )
Similarly, for agent a2, we have:
τa2 (Ya2 ,Fa2 ,Ya1 ,Fa1 ,Rp )= qa2 (Fa2 ,Ya1 )−qa1 (Fa1 ,Ya2 )
The competitive BTS mechanism has a decomposable score structure, quite similar to the
one of the multi-valued RBTS, but with a more intuitive explanation. In particular, the quality
scores of agents imply that an agent should provide her best possible prediction to maximize
her score, while she cannot manipulate the quality score of another agent due to the fact that
the qualities also include the difﬁculty of predicting ones observation. Indeed, under the
relative self-dominant condition, the competitive BTS is strictly proper.
Proposition 5. Consider N > 2 agents (each agent having k = N −1 peers) and assume that
agents do not differentiate their peers in their belief systems (e.g., Pr (Xa1 |Xa2 )= Pr (Xp2 |Xa2 ))13.
The competitive BTS is strictly proper under the relative self-dominant condition C = {CRSD }.
Proof. Consider an agent a1 whose observation is Xa1 = x, and suppose that the other agents
are honest. The score assigned to an agent a1 can be written as:
τa1 (Ya1 ,Fa1 ,Ya2 ,Fa2 ,Rp )= qa1 (Fa1 ,Ya2 )−qa2 (Fa2 ,Ya1 )
= SQ (Fa1 ,Ya2 )−SQ (Fa2 ,Ya1 )+xa1,a2 (Ya1 )−xa1,a2 (Ya2 )
13One can remove this requirement if condition CRSD is transformed so that Pra2 (Xp2 |Xa2 ) is changed to
Pra2 (Xa1 |Xa2 ).
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= SQ (Fa1 ,Ya2 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
prediction score
+xa1,a2 (Ya1 )−Pra2 (Xa1 = Ya1 |Xa2 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
information score
+b
where b does not depend on agent a1’s report. Since the prediction score is the quadratic scor-
ing rule we know that its optimal value is achieved when agent a1 reports her true prediction,
and due to the stochastic relevance, this is a strict optimum. Therefore, we only need to show
that agent a1 also strictly optimizes her information report by reporting honestly. By taking the
expectation over other agents’ observations, we obtain that the expected information score
for reporting y is:
E
(
τa1,Y (y,Ra2 ,Rp )|Xa1 = x
)= Pra1 (Xp1 = y |Xa1 = x)−EXa2 (Pra2 (Xa1 = y |Xa2 )|Xa1 = x)
Since we assumed that agent a2 does not differentiate her peers, this gives us:
E
(
τa1,Y (y,Ra2 ,Rp )|Xa1 = x
)= Pra1 (Xp1 = y |Xa1 = x)−EXa2 (Pra2 (Xp2 = y |Xa2 )|Xa1 = x)
The difference between the expected information scores for truthfulness, i.e., y = x, and
misreporting, i.e., y = z = x, is equal to:
E
(
τa1,Y (x,Ra2 ,Rp )|Xa1 = x
)−E(τa1,Y (z,Ra2 ,Rp )|Xa1 = x)
= Pra1 (Xp1 = x|Xa1 = x)−Pra1 (Xp1 = z|Xa1 = x)
−E(Pra2 (Xp2 = x|Xa2 )−Pra2 (Xp2 = z|Xa2 )|Xa1 = x)> 0
where the inequality follows from the relative self-dominant condition. This completes the
proof.
Notice that the competitive BTS does not require the common belief condition to hold. In fact,
this is important because the competition should allow agents to have different proﬁciencies in
predicting each other’s emotions, which are formally modeled as observations. Furthermore,
mechanism τa does not directly deﬁne monetary payments provided to participants, but
rather scores that are used for ranking the agents.
To simplify the input for the prediction report, a player is asked to provide the most likely
emotion of the other player, denoted by xm , and ones conﬁdence in xm , denoted by cxm .
Assuming that the player has a symmetric posterior, the mode and the conﬁdence can be
mapped into a probability distribution function over possible emotions that approximates
the player’s true posterior belief. To do so, we assign weights on different emotions, wx , that
approximately follow the gaussian shape:
wx = 1
σ
·e−
(
d(x,xm )
σ
)2
where σ is a decreasing function of conﬁdence (1/σ= c2xm/(1−c2xm +0.2)+0.001), and d(x,xm)
represents the minimal distance of emotion x from the reported mode xm on the Geneva
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emotion wheel. Once the weights are calculated, we normalize them to obtain the prediction
used in the co-BTS mechanisms:
Fp (x)= wx∑
y wy
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we explored information elicitation mechanisms that do not have access to the
ground truth nor to the agents’ beliefs. We showed that minimal elicitation mechanisms, which
elicit only information reports, require the agents’ beliefs to be highly constrained, for example,
to satisfy the self-dominant condition. This led us to decomposable mechanisms that ask each
agent to provide an additional report, which is separately scored from her information report.
While decomposable mechanisms do provide more expressive framework, they are still not
general enough to allow arbitrary beliefs constrained only with the common belief condition.
Therefore, we constructed a general BTS mechanism, called the divergence-based BTS, that is
strictly proper as long as the agents’ posteriors are more similar when they observe the same
value than when their observations are different. In the limit case, when observations are real
values, the modiﬁcation of the divergence-based BTS, called the continuous BTS, requires
that agents have a common belief system, and we proved that this requirement is not trivial
to relax. Using a community sensing testbed, we experimentally veriﬁed the importance of
mechanisms that allow non-binary observations. Finally, we showed how one can use a BTS
type of mechanism to evaluate the quality of reported information in a contest that follows
the design principles of optimal contests.
The non-existence of a strictly proper payment mechanism when observations take real values
and agents have different belief systems (Theorem 7) motivates us to further constrain the
elicitation setting so that more robust properties are allowed. Therefore, in the next chapter, we
turn to a different setting, more speciﬁc one, where a mechanism can extract useful statistics
from statistically independent reports.
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4 Multi-task peer consistency mecha-
nisms
In this chapter, we investigate an elicitation scenario where crowd participants observe multi-
ple a priori similar phenomena, with each participant observing a strict subset of them. The
considered scenario models a typical crowdsourcing of micro-tasks where a bundle of tasks
is assigned to a group of workers. For example, in text annotation, a requester could give
1000 sentences to a group of 100 workers, and each worker would annotate 50 sentences. By
utilizing the properties of such a multi-task information elicitation, we can achieve much
stronger incentive properties than the ones presented in the Chapter 3.
4.1 Formal setting
The main difference between the setting of this chapter and that of Chapter 3 is in the number
of phenomena that a group of agents observe. In particular, in this chapter we assume that
the center wants to elicit information about several statistically similar phenomena from the
same group of agents. As depicted in Figure 4.1, each agent is assigned to a speciﬁc subset of
phenomena and is asked to observe the phenomena and report her observations to the center.
By utilizing the structure of multiple phenomena, we seek to:
• allow agents to have less constrained private beliefs without necessarily reporting them;
• make uninformed reporting strategies, in which agents do not observe the phenomena,
less desirable than truthful reporting.
The ﬁrst property states that agents can have more diverse beliefs about each other’s ob-
servations than allowed by the single-task mechanisms, while the center only requires the
agents to report their private observations. The second property implies that uninformed
reporting strategies are worse off for the agents. Notice that this is a stricter property than
strict properness, which was discussed in Chapter 3. In particular, the property implies that
truthful reporting should result in a greater expected payoff than any collusive strategy which
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Figure 4.1 – Multi-task peer consistency setting
is not based on observations. This represents a significant improvement over single-task
mechanisms, which are often susceptible to even simple collusion strategies.
We distinguish two types of agents’ population: homogeneous and heterogeneous. The key
difference between the two types is that the former type assumes that agents receive their
private information in a similar fashion, while the latter type does not. In other words, for
the former type, agents have homogeneous characteristics, although their beliefs are private,
while for the latter, agents are considered to be entirely heterogeneous, both in their beliefs
and in how they obtain their private information.
4.1.1 Elicitation model
To model the setting in game-theoretic terms, we follow Section 3.1.1 in Chapter 3, but with
the following differences.
Instead of one, there are M >> 1 a priori similar and statistically independent phenom-
ena Φ = {Φ1, ...,ΦM }, meaning that agents distinguish them only by their observations and
that the observation about phenomenonΦi does not contain any novel information about
phenomenonΦ j .
Each phenomenonΦi is observed by at least 2 different agents, randomly chosen from a large
group of available agentsA (i.e., |A | >> 1). Unless specified differently, we will assume that
an agent observes exactly one phenomenon. This assumption does not have a significant
influence on the incentive properties discussed in this chapter: if it does not hold, we simply
partitionΦ into subsets that satisfy the assumption, and apply a reward mechanism to each
subset separately. The overall reward of an agent can then be defined as an average or a sum
of the obtained rewards.
Therefore, each agent a is associated with a phenomenonΦa . The peers of agent a are agents
54
4.1. Formal setting
who observe the same phenomenon, while agents who observe other phenomena are called
reference agents. A generic peer agent is denoted by p and a generic reference agent is denoted
by r . We assume that agent a does not distinguish her peers nor her reference agents.1 The
number of peer agents is k > 1 and the number of reference agents is K > 1.
When an agent a observes a phenomenon Φi , she receives a private observation X ia ∈X ,
or simply Xa (since agent a observes a single phenomenon). The observation of a peer p
is denoted by Xp , while the observation proﬁle of k peers is denoted by Xp = (Xp,1, ...,Xp,k).
Similarly, the notation for reference agents is Xr and Xr = (Xr,1, ...,Xr,K ).
Furthermore, agent a’s belief system Ba is similar to the one introduced in Section 3.1.1, and
is deﬁned by:
• prior belief regarding her own observation Pr (Xa) ∈P ;
• prior belief regarding the observations of agent a’s peers and references Pr (Xp ,Xr ) ∈
P k+K , and similarly for any subset of observations, e.g., for a single peer, we denote
Pr (Xp ) ∈P ;
• posterior belief regarding the observations of agent a’s peers and referencesPr (Xp ,Xr |Xa) ∈
P k+K , and similarly for any subset of observations, e.g., for a single peer, we denote
Pr (Xp |Xa) ∈P .
The probability distributions are assumed to be fully mixed. Moreover, posterior belief
Pr (Xp |Xa) is assumed to be stochastically relevant. As in the previous chapter, agents ai
and aj are allowed to have different beliefs (Prai and Praj respectively). However, it will often
be clear that the beliefs are associated to a speciﬁc agent a, in which case we drop the subscript
a from Pra (i.e., Pra → Pr ).
The statistical independence of phenomena is modeled by assuming that Xa1 and Xa2 are
independent for any two agents a1 and a2 who observe two different phenomena. This implies
that agent a’s posterior belief about a reference agent Pr (Xr |Xa) is equal to Pr (Xr ). Moreover,
agent a does not distinguish agent p and agent r , implying Pr (Xr )= Pr (Xp ).
Finally, agents are assumed to provide only their information report Yp , i.e., Ra ∈R =X . A
payment function τM depends on both peer reports and reference reports, i.e., τM (Ya ,Yp ,Yr ),
where Yp and Yr are report proﬁles of peers and references, respectively. Formally, a multi-task
payment mechanism is a mapping τM :×k+Ki=0 R→R.
1In game-theoretic terms, this can be modeled as agents having private ’types’ that are independently sampled
from a common distribution. Each agent would know her type, but would not know the types of other agents.
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4.1.2 Beliefs about peers
In order to establish the incentive properties of the mechanisms discussed in this chapter, we
consider four conditions imposed on the agents’ belief systems. The ﬁrst three conditions are
acquisitional constraints, while the third one is an updating constraint. One of the considered
conditions is a variation of the stochastic relevance conditions deﬁned for the acquisitional
belief constraints.
Acquisitional constraints
Observation process can be directly modeled using the state model condition CSM from
Section 4.1.2 applied to each phenomenonΦi separately.
Deﬁnition 12. Consider M random variables {ΩΦ1 , ...,ΩΦM } taking values inR. A belief proﬁle
BA satisﬁes the multi-task state model condition CMTSM if each belief system Ba is constrained
with the following set of assumptions:
• observation Xaj of agent a j who does not observe phenomenon Φi is statistically inde-
pendent ofΩΦi ;
• observations Xa1 and Xa2 of any two different agents a1 and a2 that observe different
phenomena are statistically independent;
• observations Xa1 and Xa2 of any two different agents a1 and a2 that observe phenomenon
Φi are conditionally independent givenΩΦi ;
• agent a’s prior belief regardingΩΦi is a probability density function pa(ΩΦi ) that takes
strictly positive values, and since phenomena are a priori similar, pa(ΩΦ j )= pa(ΩΦi ) for
allΩΦi andΩΦ j ;
• for all agents ai ∈A , probabilities Pra(Xai |ΩΦ j ) are strictly positive.
To indicate that the population of agents is homogeneous, one can impose a restriction that
the agents’ observations are generated in a similar fashion. More precisely:
Deﬁnition 13. Suppose that a belief proﬁle BA satisﬁes the multi-task state model condition
CMTSM. Then it also satisﬁes the homogeneous population condition CHP if for each belief
system Ba we have that:
Pra(Xai = x|Ωi =ω)= Pra(Xaj = x|Ω j =ω)
for all agents ai that observeΦi and aj that observesΦ j .
Notice that Pra(Xai )=
∫
RPra(Xai |Ωi =ω) ·pa(Ωi =ω)dω. Therefore, the homogenous pop-
ulation condition implies that agent a believes her observation to be a priori similar to the
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observation of any peer or reference agent: Pra(Xp )= Pra(Xa). More generally, for any two
agents ai and aj , Pra(Xai = x)= Pra(Xaj = x). Furthermore, for an agent ai who observedΦi
and her peer pi , we have that:
Pra(Xpi ,Xai )=
∫
R
Pra(Xpi ,Xai |Ωi =ω) ·pa(Ωi =ω)dω
=
∫
R
Pra(Xpi |Ωi =ω) ·Pra(Xai |Ωi =ω) ·pa(Ωi =ω)dω
where the last equality is due to the conditional independence of Xai and Xpi given Ωi . By
the homogenous population condition, it follows that Pra(Xpi ,Xai )= Pra(Xpj ,Xaj ) (where aj
and p j observeΦ j ), which gives us:
Pra(Xpi |Xai )=
Pra(Xpi ,Xai )
Pra(Xai )
=
Pra(Xpj ,Xaj )
Pra(Xaj )
= Pra(Xpj |Xaj )
More speciﬁcally, Pra(Xpi |Xai ) = Pra(Xp |Xa). That is, if agent a knows the observation of
agent ai (who observed a different phenomenon), then she has the same belief about the peer
of agent ai as she has about her own peer when she observes the same value. Notice that the
identities Pra(Xp ) = Pra(Xa) and Pra(Xpi |Xai ) = Pra(Xp |Xa) play an important role in our
analysis.
Finally, we consider a restriction that is similar to the stochastic relevance condition, but
slightly more restrictive. It states that an observation x is statistically different than any linear
combination of other observations.2
Deﬁnition 14. Suppose that a belief proﬁle BA satisﬁes the multi-task state model condition
CMTSM. Then it also satisﬁes the linear separability condition CLS if each belief system Ba
additionally satisﬁes:
KL(pa(Ωi |Xai = x)||
∑
z∈X \{x}
wz ·pa(Ωi |Xai = z))> 0
for all wz ≥ 0 such that∑z∈X \{x} wz = 1, where an agent ai observesΦi .
Notice that in the above conditions Pra(Xai |ΩΦ j ) and Pra′(Xai |ΩΦ j ) (and similarly pa(ΩΦi )
and pa′(ΩΦi )) are allowed to be different for two different agents a and a
′. However, it is often
clear which agent we refer to; in that case we drop the subscript a from Pra(Xai |Ω) and pa(Ω).
Updating constraint
In a more general case, agents are heterogeneous in a way they observe their private informa-
tion. While the multi-task state model condition CMTSM allows agents to be heterogenous in
a way they acquire private information, we will show that additional constraints are needed
2A similar condition is adopted by [CM85] in extracting the full surplus from efﬁcient allocation as revenue.
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in order to achieve desirable incentive properties. Therefore, we consider a belief updating
restriction equivalent to the self-predicting condition CSP introduced in Section 3.1.5, but
deﬁned for a multi-task setting.
Deﬁnition 15. A belief proﬁle BA satisﬁes the multi-task self-predicting condition CMTSP if
for the posterior belief of each Ba, we have that:3
Pr (Xp = y |Xa = x)
Pr (Xp = y)
−1< Pr (Xp = x|Xa = x)
Pr (Xp = x)
−1,∀y = x (4.1)
while Pr (Xr = y |Xa = x)= Pr (Xr = y).
As noted in Section 3.1.5, the self-prediction holds in the common case where an agent believes
that only the observation she endorses is more likely among her peers than was expected by
her prior belief. This includes binary answer spaces (as in [DG13]), as well as a more general
case when agents observe different samples drawn from the same categorical distribution,
but with unknown parameters sampled from a Dirichlet distribution.
We characterize the degree of correlation that an agent a believes to be possible between
different observation values x and y by the self-predictor δSP :
Deﬁnition 16. For a belief proﬁle BA that satisﬁes the multi-task self-predicting condition
CMTSP , we deﬁne self-predictor δSP as the smallest number in [0,1] so that for each belief
system Ba
Pr (Xp = y |Xa = x)
Pr (Xp = y)
−1<
(
Pr (Xp = x|Xa = x)
Pr (Xp = x)
−1
)
·δSP ,∀y = x (4.2)
holds.
The smaller the self-predictor is, the more distinguishable different observations are. For
example, δSP = 0 indicates that different observation values are not correlated, in a sense that
observing a value x should decrease the belief that a peer agent observes different value y . For
δSP ≈ 1, on the other hand, agents are more likely to confuse two similar observations.
4.1.3 Reporting strategies
To examine stronger incentive properties than those analyzed in Chapter 3, we extend the
agents’ strategy space to include both uninformed and misreporting strategy proﬁles. In
particular, an agent a now faces a choice between two basic strategies:
• informed reporting: observe a phenomenon to obtain observation Xa = x, but report
Ya = y , where y is randomly sampled from a probability distribution that depends on
3We keep −1 on both sides to make the proofs and the notion of the self predictor clear.
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observation Xa . An example strategy is when the agent is honest, in which case the
distribution function is of the form 1y=x , where 1cond is an indicator variable equal
to 1 when condition cond is satisﬁed, and otherwise is 0. A more general informed
reporting strategy would be when the distribution function is 1y=σˆ(x), where σˆ is a
bijective function σˆ : X →X . We refer to the strategies of this form as permutation
reporting strategies.
• uninformed reporting: not observe a phenomenon and report according to a ﬁxed
probability distribution function. The uninformed reporting strategy includes both
random reporting and collusive strategies in which agents agree in advance on reporting
the same value.
Furthermore, notice that an uninformed reporting strategy can be modeled using an informed
reporting strategy by equating all of the probability distributions from which Ya is sampled.
This means that we can assume agent a always makes an observation, but does not need to
base her reporting strategies on it.
Therefore, a generic strategy of agent a can be expressed with a set of probability distribution
functions Qa = {Qa,x ∈P |x ∈X } that deﬁnes how Ya is generated from agent a’s observation
Xa . In particular, for an observation Xa = x, Ya is a sample from a probability distribution
functionQa,x . We denote a superset of all possibleQa byQ and a set of probability distribution
functions associated to the honest strategy by Qhonesta , i.e., Q
honest
a,x (y)=1y=x .
Since agent a does not distinguish her peers and reference agents, from an agent a’s per-
spective, they have the same (expected) behaviour. Therefore, we can assume that peers and
references have a symmetric strategy proﬁle, so that Qp1 = ...=Qpk =Qrk = ...=QrK .
We now turn to the elicitation properties we investigate in this chapter, and the ﬁrst property
we deﬁne is properness of a multi-task payment mechanism, similarly to how it is deﬁned for
the single-task payment mechanisms.
Deﬁnition 17. We say that a multi-task payment mechanism τM is proper under the set of
belief constraints C if for all Ba ∈B(C ), a ∈A , and Qa ∈Qa\{Qhonesta }, we have that:
EXp ,Xr
(
τM (Xa ,Xp ,Xr )|Xa
)≥EYa ,Xp ,Xr (τM (Ya ,Xp ,Xr )|Xa) (4.3)
If the inequality is strict, then τM is strictly proper.
As argued in the previous chapter, the strict properness property is closely related to the
ex-post subjective equilibrium concept, in particular, it implies that truthful reporting is an
ex-post subjective equilibrium under the considered belief constraints. In this chapter, we
show how to achieve this property under weaker constraints on agents’ belief systems.
A stricter property is to require that agents cannot proﬁt by colluding. Clearly, without any
knowledge on how the agents acquire their observations, the center cannot, in general, make
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permutation strategy proﬁles strictly worse than honest reporting. Namely, if honest reporting
would result in strictly greater expected payoffs for one observation acquisition process, then,
by permuting the observations, we could deﬁne another acquisition process for which the
corresponding permutation reporting would result in greater expected payoffs than honest
reporting. Notice, however, that all of the permutation reporting strategies require that the
agents make observations and coordinate on their observations. Except for honest reporting,
the latter typically induces some cost. Therefore, our goal is to make honest reporting at
least as good as any other permutation reporting strategy and strictly better than any non-
permutation strategy. This is captured by a property called strong truthfulness [DG13, SAFP16],
which we deﬁne for the setting of this chapter as follows.
Deﬁnition 18. We say that a multi-task payment mechanism τM is strongly truthful under
belief constraints C if for all Ba ∈B(C ), a ∈A , Qa ∈Q, and Qp ∈Q, we have that:
EXp ,Xr
(
τM (Xa ,Xp ,Xr )|Xa
)≥EYa ,Yp ,Yr (τM (Ya ,Yp ,Yr )|Xa) (4.4)
where the equality holds only if Qa and Qp represent the same permutation reporting strategy.
Strong truthfulness implies strict properness in a sense that any strongly truthful mechanism
is also strictly proper. The converse is not true. Therefore, we minimally require that a payment
mechanism is strictly proper.
Remark 5. The strong truthfulness property implies collusive resistance in situation when
agents distinguish phenomena only by the values they observe. As pointed out by [GWL16],
if agents have alternative ways of distinguishing phenomena, there might exists collusive
strategy proﬁles that are more proﬁtable than truthful reporting. Although such a collusive
behaviour has been studied on a peer grading data set [SP16b], it is not clear whether these
types of misreporting strategies would be indeed adopted in practice. We leave further analysis
on how to cope with this type of collusion for future work.
4.2 Related work
One of the ﬁrst methods developed for a multi-task peer consistency is the peer consistency
mechanism of [DG13], which we refer to as the Dasgupta&Ghosh mechanism. The setting
that it operates in allows agents to be heterogeneous, both in their beliefs and in the way they
acquire their private signal. The mechanism assumes that observations are binary signals
related to an objective information, while the agents’ proﬁciencies in obtaining the true value
are bounded from below. Under this assumption, the Dasgupta&Ghosh mechanism is strongly
truthful. The acquisitional heterogeneity is reﬂected through the fact that agents are allowed
to have different proﬁciencies. However, as argued later in the chapter and independently
shown by [SAFP16], the Dasgupta&Ghosh mechanism requires that the categorical property
holds, i.e., that the increase from prior to posterior only happens for the observed value. This
property is not trivially satisﬁed when observations are non-binary.
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In contrast, [WP13b] analyze a minimal peer consistency setting where agents are homoge-
neous in the way they observe their private information, although their beliefs are subjective
(private). In particular, they apply the shadowing approach on empirical frequencies sampled
from independent phenomena to achieve strict properness for a homogenous population.
We develop on these mechanisms and extend them to settings with a non-binary observation
space. A host of recent results on the multi-task peer consistency methods is closely related
to our work. [KSM+15] investigate the same two settings as we do, and derive two strongly-
truthful mechanism, one for each of the settings. Both mechanisms resemble the robust
peer truth serum developed in this chapter, but are analyzed only in the limit case when the
number of phenomena is large. The correlated agreement mechanism of [SAFP16] adopts
the principles of the Dasgupta&Ghosh mechanism and generalizes it to a non-binary setting.
The mechanism is not necessarily strongly truthful nor strictly proper. Instead, it is informed-
truthful, which, in the case of a binary effort model, means that the mechanism provides
strict incentives for high effort, but agents are not strictly incentivized to report truthfully their
observations.4 Furthermore, the mechanism assumes a partial knowledge of agents’ belief
structure, which enables it to achieve its incentive properties using a small number of tasks.
The authors, however, describe an alternative approach that learns this partial knowledge
given a large enough set of tasks. [KS16b] provide a framework that one can use to derive
a number of results on strong-truthfulness, including the proof that the Dasgupta&Ghosh
mechanism is strongly-truthful. Moreover, they show how to extend the Dasgupta&Ghosh
mechanism to a non-binary setting, assuming that agents solve a large number of a priori
similar elicitation tasks.5 [SP16a] use replicator dynamics to demonstrate that the equilibrium
selection is important if agents are learning how to play over time. This result is supported by
the empirical study of [GMCA14], which experimentally showed that people can learn to play
uninformed reporting strategies if they result in higher payoffs.
Finally, we also mention the empirical work related to the peer consistency incentives de-
signed for two applications: peer grading and community sensing [ASC+10, KHKZ08]. While
several references propose the peer consistency mechanisms for massive open online courses
(MOOCs) [DG13, KSM+15, dASP16], to our knowledge, there has been very little work done on
evaluating different mechanisms in a peer grading scenario. The most systematic approach is
taken in [SAFP16, SP16a], where the authors study a structure of a MOOCs dataset and using a
replicator dynamics argued which mechanisms are potentially the most suitable for the peer
grading in MOOCs. Furthermore, [SP16b] raise practical concerns relevant for applying peer
consistency mechanisms in peer grading. By simulating several peer consistency mechanisms
4Informed truthfulness is a weaker notion than strong truthfulness, but as argued by [SAFP16], it is of a practical
importance, because informed-truthful mechanisms make uninformed reporting strategies strictly worse of than
informed ones. One of the important future steps would be to see whether a similar claim can be made for a
non-binary effort model.
5Both the learning algorithm of [SAFP16] and the mechanism of [KS16b] assume that an agent solves a large
(enough) number of a priori similar tasks. Thus, the allowed heterogeneity by these mechanisms does not
contradict Proposition 6, which provides an impossibility result of a proper knowledge-free elicitation for a
heterogeneous population of agents.
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on a MOOCs data set, they conclude that the gain from exerting effort in peer grading might
be relatively low due to frequent disagreement between peers. In contrast, we perform an
on-campus experiment that compares the performance of one of the mechanisms developed
in this chapter to the performance of mechanisms with a simpler structure. There is also a
growing literature that studies other aspects in peer grading and takes orthogonal approaches
to achieve a better quality of peer grades (e.g., [PHC+13, KWL+13, WTL15, WDK+15]). For
example, estimating the reliability of peer graders and correcting for their biases [PHC+13]
or improving the grading accuracy by providing the peer graders with a feedback about their
grading biases [WTL15]. In regard to community sensing, there is a vast literature addressing
different issues, such as the optimal sensor placement [KSG08] or privacy and trustworthiness
of sensors [DBFH09, CRKH11, SK13]. One of the peer consistency methods proposed for
information elicitation in community sensing setting is the peer truth serum (PTS) [FLJ14],
and we study how to modify its design to make it more robust.
4.3 Homogeneous population
We ﬁrst consider a homogeneous population of agents where the observations of different
agents are formed in a similar fashion. That is, the set of belief constraints C contains the
homogeneous population condition CHP
4.3.1 Minimal peer prediction with private priors
We start by demonstrating that the elicitation of private observations can be done with a
payment mechanism that asks agents to provide their information reports. To do so, we deﬁne
proxy events linked to the observations of other agents whose probabilities are the same as
those that would be reported in a prediction report, and use these to construct an expression
that an agent expects to be the same as the quadratic scoring rule. The mechanism acts as the
classical peer prediction [MRZ05], but instead of directly transforming an agent’s report to her
posterior belief, it appropriately samples reports of reference agents in order to obtain a term
that is in expectation equal to the agent’s posterior.
Mechanism
Consider an agent a1 that observes a phenomenonΦ1. Once agent a1 acquires observation
Xa1 = x, she updates her belief regarding the observation of her peer agent p1 to Pr (Yp1 |Xa1 =
x). If agent a1 believes that the other agents are honest, Pr (Xp1 |Xa1 = x) is also her belief
about the report of peer p1.
Now, consider another phenomenon Φ2 =Φ1 observed by a reference agent r2. Agent a1’s
belief about the observation of agent r2 is Pr (Xr2 ) because agent a1 does not observeΦ2. How-
ever, agents obtain their private observations in a similar fashion. Therefore, if agent a1 knows
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that a proxy agent aproxy2, associated to phenomenon Φ2, has observed Xproxy2 = y , her
belief about agent r2’s observation changes from Pr (Xr2 ) to Pr (Xp1 |Xa1 = y). Namely, agents
acquire their observation in the same way, so agent a1 should believe that Pr (Xr2 |Xaproxy2 = y)
is equal to Pr (Xp1 |Xa1 = y). This means that the indicator variable 1Xr2=z is in expectation
equal to Pr (Xp1 = z|Xa1 = y) whenever the proxy for phenomenonΦ2 observes y .
Suppose that r2 is honest, i.e., Yr2 = Xr2 , and that the observation of honest proxy aproxy2 is
equal to agent a1’s report, i.e. Yaproxy = Xaproxy = Ya1 = y . Then, the indicator variable 1Yr2=z
is in expectation equal to agent a1’s belief Pr (Xp1 = z|Xa1 = y), which would make up her
prediction report regarding her peer’s observation.
The idea is to arrange indicators 1Yr j =z so that they correspond to the quadratic scoring rule
(see (2.2) in Chapter 2), in which prediction Pr (Xp1 |Ya1 ) is scored by how well it predicts the
report of peer p1. Provided that the peer is honest, the expected score is maximized when the
prediction is equal to Pr (Xp1 |Xa1 ), which implies truthfulness of agent a1.
Minimal Peer Prediction with Private Priors. Let agent a1 and her peer p1 be an arbitrary
agents that report their observation Ya1 and Yp1 regarding the same phenomenon, here
denoted byΦ1.6 The mechanism has the following structure:
1. Randomly sample one response for all phenomena Φ2 =Φ1 that are not observed by
agent a1. We denote this sample by Σ and we call it double-mixed if it contains all
possible values fromX at least twice.
2. If sample Σ is not double-mixed, agent a1’s score is equal to τM (Ya1 ,Yp1 ,Yr )= 0, where
Yr are the reports of all the reference agents of agent a1 (in this case, all agents that have
not observedΦ1).
3. Otherwise, take two different phenomenaΦ2 =Φ3 =Φ1 whose Σ samples are equal to
Ya1 , and randomly select another sample for each of them to obtain two responses Yr2
and Yr3 . Finally, the score of an agent a1 is equal to:
τM (Ya1 ,Yp1 ,Yr )=
1
2
+1Yr2=Yp1 −
1
2
∑
z∈X
1Yr2=z ·1Yr3=z
Notice that the last step of the mechanism is only applied when Σ is double-mixed, and this
is important to prevent a potential bias towards the more likely observations. Namely, if the
fourth step is executed wheneverΣ contains two reports equal to report Ya1 , which is sufﬁcient
for calculating score τM (Ya1 ,Yp1 ,Yr ) in this step, agent a1 might report dishonestly in the hope
of increasing the probability of getting non-zero payoff.
Figure 4.2 shows one possible outcome of the elicitation process for a binary evaluation space
{x, y}. To score agent a1, the minimal peer prediction ﬁrst buildsΣ sample based on the reports
6Subscripts 1, 2, and 3 are chosen for clarity; they can be replaced by any three different numbers from 1 to M .
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Φ1 Φ2 Φ3 Φ4 Φ5
a1 x
p1 y
r2 x
r3 y
proxy2 x
proxy3 x
proxy4 y
proxy5 y
Phenomena
A
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s
sample Σ
Figure 4.2 – Minimal peer prediction with private priors.
of the proxy agents. Since Σ is double-mixed, the mechanism acquires the reports of agents r2
and r3, that, together with the report of agent p1, deﬁne agent a1’s score. In this case, the (ex
post) score of agent a1 is equal to
1
2 .
Properties
To illustrate the principle of the minimal peer prediction, consider an agent a1 with observa-
tion equal to Xa1 . Her belief about the observation of her peer is Pr (Xp1 |Xa1 ), while her belief
about the observation of a reference agent is Pr (Xr ). The mechanism works as follows. If Σ
is not double-mixed — which happens with probability strictly less than 1 for |Σ| ≥ 2 · |X | —
agent a1’s reward is 0. Otherwise, the mechanism searches in Σ for two phenomenaΦ2 andΦ3
whose Σ samples are equal to Ya1 . Since agent a1 knows that samples ofΦ2 andΦ3 are equal
to Ya1 , and all agents make observations in a similar way, agent a1 updates her belief about
the other observations ofΦ2 andΦ3: Pr (Xr )→ Pr (Xp1 |Ya1 ). This means that a1’s belief about
the observations of agent r2 (who observesΦ2 and whose report is not in Σ) and agent r3 (who
observesΦ3 and whose report is not in Σ) is equal to Pr (Xp1 |Ya1 ).
Furthermore, the indicators 1r2=z and 1r3=z in score τM (Ya1 ,Yp1 ,Yr ) are in expectation equal
to Pr (Yp1 = z|Ya1 ). Therefore, assuming that the agents other than a1 are honest and that
sample Σ is double-mixed, the score is in expectation equivalent to the quadratic scoring rule
SQ (Pr (Xp1 |Ya1 ),Xp1 ) whose expected value is maximized for Ya1 = Xa1 . More formally:
Theorem 8. The minimal peer prediction with private priors is strictly proper under the ho-
mogenous population condition, i.e.,C = {CHP }, whenever Σ sample contains at least two times
more elements than observation setX , i.e., |Σ| ≥ 2 · |X |.
Proof. Consider an agent a1 whose evaluation is equal to Xa1 = x, and suppose other agents
are honest, including an agent p1. Due to the independence of Xr2 and Xr3 and linearity of
expectations, the expected score of agent a1 for reporting x˜ when her peer reports y is equal
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to:
τ¯M (x˜, y)= pΣ ·
[
1
2
+Pr (Xp1 = y |Xa1 = x˜)−
1
2
· ∑
z∈X
Pr (Xp1 = z|Xa1 = x˜)2
]
where pΣ is the probability that Σ is double-mixed. Fully mixed priors and |Σ| ≥ 2 · |X | imply
that pΣ > 0, so τ¯M (x˜, y) has the structure of the quadratic scoring rule (see (2.2) in Chapter 2),
scaled by pΣ, that rewards agent a1’s posterior beliefs Pr (Xp1 |Xa1 = x˜) with the realization of
the outcome speciﬁed by peer p1’s report. Since the quadratic scoring rule is in expectation
maximized when agent a1 reports her true belief Pr (Xp1 = y |Xa1 = x), agent a1 is incentivized
to report honestly her observation, i.e., x˜ = x. Moreover, agent a1 is strictly incentivized to do
so because of the stochastic relevance of her posterior beliefs.
To score an agent, the mechanism requires 2 · |X | statistically similar phenomena in addition
to the phenomenon rated by the agent. Often, the number of phenomena that the mechanism
wants to monitor is signiﬁcantly larger than observation space X , as in product reviewing,
where the number of ratings is relatively small, e.g., 5, while many products have statistically
similar features, i.e., they are a priori similar.
While the mechanism represents a possibility result for knowledge-free information elicitation,
it does not satisfy strong-truthfulness. We, therefore, turn to an alternative approach, which
assumes that the population of agents is large.
4.3.2 Logarithmic peer truth serum
Instead of sampling reports to design a score that acts as the classical peer prediction, one
can score agents by the statistical signiﬁcance of their reports. This principle comes from the
(original) Bayesian truth serum (BTS) [Pre04], but we apply it in a different manner. Unlike the
original BTS mechanism, the novel mechanism does not require agents to have a common
prior belief and is minimal, in a sense that sensors report only their observations.
Mechanism
To determine the statistical signiﬁcance, we ﬁrst sample reports across different phenomena
and make the normalized histogram xΦ of reported values. That is, for each possible obser-
vation value x, we evaluate the fraction of reports in the sample that are equal to x. Second,
we calculate the normalized histogram xΦi of reports for each phenomenaΦi . The statistical
signiﬁcance of a report equal to x associated to phenomenonΦi is then deﬁned as log
xΦi (x)
xΦ(x)
.
Logarithmic Peer Truth Serum. Consider an agent who observes Φi and whose report is
equal to Ya = x. The logarithmic peer truth serum (log-PTS) applies the following steps to
reward the agent:
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• Calculate two empirical frequencies:
– Frequency of reports equal to x among agent a’s peers:
xΦi (x)=
1
k
·
k∑
i=1
1Ypi =x
– Frequency of reports equal to x among reference agents (rˆ1, ..., rˆM−1) that are not
each other’s peers nor peers of agent a:
xΦ(x)= 1
M −1 ·
M−1∑
i=1
1Yrˆi =x
To obtain reports from the reference agents (rˆ1, ..., rˆM−1), one can randomly sample
a report for each phenomenon, except the one observed by agent a.
• Finally, reward agent a for reporting Ya = x with:
τM (Ya ,Yp ,Yr )= log
xΦi (x)
xΦ(x)
To avoid potential issues with 0 values in xΦi and xΦ histograms, one can apply Laplace
(additive) smoothing with small smoothing parameters, or simply include the report of agent
a in both histograms. The latter would make the score equal to 0 when xΦi (Ya) = 0 and
xΦ(Ya)= 0. In our analysis, we use the convention of setting the score to 0 when xΦi (Ya)= 0
and xΦ(Ya)= 0.
Properties
Strict-properness. Consider an agent a whose belief systems satisﬁes the homogenous popu-
lation condition CHP , and assume that the other agents are honest. It can be shown that the
logarithm of ratio
xΦi (y)
xΦ(y)
from agent a’s perspective converges to:
lim
k,M→∞
log
xΦi (y)
xΦ(y)
=
a.s.
log
Pr (Xa = y |ΩΦi )
Pr (Xa = y)
where y is the agent a’s report. Using Bayes’ rule we obtain:
lim
k,M→∞
log
xΦi (y)
xΦ(y)
=
a.s.
log
p(ΩΦi |Xa = y)
p(ΩΦi )
= logp(ΩΦi |Xa = y)+b
where b does not depend on report y . The score has one indicative feature: agent a is
scored based on how well it predicts state ΩΦi . More precisely, log
xΦi (y)
xΦ(y)
is related to the
logarithmic scoring rule (see (2.1) in Chapter 2) applied on the posterior belief of an agent
whose observation is equal to y . The true belief of agent a is p(ΩΦi |Xa = x), where x is her
observation, so in order to be scored with her true belief, the agent should report y = x. Since
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the logarithmic scoring rule incentivizes agents to report their true beliefs, we obtain that
log-PTS provides proper incentives. To show this formally, we ﬁrst prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Consider an agent a who observes Xa = x. As k → ∞ and M → ∞, the agent’s
payment in the logarithmic peer truth serum is maximized under the homogenous population
condition (C = {CHP }) if and only if she reports y such that:
p(ΩΦi |Xa = x)= p(ΩΦi |Yp = y)
Proof. Reports from histogram xΦi are conditionally independent givenΩΦi , so we can apply
the law of large numbers to obtain:
lim
k→∞
xΦi (x) =a.s.Pr (Yp = x|ΩΦi )
where we used the fact that peers are homogenous (Pr (Xpi = z|ΩΦi )= Pr (Xpj = z|ΩΦi )) and
have a symmetric strategy proﬁle.
Next, consider reference agents (rˆ1, ..., rˆM−1). The reports of agents in (rˆ1, ..., rˆM−1) are statisti-
cally independent, which implies that:
lim
M→∞
xΦ(x) =
a.s.
Pr (Yp = x)
due to the properties of the homogenous population condition CHP and the fact that peers
and references have a symmetric strategy proﬁle.
Therefore, the expected score of agent a who observed Xa = x for reporting Ya = y is equal to:
lim
M→∞,k→∞
∫
R
p(ΩΦi =ω|Xa = x) · log
xΦi (y)
xΦ(y)
dω
=
a.s.
∫
R
p(ΩΦi =ω|Xa = x) · log
Pr (Yp = z|ΩΦi =ω)
Pr (Yp = z)
dω
=
∫
R
p(ΩΦi =ω|Xa = x) · log
p(ΩΦi =ω|Yp = y)
p(ΩΦi =ω)
dω
where the last equality is due to Bayes’ rule (the term inside the logarithm). The equation can
be further reduced to:∫
R
p(ΩΦi =ω|Xa = x) · log
p(ΩΦi =ω|Yp = y) ·p(ΩΦi =ω|Xa = x)
p(ΩΦi =ω) ·p(ΩΦi =ω|Xa = x)
dω
=
∫
R
p(ΩΦi =ω|Xa = x) · log
p(ΩΦi =ω|Yp = y)
p(ΩΦi =ω|Xa = x)
dω
+
∫
R
p(ΩΦi =ω|Xa = x) · log
p(ΩΦi =ω|Xa = x)
p(ΩΦi =ω)
dω
=−KL(p(ΩΦi |Xa = x)||p(ΩΦi |Yp = y))+KL(p(ΩΦi |Xa = x)||p(ΩΦi ))
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Notice that the only part that depends on the agent’s report is KL(p(ΩΦi |Xa = x)||p(ΩΦi |Yp =
y)). The expected payoff is negative in the KL divergence, so the best case for the agent is when
its value is equal to 0, which occurs if and only if p(ΩΦi |Xa = x)= p(ΩΦi |Yp = y).
Theorem 9. The logarithmic peer truth serum is strictly proper under the homogenous belief
condition (C = {CHP }) as k →∞ and M →∞.
Proof. Suppose that the peers and the reference agents are honest (Yp = Xp ) and let p(ΩΦi |Xa =
x) = p(ΩΦi |Yp = y) = p(ΩΦi |Xp = y). The homogeneity condition implies that p(ΩΦi |Xp =
y)= p(ΩΦi |Xa = y). Therefore, p(ΩΦi |Xa = x)= p(ΩΦi |Xa = y), which gives us:
Pr (Xp |Xa = x)=
∫
R
Pr (Xp |ΩΦi =ω,Xa = x) ·p(ΩΦi =ω|Xa = x)dω
=
∫
R
Pr (Xp |ΩΦi =ω) ·p(ΩΦi =ω|Xa = x)dω
=
∫
R
Pr (Xp |ΩΦi =ω) ·p(ΩΦi =ω|Xa = y)dω
=
∫
R
Pr (Xp |ΩΦi =ω,Xa = y) ·p(ΩΦi =ω|Xa = y)dω
= Pr (Xp |Xa = y)
where we used the conditional independence of Xp and Xa given ΩΦi . By the stochastic
relevance condition, it follows that y = x, which, by Lemma 4, implies the strict properness of
log-PTS.
Strong-truthfulness. Suppose now that the agents report according to a strategy which pre-
scribes that for an observation equal to x or y , the report is x, while for any other observation,
the report is truthful. In this case, the logarithm of ratio
xΦi (x)
xΦ(x)
converges to:
lim
k,M→∞
log
xΦi (x)
xΦ(x)
=
a.s.
log
Pr (Xa ∈ {x, y}|ΩΦi )
Pr (Xa ∈ {x, y})
= log p(ΩΦi |Xa ∈ {x, y})
p(ΩΦi )
where the last equality follows from Bayes’ rule. The part that is dependent on x is equal to
logp(ΩΦi |Xa = {x, y}). Therefore, if agent a reports x, she will get scored by the logarithmic
scoring rule applied on the belief of an agent who cannot distinguish between x and y . On
the other hand, if agent a’s observation is x, her true belief is p(ΩΦi |Xa = x). In other words,
her score is expected to be suboptimal, unlike in the case when everyone is honest. More
generally, log-PTS is strongly truthful for a large population of agents under the homogeneous
population and linear separability constraints. To show this, we ﬁrst prove a lemma which
states that the agents should adopt the same reporting strategy when they use permutation
reporting.
Lemma 5. In the logarithmic peer truth serum, under the homogenous population condition
(C = {CHP }), agent a’s strictly best response to a permutation reporting strategy is to report
according to it, provided that k →∞ and M →∞.
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Proof. Let σˆ be a bijective function that deﬁnes the permutation reporting strategy of an agent
a’s peers and references, i.e., Qp,x(z) = 1z=σˆ(x). Log-PTS rewards report y with the score of
report σˆ(y) when the peers and the references are honest. Due to Theorem 9, agent a’s best
response to truthful reporting of the other agents is to report Xa . Therefore, when the other
agents report according to σˆ, agent a’s best response is σˆ(Xa), which implies that the agent
should use the same reporting strategy as her peers and reference agents.
Theorem 10. The logarithmic peer truth serum is strongly truthful under the belief constraints
C = {CHP ,CLS} as k →∞ and M →∞.
Proof. Consider an agent a who uses strategy deﬁned by Qa and believes that her peers and
reference agents adopt a strategy deﬁned by Qp . Let us rewrite the condition of Lemma 4 as:
p(ΩΦi |Xa = x)= p(ΩΦi |Yp = y)=
Pr (Yp = y |ΩΦi )
Pr (Yp = y)
·p(ΩΦi )
where we applied Bayes’ rule. Due to the homogeneity condition CHP , we know that:
Pr (Yp = y |ΩΦi )=
∑
z∈X
Qp,z(y) ·Pr (Xp = z|ΩΦi )=
∑
z∈X
Qp,z(y) ·Pr (Xa = z|ΩΦi )
Pr (Yp = y)=
∑
z∈X
Qp,z(y) ·Pr (Xp = z)=
∑
z∈X
Qp,z(y) ·Pr (Xa = z)
which, together with the previous expression and Bayes’ rule, gives us:
p(ΩΦi |Xa = x)=
∑
z∈X
Qp,z(y)∑
zˆ∈X Qp,zˆ(y) ·Pr (Xa = zˆ)
·Pr (Xa = z|ΩΦi ) ·p(ΩΦi )
= ∑
z∈X
Qp,z(y) ·Pr (Xa = z)∑
zˆ∈X Qp,zˆ(y) ·Pr (Xa = zˆ)
·p(ΩΦi |Xa = z)
By setting w ′z = Qp,z (y)·Pr (Xa=z)∑zˆ∈X Qp,zˆ (y)·Pr (Xa=zˆ) , we obtain:
p(ΩΦi |Xa = x)=
∑
z∈X
w ′z ·p(ΩΦi |Xa = z)
Notice that w ′z slightly differs from wz in the linear separability condition CLS as it includes
also w ′x . If w ′x < 1, we can deﬁne wz = w
′
z
1−w ′x for z = x, so that wz ≥ 0,
∑
z∈X \{x} wz = 1 and:
p(ΩΦi |Xa = x)=
∑
z∈X \{x}
wz ·p(ΩΦi |Xa = z)
Due to the linear separability conditionCLS , this cannot be the case, which implies that wx ′ = 1.
Therefore:
Qp,x(y) ·Pr (Xa = x)∑
zˆ∈X Qp,zˆ(y) ·Pr (Xa = zˆ)
= 1
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Qp,z(y) ·Pr (Xa = z)∑
zˆ∈X Qp,zˆ(y) ·Pr (Xa = zˆ)
= 0,∀z = x
Since this has to hold for all possible observations x, we have that Qp,x(y)= 1. In other words,
peers and reference agents should use a permutation reporting strategy for the condition in
Lemma 4 to hold. Due to Lemma 5, agent a should also use the same strategy (i.e., Qa =Qp ) in
order for the condition to hold, which by Lemma 4, implies the strong truthfulness of log-PTS.
Hence, we proved the statement.
The main drawback of log-PTS is that it requires a large population of agents and, in particular,
a large number of peers. We therefore investigate an alternative approach which has more
stable payments as the number of peers decreases, and thus is more robust in terms of the
population size.
4.4 Heterogeneous population
Unlike the previous section, a group of agents is now considered to have heterogeneous
characteristics, i.e., agents differ in the way they observe phenomena. In the context of the
multi-task state model condition CMTSM , this would mean that, for two different agents a1
and a2, Pr (Xa1 |ΩΦi ) and Pr (Xa2 |ΩΦi ) are allowed to be different. We show, however, that it is
not possible to create strict incentives that would elicit both agent a1’s and agent a2’s private
signals under the set of constraints that contains only the multi-task state model condition
CMTSM . The intuition behind this result is that an agent might believe she is special in the way
she observes two possible observations x and y . In particular, she might believe that the other
agents swap these two observations.
Proposition 6. There exists no strictly proper mechanism τM under the multi-task state model
condition, i.e., C = {CMTSM }.
Proof. Consider two agents a1 and a2 that observe phenomenonΦi . Assume agent a1 believes
that the observation of any of her peers, Xp1 , is statistically similar to her observation:
Pra1 (Xp1 = x|ΩΦi )= Pra1 (Xa1 = x|ΩΦi ),∀x
while agent a2 believes that the observation of any of her peers, Xp2 , is a sample from the
distribution:
Pra2 (Xp2 = x|ΩΦi )= Pra2 (Xa2 = y |ΩΦi )
Pra2 (Xp2 = y |ΩΦi )= Pra2 (Xa2 = x|ΩΦi )
Pra2 (Xp2 = z|ΩΦi )= Pra2 (Xa2 = z|ΩΦi ),∀z = x, y
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Furthermore, let Pra1 (Xa1 = z|ΩΦi ) = Pra2 (Xp2 = z|ΩΦi ) and Pra1 (Xr1 = z|ΩΦ j ) = Pra2 (Xr2 =
z|ΩΦk ) for all evaluations z, where r1 and r2 are reference agents of a1 and a2, respectively.
By applying the properties of the multi-task state model condition CMTSM , we obtain from
the above conditions that:
Pra1 (Xp1 ,Xr1 |Xa1 = x)= Pra2 (Xp2 ,Xr2 |Xa2 = y) (4.5)
Pra1 (Xp1 ,Xr1 |Xa1 = y)= Pra2 (Xp2 ,Xr2 |Xa2 = x)
Now, suppose that there exists a strictly proper mechanism τM and let Xa1 = Xa2 = x. Strict
properness implies:
∑
Xp1 ,Xr1
Pra1 (Xp1 ,Xr1 |Xa1 = x)·τM (x,Xp1 ,Xr1 )>
∑
Xp1 ,Xr1
Pra1 (Xp1 ,Xr1 |Xa1 = x) ·τM (y,Xp1 ,Xr1 )
Since the formal setting assumes that the agents do not differentiate their peers nor reference
agents, by applying identity (4.5), we obtain:
∑
Xp2 ,Xr2
Pra2 (Xp2 ,Xr2 |Xa2 = y)·τM (x,Xp2 ,Xr2 )>
∑
Xp2 ,Xr2
Pra2 (Xp2 ,Xr2 |Xa2 = y) ·τM (y,Xp2 ,Xr2 )
which contradicts the assumption that τM is strictly proper.
Instead of imposing a restriction on how agents acquire their private information, we now take
an alternative approach and put constraints on their belief updating process. More precisely,
the condition we assume to hold is the multi-task self-prediction CMTSP , which allows the
agents to have a limited heterogeneity in observing the phenomena.
4.4.1 Robust peer truth serum
The mechanism we consider combines the ideas from [DG13, WP13b] with the peer truth
serum (PTS) introduced in [JF11, FLJ14, FPTJ14], and we call it the robust peer truth serum
(RPTS). The idea behind the mechanism is to use the distribution of reported values from
different phenomena as the prior probability of possible observations, and scale the reward
given for agreement between agents with this distribution. This solves the major issue with
the PTS mechanism as presented in [FPTJ14], which is that the prior distribution had to be
known.
Mechanism
The peer truth serum (PTS) [JF11, FPTJ14] rewards an agent who reports answer x only if
a randomly chosen peer reported the same observation. It uses a commonly known prior
probability distribution x(x) over possible values x, and rewards a matching report x with 1x(x) .
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Instead of using a predeﬁned value for x, we construct it from the reports of agents who
observe different phenomena. Since x is calculated from a ﬁnite number of samples, it is
possible that x(x) is equal to 0 for a certain report x, which would lead to an ill-deﬁned score
due to the division by 0. To overcome this problem, we distinguish values x for which statistic
x(x) is equal to 0. When x(x) = 0, an agent who reports x obtains a score proportional to 1x(x)−1
if her peer has also reported x, and a score proportional to −1 in any other case. Otherwise,
if x(x)= 0, an agent who reports x obtains 0, since there is no peer that matches the agent’s
report.
Robust Peer Truth Serum. Consider an agent a who observes phenomenon Φi and whose
report is equal to Ya = x. The robust peer truth serum (RPTS) rewards the agent using the
following steps:
• Randomly sample M reports from M different phenomena, including the phenomenon
Φi , but not agent a’s report.
• Calculate the frequency of reported values equal to x within this sample:
xa(x)= num(x)∑
y∈X num(y)
where num is the function that counts occurrences of reported values in the sample.
• Reward agent a for reporting Ya = x with:
τM (Ya ,Yp ,Yr )=
⎧⎨
⎩
1x=xp
xa (x)
−1 if xa(x) = 0
0 if xa(x)= 0
(4.6)
where xp is the report of agent a’s peer, who observes phenomenonΦi and whose report
is in the sample from which xa was obtained.
The RPTS payment function uses multiple reference agents, but unlike log-PTS, it requires
only one peer. This represents a signiﬁcant improvement in the numerical stability of the
score. If we can assign multiple peers p to agent a, which is the case when more than one peer
agent observesΦi , the ﬁnal score of agent a can be the average of the RPTS over all selected
peers. Due to the linearity of the expectation, the transformed score has the same incentive
properties. However, using multiple reports reduces the variance in payments which may
often be desirable.
Properties
Although RPTS is a nonlinear scheme, the expected score can be expressed in a closed form.
Lemma 6. The expected payment to an agent a with observation Xa = x and report Ya = y in
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the RPTS mechanism is equal to:⎧⎨
⎩
(
Pr (Yp=y |Xa=x)
Pr (Yp=y) −1
)
· (1− (1−Pr (Yp = y))M−1) if Pr (Yp = y)> 0
0 if Pr (Yp = y)= 0
(4.7)
Proof. To make the proof notationally clear, let us denote Pp|a(y |x)= Pr (Yp = y |Xa = x) and
Pp (y)= Pr (Yp = y).
It is clear that for Pp (y) = 0, the expected payment to agent a is 0. When Pp (y) > 0, the
expected payment to agent a is:
∏
ri |Xri =y
Pri (y)
∏
ri |Xri =y
(1−Pri (y)) ·Pp|a(y |x) ·
1
(num(Xri = y)+1)/M︸ ︷︷ ︸
due to
1xp=y
xa (y)
part when xa (y) = 0
−
(
1− (1−Pp|a(y |x))
∏
ri
(1−Pri (y))M−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
due to −1 part when xa (y) = 0
Since agent a does not distinguish her workers, Pp (y)= Prk (y). Let i be the number of reports
equal to y from reference agents. We have:[
M−1∑
i=0
(
M −1
i
)
·Pp (y)i · (1−Pp (y))M−1−i ·Pp|a(y |x) · 1
(i +1)/M︸ ︷︷ ︸
due to
1xp=y
xa (y)
part when xa (y) = 0
− (1− (1−Pp|a(y |x)) · (1−Pp (y))M−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
due to −1 part when xa (y) = 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
=
[
Pp|a(y |x) ·M ·
M−1∑
i=0
(M −1)!
i !(M −1− i )! ·Pp (y)
i · (1−Pp (y))M−1−i · 1
i +1
−1+ (1−Pp|a(y |x)) · (1−Pp (y))M−1
]
=
[
Pp|a(y |x)
Pp (y)
·
M−1∑
i=0
(M −1+1)!
(i +1)!(M −1− i )! ·Pp (y)
i+1 · (1−Pp (y))(M−1+1)−(i+1)
−1+ (1−Pp|a(y |x)) · (1−Pp (y))M−1
]
=
[
Pp|a(y |x)
Pp (y)
·
M∑
i=1
(
M −1+1
i
)
·Pp (y)i · (1−Pp (y))(M−1+1)−i
−1+ (1−Pp|a(y |x)) · (1−Pp (y))M−1
]
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=
[
Pp|a(y |x)
Pp (y)
·
M∑
i=1
(
M
i
)
·Pp (y)i · (1−Pp (y))M−i
−1+ (1−Pp|a(y |x)) · (1−Pp (y))M−1
]
=
[
Pp|a(y |x)
Pp (y)
· (1− (1−Pp (y))M )−1+ (1−Pp|a(y |x)) · (1−Pp (y))M−1
]
=
[
Pp|a(y |x)
Pp (y)
· (1− (1−Pp (y))M−1+Pp (y) · (1−Pp (y))M−1)
− (1− (1−Pp (y))M−1)−Pp|a(y |x) · (1−Pp (y))M−1
]
=
(
Pp|a(y |x)
Pp (y)
−1
)
· (1− (1−Pp (y))M−1)
Hence, we proved the statement.
Strict-properness. We now give an intuitive understanding of the RPTS mechanism, assuming
a scenario where there are many phenomena M in the mechanism.
To decide on her best strategy, an agent a should estimate the reward she can expect for
reporting observation y . From Lemma 6, the agent’s payoff converges towards
Pr (Xp=y |Xa=x)
Pr (Xp=y) −1
provided that her observation is x and that the other agents are honest. Intuitively, xa(y)
approximates prior Pr (Xp = y) as the agent has only prior information about her reference
agents, while the probability of matching the peer agent is equal to Pr (Xp = y |Xa = x). If agent
a’s beliefs satisfy the self-predicting condition CMTSP , i.e.,
Pr (Xp=y |Xa=x)
Pr (Xp=y) <
Pr (Xp=x|Xa=x)
Pr (Xp=x) for
y = x, then her payoff is strictly maximized for y = x.
A more formal analysis, including cases with a smaller number of phenomena, is given in
Theorem 11. In particular, the theorem gives a condition on the number of phenomena M that
the center should use in rewarding each agent. The condition is related to the belief systems
of the agents, and is expressed through self-predictor δSP .
Theorem 11. The robust peer truth serum is strictly proper under the multi-task self-predicting
condition (C = {CMTSP }) if the number of phenomena M in the mechanism satisﬁes:
1− (1−Pra(Xp = x))M−1
1−Pra(Xp = x)M−1
≥ δSP (4.8)
for all x ∈X and all agents a ∈A .
Proof. From Lemma 6, it follows that the expected payoff of agent a, with observation Xa = x
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and report Ya = y , is:(
Pr (Xp = y |Xa = x)
Pr (Xp = y)
−1
)
·(1− (1−Pr (Xp = y))M−1)
≤
(
Pr (Xp = y |Xa = x)
Pr (Xp = y)
−1
)
· (1−Pr (Xp = x)M−1)
<
(
Pr (Xp = x|Xa = x)
Pr (Xp = x)
−1
)
· (1− (1−Pr (Xp = x))M−1)
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Pr (Xp = y)+Pr (Xp = x)≤ 1 and the second inequality
follows from (4.1) (the self-predicting condition) and (4.8). We see that the maximal expected
payoff when the task is solved is achieved when agent a reports her true observation.
Strong-truthfulness. As has been done for the log-PTS mechanism, suppose now that the
agents report according to a strategy which prescribes that the report is x for an observation
equal to x or y , while for any other observation, the report is truthful. From Lemma 6, the
payoff for reporting x converges towards
Pr (Xp=x|Xa=x)+Pr (Xp=y |Xa=x)
Pr (Xp=x)+Pr (Xa=y) −1. Namely, in this case,
xa(y) approximates prior Pr (Xp = x)+Pr (Xp = y) as both agents who observe x and y report
x. Similarly, the probability of matching is Pr (Xp = x|Xa = x)+Pr (Xp = y |Xa = x). Let us
rearrange the expected payoff:
Pr (Xp = x|Xa = x)+Pr (Xp = y |Xa = x)
Pr (Xp = x)+Pr (Xa = y)
−1
= Pr (Xp = x|Xa = x)−Pr (Xp = x)+Pr (Xp = y |Xa = x)−Pr (Xa = y)
Pr (Xp = x)+Pr (Xa = y)
=
Pr (Xp = x) ·
(
Pr (Xp=x|Xa=x)
Pr (Xp=x) −1
)
+Pr (Xp = y) ·
(
Pr (Xp=y |Xa=x)
Pr (Xp=y) −1
)
Pr (Xp = x)+Pr (Xa = y)
=
(
Pr (Xp = x|Xa = x)
Pr (Xp = x)
−1
)
· Pr (Xp = x)+Pr (Xp = y) ·b
Pr (Xp = x)+Pr (Xa = y)
(4.9)
where we put:
b =
Pr (Xp=y |Xa=x)
Pr (Xp=y) −1
Pr (Xp=x|Xa=x)
Pr (Xp=x) −1
If agent a’s beliefs satisfy the self-predicting conditionCMTSP , i.e.,
Pr (Xp=z|Xa=x)
Pr (Xp=z) <
Pr (Xp=x|Xa=x)
Pr (Xp=x)
for z = x, then it has to be that b < 1, which implies that expression (4.9) is strictly smaller than
Pr (Xp=x|Xa=x)
Pr (Xp=x) −1. This, on the other hand, is the expected payoff of agent a when everybody
is honest. More generally, RPTS is strongly truthful if the agents’ belief systems are compat-
ible with the self-predicting condition CMTSP and the number of tasks exceeds a threshold
dependent on the self-predictor δSP . To show this formally, we ﬁrst prove an equivalent result
to that of Lemma 5 for log-PTS: agents should adopt the same reporting strategy when they
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use permutation reporting.
Lemma 7. Suppose that agent a’s belief system Ba satisﬁes the multi-task self-predicting condi-
tion (C = {CMTSP }) and condition (4.8). Then, in the robust peer truth serum, agent a’s strictly
best response to a permutation reporting strategy is to report according to it.
Proof. The proof is equivalent to the one for Lemma5. Let σˆbe a bijective function that deﬁnes
the permutation reporting strategy of an agent a’s peers and references, i.e., Qp,x(z)=1z=σˆ(x).
RPTS assings to report y a score equal to the score of report σˆ(y) when the peers and the
references are honest. Due to Theorem 11, agent a’s best response to truthful reporting of the
other agents is to report Xa . Therefore, when the other agents report according to σˆ, agent a’s
best response is σˆ(Xa), which implies that the agent should use the same reporting strategy as
her peers and reference agents.
Theorem12. The robust peer truth serum is strongly truthful under the multi-task self-predicting
condition (C = {CMTSP }) if the number of phenomena M in the mechanism satisﬁes:(
1− (M −1) ·Pra(Xp = x) ·
(1−Pra(Xp = x))M−2
1− (1−Pra(Xp = x))M−1
)
≥ δSP (4.10)
for all x ∈X and all agents a.
Proof. Consider an agent a that observes Xa = x and suppose her peers and reference agents
use a strategy proﬁle deﬁned by distribution Qp . The agent’s payoff for reporting y is equal to:
(∑
z∈X Qp,z(y) ·Pr (Xp = z|X = x)∑
z∈X Qp,z(y) ·Pr (Xp = z)
−1
)
·
(
1−
(
1− ∑
z∈X
Qp,z(y) ·Pr (Xp = z)
)M−1)
=
(
Qp,x(y) ·Pr (Xp = x|Xa = x)+∑z∈X \{x}Qp,z(y) ·Pr (Xp = z|Xa = x)
Qp,x(y) ·Pr (Xp = x)+∑z∈X \{x}Qp,z(y) ·Pr (Xp = z) −1
)
·
(
1−
(
1−Qp,x(y) ·Pr (Xp = x)−
∑
z∈X \{x}
Qp,z(y) ·Pr (Xp = z)
)M−1)
(4.11)
where we used Lemma 6 to calculate the expected payoff.
Let us simplify our notation with the following substitutions: p = Pr (Xp = x), Δp = Pr (Xp =
x|Xa = x)−Pr (Xp = x), q = ∑z∈X \{x}Qp,z(y) ·Pr (Yp = z), Δq = ∑z∈X \{x}Qp,z(y) · (Pr (Xp =
z|Xa = x)−Pr (Xp = z)). Expression (4.11) can be written in the new notation as:
Qp,x(y) ·Δp+Δq
Qp,x(y) ·p+q
· (1− (1−Qp,x(y) ·p−q)M−1)
We will prove the statement by showing that under the conditions of the theorem:
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1. An optimum of the expected payoff is achieved when Qp,x(y)= 1, regardless of q .
2. When q > 0 the payoff is lower than when q = 0.
Part 1:
Notice that the self prediction implies the existence of > 0 such that Δpp ·(1−)=
Δq
q . Therefore,
we have:
Qp,x(y) ·Δp+Δq
Qp,x(y) ·p+q
· (1− (1−Qp,x(y) ·p−q)M−1)
=
Δp
p ·Qp,x(y) ·p+
Δq
q ·q
Qp,x(y) ·p+q
· (1− (1−Qp,x(y) ·p−q)M−1)
= Δp
p
·
(
1−  ·q
Qp,x(y) ·p+q
)
· (1− (1−Qp,x(y) ·p−q)M−1) (4.12)
The optimum of (4.12) is achieved for Qp,x(y)= 1, regardless of q .
Part 2:
We also need to show that the agents whose evaluations are z = x lower the value of expression
(4.11) when Qp,z(y)> 0. Consider a function of λ ∈ [0,1]:
f (λ)= Δp+λ ·Δq
p+λ ·q · (1− (1−p−λ ·q)
M−1)= (Δp+λ ·Δq) · (
M−2∑
i=0
(1−p−λ ·q)i )
=Δp · (1+ Δq
q ·Δp ·λ ·q)(
M−2∑
i=0
(1−p−λ ·q)i ) (4.13)
where the second equality is due to (A.1) (see the appendix). For λ= 1, function f corresponds
to expression (4.11) with Qp,x(y)= 1. It sufﬁces to show that function f is strictly decreasing,
meaning that the optimal value is obtained when λ = 0. Since this trivially follows when
Δq ≤ 0, in the remaining part of the proof we only consider the case when Δq > 0. Due
to the fully mixed beliefs, p + q = 1 implies Qp,z(y) = 1 for all z ∈X , which further implies
Δq =∑z∈X \{x}(Pr (Xp = z|Xa = x)−Pr (Xp = z))= (1−Pr (Xp = x|Xa = x))− (1−Pr (Xp = x))=
−Δp < 0. This means that for Δq > 0, we have p+λ ·q ≤ p+q < 1. The partial derivative of f
w.r.t. λ is equal to:
∂ f
∂λ
(λ)=Δq · (
M−2∑
i=0
(1−p−λ ·q)i )− (Δp+λ ·Δq) · (
M−2∑
i=1
i ·q · (1−p−λ ·q)i−1)
Due to (4.13), condition (4.10) (which implies Δqq·Δp < 1p ), p +λ · q < 1 and Lemma 9 (in Ap-
pendix), a sufﬁcient condition for f to be strictly decreasing is that ∂ f∂λ (λ) < 0 for λ = 0. We
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have:
∂ f
∂λ
(0)=Δq · (
M−2∑
i=0
(1−p)i )−q ·Δp · (
M−2∑
i=1
i (1−p)i−1)
Expressions (A.1) and (A.2) imply:
∂ f
∂λ
(0)=Δq · 1− (1−p)
M−1
p
−q ·Δp · (1− (1−p)
M−1)−p · (M −1) · (1−p)M−2
p2
Therefore, ∂ f∂λ (0)< 0 whenever:
Δq
q
< Δp
p
·
(
1− (M −1) ·p · (1−p)
M−2
1− (1−p)M−1
)
Since Δqq ≤maxz =x
Pr (Xp=z|Xa=x)
Pr (Xp=z) and condition (4.10) holds, we conclude that
∂ f
∂λ (0)< 0. This
means that, from agent a’s perspective, the optimal value of Qp,z(y) for z = x is 0.
Conclusion:
From Part 1 and Part 2 of the proof, we conclude that agent a strictly maximizes her payoff
when the other agents adopt a permutation reporting strategy. Now, notice that condition
(4.10) is stricter than condition (4.8) (see below Lemma 8). Therefore, by Lemma 7, the strictly
optimal choice for agent a is to adopt the same permutation reporting strategy, which proves
that the RPTS mechanism is strongly truthful.
Condition (4.10) is stricter than condition (4.8) in a sense that any self-predictor δSP that
satisﬁes (4.10) necessarily satisﬁes (4.8).
Lemma 8. If self-predictor δSP satisﬁes condition (4.10), then it also satisﬁes condition (4.8).
Proof. Suppose δSP satisﬁes condition (4.10). We have that:
δSP ≤
(
1− (M −1) ·Pr (Xp = x) ·
(1−Pr (Xp = x))M−2
1− (1−Pr (Xp = x))M−1
)
=
⎛
⎜⎝1− (M −1) · (1−Pr (Xp = x))M−2
1−(1−Pr (Xp=x))M−1
1−(1−Pr (Xp=x))
⎞
⎟⎠=
(
1− (M −1) · (1−Pr (Xp = x))
M−2∑M−2
i=0 (1−Pr (Xp = x))i
)
<
(
1− (M −1) · (1−Pr (Xp = x))
M−2
M −1
)
< 1− (1−Pr (Xp = x))M−1
< 1− (1−Pr (Xp = x))
M−1
1−Pr (Xp = x)M−1
which means that δSP satisﬁes the condition (4.8). Hence, we proved the statement.
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Both conditions (4.8) and (4.10), as well as the expected payoff (4.7), depend on the number of
tasks M and self-predictor δSP . The bounds on δSP in(4.8) and (4.10) are always greater than
or equal to 0. This means that for categorical cases, where increase from prior to posterior
only happens for the observed value, the conditions (4.8) and (4.10) are satisﬁed regardless of
M and δSP . In the next subsection, we show how the number of tasks inﬂuences the amount
of positive correlation allowed between different observation values for a more general case.
4.4.2 Limiting cases with the number of tasks M = 2 and M →∞
We ﬁrst examine the case when the mechanism uses only 2 phenomena to reward an agent
and one of them is observed by the agent (i.e., M = 2). The expected payoff of an agent a with
observation x for reporting y is in that case equal to:(
Pr (Yp = y |Xa = x)
Pr (Yp = y)
−1
)
· (1− (1−Pr (Yp = y)))= Pr (Yp = y |Xa = x)−Pr (Yp = y)
when Pr (Yp = y)> 0, while it is 0 otherwise. This effectively means that for M = 2, the RPTS
score is in expectation equivalent to a score that rewards Ya = x with:
τM (x,Yp ,Yr )=1x=xp −x′a(xw ) (4.14)
where x′a(x)= 2 ·
(
xa(x)− 1x=xp2
)
=1x=xq , i.e., x′a(x) is constructed by sampling one report from
the phenomenon not observed by agent a. xp and xa are as deﬁned in the RPTS mechanism.
The requirement for strict properness of this score is that each belief system Ba satisﬁes:
Pr (Xp = y |Xa = x)−Pr (Xp = y)< Pr (Xp = x|Xa = x)−Pr (Xp = x),∀y = x
That is, an agent’s belief change from prior to posterior should be the largest for the peer’s
observation equal to the agent’s observation. However, the condition for strong truthfulness
(4.10) imposes restriction that observation values are categorical, i.e., the increase from prior
to posterior should only occur for the observed value:
Pr (Xp = y |Xa = x)−Pr (Xp = y)< 0,∀y = x
Although condition (4.10) is only a sufﬁcient condition of Theorem 12, it is actually tight for
M = 2. Namely, if the condition did not hold, agents with observations x and y , and beliefs
Pr (Xp = y |Xa = x)−Pr (Xp = y)> 0 and Pr (Xp = x|Xa = y)−Pr (Xp = x)> 0, would be better
off reporting the same value (e.g., all of them report x or y) than reporting honestly. This comes
from the fact that their expected payoff with such a collusive behavior would be Pr (Xp =
x|Xa = x)+Pr (Xp = y |Xa = x)−Pr (Xp = x)−Pr (Xp = y) > Pr (Xp = x|Xa = x)−Pr (Xp = x)
and Pr (Xp = x|Xa = y)+Pr (Xp = y |Xa = y)−Pr (Xp = x)−Pr (Xp = y) > Pr (Xp = y |Xa =
y)−Pr (Xp = y), respectively for agents with observations x and y .
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Table 4.1 – Desirable lower bound on δSP w.r.t. M and mina,z Pra,z(Xp = z)
M mina,z Pra,z(Xp = z)= 0.05 mina,z Pra,z(Xp = z)= 0.1 mina,z Pra,z(Xp = z)= 0.2
10 δSP ≤ 0.19 δSP ≤ 0.36 δSP ≤ 0.65
30 δSP ≤ 0.55 δSP ≤ 0.84 δSP ≤ 0.98
60 δSP ≤ 0.84 δSP ≤ 0.98 δSP ≤ 1
100 δSP ≤ 0.96 δSP ≤ 1 δSP ≤ 1
With a larger number of tasks, the RPTS mechanism is equivalent to a payment rule that
rewards Ya = x with:
τM (x,Yp ,Yr )=
1x=xp
x′a(x)
(4.15)
for x′a(x)> 0, and with 0 otherwise. Since x′a includes report xp , the mechanism can be simply
described by saying that agent a gets payment equal to 1x′a (x) when her report matches the
report of her peer, and 0 otherwise. For a large number M , the RPTS requirements for strict
properness and strong truthfulness coincide and are equal to the self-predicting condition
with an unconstrained self-predictor δSP ∈ [0,1]. In other words, RPTS allows, to some extent,
observation spaces that are not necessarily categorical.
We see that the center has to decide on an appropriate number of tasks to allow correlations
between two different observation values. To do this, it does not need a knowledge about
agents’ belief systems, only an upper bound on the minimal value of priors mina,z Pra(Xp = z)
and a lower bound on the value of self-predictor δSP . That is, mina,z Pra(Xp = z) should
not be overestimated, while δSP should not be underestimated. For example, one could
incrementally take reports of different phenomena into account - one by one - until the agents’
responses clearly indicate a bound on mina,z Pra(Xp = z), determined by the frequency of
the least frequent report, and a bound on δSP , determined by the correlation among different
reported values.
Conditions (4.8) and (4.10) specify the upper bound on correlations among different observa-
tion values, expressed by self-predictor δSP . In the table below we show how quickly the upper
bound of (4.10) approaches 1 as the number of tasks grows. Since, by Lemma 8, condition
(4.10) is stricter than condition (4.8), the upper bound applies for both conditions. Clearly,
for a reasonable number of tasks n, the bound allows signiﬁcant deviations of δSP from the
categorical case (δSP = 0), even for the prior with values as small as 0.05.
We have seen that RPTS reduces to a simple score when statistic xa is calculated based on only
one phenomenon in addition to the phenomenon being observed by an agent a. The form of
the score (4.14) is similar to the Dasgupta&Ghosh mechanism introduced in [DG13]. In fact,
they are equivalent (see Section A.3 in the Appendix), which means that the Dasgupta&Ghosh
mechanism is a special case of RPTS obtained in the limit case when xa is calculated from only
two phenomena. Moreover, the equivalence implies that the Dasgupta&Ghosh mechanism
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requires non-correlated (categorical) observation values for the honest reporting strategy
proﬁle to result in a maximum payoff.
4.5 Applications
The scenario depicted by Figure 4.1 captures many interesting crowdsourcing tasks. These
include objective tasks which have correct answers and subjective tasks where workers (agents)
are asked to provide their opinions. We present two examples of such crowdsourcing tasks,
peer grading and community (participatory) sensing.
4.5.1 Peer grading
One of the main challenges in massive open online courses (MOOCs) represents evaluation of
student assignments. This is especially true if assignments are essay questions that cannot be
graded automatically. In such cases, peer grading techniques can be applied: a participant
(student) grades assignments of their colleagues, and the grade of each student is obtained by
aggregating the peer-grades.
Peer grading in MOOCs represents an example of crowdsourcing where workers (agents) are
students who are assigned to grade their own assignments. A proper monitoring of such a
grading system is often infeasible due to a large number of participants, so the quality control
has to be designed in the form of incentives. Moreover, the incentives have to take into account
that participants have different grading abilities and are inclined to manipulate the reward
system.
Often, the quality control in subjective crowdsourcing tasks is achieved by using the output
agreement mechanism that rewards workers when their reports agree [vAD04, vAD08, HF13b].
This type ofmechanism, however, does not take into account thatworkersmay have a potential
bias towards more likely evaluations. That is, workers who believe that their opinion is not
the most common one, are incentivized to misreport. Moreover, colluding strategies where
workers report the same value result in higher payoffs, and such behaviour is likely to occur
[GMCA14].
We propose the RPTS mechanism for incentivizing peer-graders to invest their effort in grading
students. We consider a simpliﬁed version of the mechanism, similar to the one described by
expression (4.15), except that xa is calculated from all peer and reference reports. This does
not signiﬁcantly effect the incentive properties, as the number of peer graders per grading
task is relatively low compared to the total number of peer graders, so we can expect that xa
converges towards prior Pr (Xp ). On the other hand, the simpliﬁed version of RPTS is much
easier to explain than the one which samples reference reports to construct xa .
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(a) The correct solution to a quiz question and a
student’s solution
(b) Input form for corrections of a student’s so-
lution
Figure 4.3 – Peer grading task
Experimental setup
In order to test the impact that RPTS has on the quality of grades, we designed a peer grading
experiments within "Artiﬁcial Intelligence" course at EPFL. In particular, as a part of the
evaluation process, the course contained three quizzes, each consisting of two parts: in one
part, students were asked to add a missing code; in the other, they were asked to ﬁnd mistakes
in a given code. The three quizzes took place at different time periods during the semester,
assessing the knowledge about different topics of the course. Each problem in the quizzes
had a correct solution and these solutions were used to assign points to the students, which
were a part of the ﬁnal grade. The ofﬁcial corrections of the quizzes were done by the teaching
assistants of the course. Before the ofﬁcial points were announced, the students were asked to
correct the solutions of their colleagues based on the correct solutions.
A criterion to determine the quality of a solution for a part of a quiz in which students were
supposed to add a missing code was described by three to four different cases that deﬁned
potential mistakes or shortcomings of a student’s solution. These cases were designed so that
each of them covered combination of possibilities that could occur in the students’ solutions,
keeping in mind that the combinations are mutually exclusive between the cases. Naturally,
a peer grader was selecting only one of these cases, and reporting only one value in total for
the whole part. For the other part of the quiz, where students were supposed to ﬁnd mistakes
in a given code and correct them, a grading criterion was much easier to deﬁne. For each
mistake in a given code, a student could either: not ﬁnd the mistake; ﬁnd a mistake, but not
correct it; ﬁnd a mistake and correct it. Therefore, a peer grader was presented with these
three possibilities. Notice, however, that a peer grader made such reports for all mistakes that
were in a given code (four to ﬁve), effectively reporting several values. Each reported value
was treated separately in a peer rewarding mechanism. Figure 4.3a depicts the web interface
of the peer grading task.
To incentivize participation we rewarded the peer graders with bonus points (additional
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points that could improve their grades), that were obtained using one of the three different
reward schemes: the constant reward, the output agreement and RPTS. For the constant
reward regime, a peer grader who participated in the peer grading obtained the maximum
number of bonus points MaxTotalReward . For the output agreement, reward for reporting
an answer was equal to MaxTotalRewardNumTasks if a chosen peer reports the same answer, and is
0 otherwise. NumTasks denotes the number of sub-parts to grade, which was equal to
the number of reports that a peer grader made. The RPTS mechanism was also applied for
each report separately. Furthermore, RPTS was scaled with the scaling parameters equal
to α = β = 12 · MaxTotalRewardNumTasks — this ensured that the bonus points remained positive (see
Chapter 2). If a total number of the RPTS points exceeded MaxTotalReward , it was set to
MaxTotalReward . Finally, statistic xa(x) in RPTS was designed for each sub-part of a quiz
separately, and it was deﬁned as an empirical frequency of grades equal to x among all reports
that were rewarded with RPTS for that sub-part of the quiz.
To test the quality of the reward schemes, we split the students into three groups of approx-
imately the same number of students. Since participation in the peer grading experiment
was not obligatory, the sizes of these groups varied. Each group was rewarded using all three
reward schemes, but different mechanisms were applied for different quizzes in a round robin
fashion. That is: if RPTS was used to assign rewards to a group for peer grading the ﬁrst quiz,
the same group was rewarded with the constant reward for peer grading the second quiz; if
the output agreement was used to assign rewards to a group for peer grading the ﬁrst quiz, the
same group was rewarded by RPTS for peer grading the second quiz, etc.
In order to do a peer grading for a quiz, students needed to go through a tutorial that explained
the peer grading task and a reward scheme that was used to assign bonus points - these
two were separately explained in two different sections. The tutorial also contained two
examples, one for the task explanation and one for the mechanism explanation. Each example
contained a simple test questions for improving students’ understanding. Different schemes
had a different example question, showing the most basic features of the mechanisms. For
the constant reward, students were asked to answer how many points they would obtain
upon fulﬁlling the peer grading task, with three possible answers: MaxTotalReward per
task, MaxTotalReward in total, or it depends on how other raters grade. For the output
agreement, the question asked to pick the correct claim, provided that the peer reported
correct. The claims were: for reporting correct the reward is 0, for reporting incorrect the reward
is MaxTotalRewardNumTasks , or for reporting correct the reward is
MaxTotalReward
NumTasks . Finally, for RPTS, the
question asked what the reward was for reporting correct provided that everybody else reported
correct, and the options were: 5 · MaxTotalReward2·NumTasks , 3 · MaxTotalReward2·NumTasks , or 1 · MaxTotalReward2·NumTasks .7
The options for each question were presented in a different order for different groups. Figure
4.4 depicts the tutorial web interface shown to users. A reward mechanism in subﬁgure is the
output agreement; similar interfaces were designed for the constant reward mechanism and
RPTS, and can be found in Section A.5 of the appendix.
7We used numerical values in all of the three test questions.
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(a) Explanation of the peer grading task (b) Explanation of a reward mechanism (output
agreement)
Figure 4.4 – Tutorial about the peer grading task
Experimental results
We measured the quality of raw data (non-aggregated responses from students) with respect to
the corrections made by the teaching assistants. For each student, we calculated the number
of correct reports, and then, for each mechanism, we determined the average error rate, i.e.
the percentage of incorrect grades. To measure the statistical signiﬁcance, we performed
two tailed student’s t-test, with the signiﬁcance level of 0.05. The null-hypothesis was that
the students’ error rates for two groups rewarded by different mechanisms follow the same
distribution.
For the ﬁrst two quizzes, each peer grader graded 4 partial solutions of her colleagues; more
precisely, 2 solutions to the ﬁrst part of the quiz, and 2 solutions to the second part of the
quiz. Since our analysis did not reveal any statistical signiﬁcance of the accuracy of the raw
data across different schemes, we increased the number of solutions to grade for the third
peer grading task. That is, for the third quiz, each peer grader graded 10 partial solutions of
her colleagues; more precisely, 5 solutions to the ﬁrst part of the quiz, and 5 solutions to the
second part of the quiz.
Table 4.2 – Average error rate for different mechanisms
Mechanism Num. students Error rate (%)
RPTS 16 6.88
output agreement 16 10.48
constant 14 11.98
The results of the third quiz are shown in Table 4.2; for each group, they contain the number of
students and the average error rate. As we can see, RPTS outperforms the baseline algorithms
by 3-5%. Furthermore, t-tests (in Table 4.3) show that there is a statistically signiﬁcant dif-
ference between the error rates for the RPTS mechanism and the error rates for the constant
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Table 4.3 – T-tests: p-values for different mechanisms
Mechanism RPTS output agreement constant
RPTS - 0.0255 0.0497
output agreement 0.0255 - 0.5566
constant 0.0497 0.5566 -
reward or the output agreement, with p-values equal to 0.0497 and 0.0255, respectively.
4.5.2 Community sensing
In contrast to the previous chapter, we investigate now a community sensing scenario where
the network of community sensors is evenly distributed across an urban area and each sensor
reports frequently its measurements. This type of setting has been analyzed in [FLJ14], how-
ever, the proposed peer consistency method, called the peer truth serum, does not fully utilize
the properties of the setting. In particular, its major drawback is that uninformed reporting
strategies (strategies where sensors do not make measurements) can result in signiﬁcantly
higher expected payoffs than honest reporting, which we verify in this section.
We formalize the considered community sensing scenario using the multi-task peer consis-
tency model, describe the application of the RPTS mechanism in the considered setting, and
experimentally conﬁrm that it effectively discourages a wide range of collusive strategies —
those which are not based on sensors’ locations. Furthermore, we also compare its experi-
mental performance to that of the log-PTS mechanism, which also provides strong incentive
properties, but requires a denser sensor network.
Air pollution monitoring
As in the previous chapter, we consider an air quality monitoring over an urban area, where
each sensor is assigned a task of measuring air pollution at its location and reporting the
observed value to the center.
Air pollution is a localized phenomenon, meaning that its value signiﬁcantly varies with
distance. Therefore, we approximate the correlation between two distant measurements by
assuming that they are conditionally independent given a global state Γ, which is modeled as
a random variable that takes values in a ﬁnite discrete set {γ1,γ2, ...}.
In particular, we model sensors’ belief systems as in the formal setting of this chapter, but
assuming that they depend on a speciﬁc value of Γ. In other words, the parameters of an agent
a’s belief system, such as probability distribution functions Pr (Xp ,Xr |Xa) and Pr (Xp ,Xr ),
depend on Γ, but satisfy the conditions imposed by the formal model and the set of constraints
C for each value of Γ. For example, Xp and Xr are independent (given Γ), and if the self-
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predicting condition CMTSP is imposed, the belief system satisﬁes:
Pr (Xp = y |Xa = x,Γ= γ)
Pr (Xp = y |Γ= γ)
< Pr (Xp = x|Xa = x,Γ= γ)
Pr (Xp = x|Γ= γ)
, y = x
for all γ ∈ {γ1,γ2, ...}. The set of peers of sensor a is now deﬁned as the sensors located in
the vicinity of sensor a, while the reference sensors are those located relatively far away
from sensor a. With this structure of sensors’ beliefs, the expected payoffs of sensors in the
mechanisms discussed in this chapter preserve the properties of strict properness and strong
truthfulness.8
Simulation setup
We examine the characteristics of incentives using realistic data of Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2)
concentrations over the city of Strasbourg. The data consists of both real measurements
collected by ASPA [ASP13] and estimations of pollution from the physical model ADMS Urban
V2.3 [CWC+02]. In total, the data set contains concentrations of NO2 for each hour, expressed
in parts per million (ppm), at 116 different locations over a period of four weeks. Each of
the 116 locations represents a sensor that reports measurements on hourly basis and gets
rewarded for each report separately. Figure 4.5 shows the sensor locations of the Strasbourg
dataset.
??????????????????? ??????????
???????????????????????????????
Figure 4.5 – Sensor placement in Strasbourg urban area
Although the initial measurements take values in R, we discretize it using four levels of
pollution deﬁned as:
• low: concentrations 0−20 ppb;
• medium: concentrations 20−40 ppb;
8In log-PTS and RPTS, one can choose reference sensors that are not each other’s peers when calculating xΦ
and xa , respectively.
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• high: concentrations 40−60 ppb;
• extra-high: concentrations 60−∞ ppb.
Each hour, sensors report the measured level of pollution to the center and are rewarded for
providing their measurements. As a criterion for peer selection, we consider distance and
deﬁne peers of a certain sensor as k closest sensors. For example, Figure 4.5 shows where
peers of 2 sensors, sensor 27 and sensor 103, are located on the map. The peers of a sensor are
in this case deﬁned as the ten sensors closest to it.
In the RPTS mechanism, we select one of k = 10 peers to score a sensor using the simpliﬁed
version of the RPTS mechanism, in which statistic xa is calculated from all of the reports
except the report of a sensor being scored. In the peer selection process of RPTS mechanism,
we effectively simulate the prior knowledge of the center by identifying for each location a
neighboring location at which the true measurements are the most correlated to the true
measurements at the considered location.9 The sensor located in this neighboring location is
considered to be a peer.10
In the peer truth serum (e.g., [JF11, FPTJ14]), we use the same peer selection process as in
the RPTS mechanisms. The PTS mechanism requires a knowledge about sensors’ prior belief,
so we construct the prior by calculating the frequency of different pollution levels in the
whole dataset. Notice that the frequencies are calculated from the true data, not sensors’
reports that are not necessarily truthful. The obtained prior x is equal to: x(low) = 0.402,
x(medium) = 0.384, x(high) = 0.16, x(extr a −high) = 0.054. The PTS mechanisms uses
the same scaling parameters as RPTS. Thus, it rewards sensor a with 1/x(Ya)−1 if its report
matches the report of her peer, and otherwise the payoff of the sensor is equal to −1.
In the log-PTS mechanism, we use all k = 15 peers to calculate the frequency of peer reports
xΦi , while we simplify the calculation of the frequency of reference reports xΦ by including in
it the reports of all sensors, except for the report of the sensor that is being scored. The latter
resembles the simpliﬁcation that we adopted for the RPTS mechanism. Furthermore, xΦi and
xΦ are smoothed using the Laplace (additive) smoothing operator with parameters αΦi = 10−4
and αΦi = 10−3 (parameters reﬂect that xΦ is calculated based on approximately 8 times more
reports than xΦ). No speciﬁc scaling was used in the log-PTS mechanism.
To demonstrate the correctness of our results, we examine six different reporting strategies
and evaluate their performance by analyzing the average scores of sensors. The six strategies
are deﬁned as follows:
• honest: All sensors are honest.
9Notice that we examine the correlations using the true data, not sensors’ reports, which are not necessarily
truthful.
10On average, the best response to truthfulness is to report honestly, indicating that, in the considered data set,
the self-predicting condition holds in an average case.
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• collude: Sensors collude so that those who observe low or medium report low , while
those who observe high or extr a−high report high.
• colludeLow: All sensors collude and report low .
• colludeExtraHigh: All sensors collude and report extr a−high.
• random: A sensor whose score is being calculated reports uniformly at random, while
others sensors are honest.
• randomAll: All sensors report uniformly at random.
For each sensor, we run a separate process in which the sensors report according to one of
these strategy proﬁles and we calculate the average payoff of the considered sensor.
Simulation results
The statistics of the average RPTS payoffs are shown in Table 4.4.11 These payoffs can be
further scaled in different ways, so that, for example, the incentives take positive values and
cover the cost of sensing.
Table 4.4 – Average payoffs — RPTS
Strategy mean min max median 1st quartile 3rd quartile
honest 0.678 -0.003 5.997 0.366 0.27 0.781
collude 0.232 -0.0146 2.177 0.105 0.07 0.281
colludeLow 0 0 0 0 0 0
colludeExtraHigh 0 0 0 0 0 0
random 0.022 -0.1974 2.678 -0.108 -0.143 0.017
randomAll 0.007 -0.216 0.214 0.018 -0.044 0.061
As expected, random reporting strategies lead to scores that are concentrated around 0,
which is clearly seen from the median of random and randomAll strategies. Colluding on a
single value results in a payoff equal to 0, and this trivially follows from the structure of the
score. Collusion strategy collude has lower mean of the average payoffs than honest reporting.
Moreover, a careful inspection of medians and quartiles shows that the collusive strategies
are worse than honest reporting for the majority of sensors: the median, the 1st quartile, the
3rd quartile and the maximum of average payoffs are greater for honest reporting than for the
collusive strategies.
The described scenario involves stationary sensors, which means that the sensors are solving
approximately the same task over a longer period of time. This means that some sensors might
11T-tests show that the RPTS payments for truthful reporting are statistically different than the RPTS payments
for the other strategy proﬁles, with p-values smaller than 0.01. The same holds for the log-PTS (Table 4.6). For
the standard PTS (Table 4.5), the highest paying strategy proﬁle is colludeExtraHigh, with payments that are
statistically different than the PTS payments for the other strategy proﬁles (p-values are smaller than 0.01).
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Table 4.5 – Average payoffs — PTS
Strategy mean min max median 1st quartile 3rd quartile
honest 1.992 1.449 3.094 1.908 1.72 2.183
collude 1.982 1.724 2.394 1.966 1.882 2.054
colludeLow 1.485 1.485 1.485 1.485 1.485 1.485
colludeExtraHigh 17.618 17.618 17.618 17.618 17.618 17.618
random -0.01 -0.333 0.387 -0.022 -0.116 0.083
randomAll 0.87 0.478 1.282 0.861 0.761 0.941
be favored in terms of their average payoffs. For example, a sensor that reports randomly
might obtain a relatively high average payoff over a longer sensing period when the histogram
of its reports is more correlated to the reports of its peer than statistic xa is. Although the
sensor reports randomly, its reports carry some information about its peer w.r.t. xa , hence it is
not surprising that such a sensor might obtain positive rewards. Notice, however, that honest
reporting leads to signiﬁcantly higher payoffs, as shown in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.6 – Average payoffs (times 10) of honest and random strategies for each sensor,
arranged in no particular order along the x-axis.
Unlike the RPTS mechanisms, the standard version of PTS is not resistant to collusive strategies.
As shown in Table 4.5, payoffs of the PTS mechanisms are signiﬁcantly higher for collusive
strategies, in particular, when sensors report the least likely value (extr a −high), which
leads to the order of magnitude greater payoffs than truthful reporting. This shows us the
importance of the robust design that can be achieved in the multi-task model.
Finally, we examine the payoffs of log-PTS and compare its qualitative performance to RPTS.
The statistic of the average log-PTS payoffs is shown in Table 4.6. As for RPTS, these payoffs
can be scaled so that they take positive values.
Qualitative performance of log-PTS is the same as for RTPS: honest reporting results in the
highest payoff. However, to achieve these properties, log-PTS requires a relatively dense sensor
network, with about 15 peers. We further investigate how robust log-PTS is when the density
of the sensor network decreases. To do so, we randomly sample subsets of sensors of different
sizes (100, 80, 60 and 40 sensors) on daily basis (i.e., each day a different subset is chosen), and
we calculate the median of average payoffs. Namely, the median of average payoffs reﬂects
89
Chapter 4. Multi-task peer consistency mechanisms
Table 4.6 – Average payoffs — log-PTS
Strategy mean min max median 1st quartile 3rd quartile
honest 0.037 -1.153 0.291 0.047 -0.017 0.102
collude 0.014 -0.27 0.106 0.019 -0.009 0.039
colludeLow 0 0 0 0 0 0
colludeExtraHigh 0 0 0 0 0 0
random -0.876 -1.631 -0.36 -0.823 -1.075 -0.673
randomAll -0.228 -0.362 -0.123 -0.228 -0.258 -0.19
how good a reporting strategy is for the majority of the sensors. In addition to reducing the
number of sensors, we also reduce the number of peers for each sensor. For example, in a
random subset of 80 sensors, the set of peers of a certain sensor contains 11 closest sensors.
Since the average payoffs in Table 4.6 for honest reporting were signiﬁcantly higher than for
random reporting strategies, we only examine honest, collude and colludeLow strategy proﬁles
(colludeHigh results in the same payoff as colludeLow). The detailed results can be found in
Section A.4 of the appendix, and they include also other indicators, such as the mean of the
average payoffs.
Figure 4.7 shows the median of the average payoffs for the three strategies. Scores are scaled
so that the maximum score is equal to 50, while the score in colludeLow strategy proﬁle is
equal to 10. We can see that truthful reporting remains the optimal strategy until the number
of sensors decreases to 40, which represents a critical value where the collusive strategies
colludeLow and collude become more proﬁtable than truthfulness. This can be explained by
the low amount of information used in generating xΦi and xΦ (xΦi is constructed from only 7
reports). In colludeLow and collude strategies, sensors report one and two levels of pollution
respectively, so these strategies are less susceptible to random variations in measurements
than truthful reporting, where all four levels of pollution are reported.
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Figure 4.7 – Median of average payoffs for different number of sensors and peers (log-PTS).
Unlike log-PTS, RPTS produces relatively stable scores across different conﬁgurations in the
number of sensors and peers. To avoid a potential bias in the peer selection process, we
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now use all peers in rewarding a sensor with the RPTS mechanism: the reward of a sensor
is obtained by averaging RPTS rewards across all of the peers. As shown in Figure 4.8, RPTS
scales down quite well, preserving the strong incentive properties even for a relatively small
population of sensors. This implies a greater practicality of the RPTS mechanism when
compared to the log-PTS mechanism.
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Figure 4.8 – Median of average payoffs for different number of sensors and peers (RPTS).
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigated an elicitation setting where agents observe multiple phenom-
ena, which models a typical multi-task crowdsourcing scenario. We showed that, when agents’
characteristics are homogeneous, there exists a simple and intuitive mechanism for truthful
elicitation of agents’ private information. The mechanism implements the peer prediction
with the quadratic scoring rule by appropriately sampling reports in the multi-task setting. Un-
like the (original) peer prediction, it does not require the knowledge of agents’ beliefs, that are
also allowed to be different. When the population of agents is large, we showed how to adopt
the principles of the (original) Bayesian truth serum in order to construct a mechanism that
not only allows agents to have different private beliefs, but is also strongly truthful, meaning
that truthful reporting results in the highest payoff among all strategy proﬁles.
On the other hand, for agents with heterogeneous characteristics, it is not possible to produce
strict incentives for truthfulness in the general case. Therefore, we analyzed the case when
agents have limited heterogenous characteristics, described by the self-predicting condition.
We presented a robust version of the peer truth serum mechanism, and showed that it has
strong incentive properties. Due to its simplicity and robustness, the mechanism is applicable
to a wide variety of crowdsourcing settings, such as community sensing or peer grading, which
we supported with experiments and simulations.
The mechanisms explained in this section rely on rewarding agents when their reports match.
Therefore, an interesting direction would be to explore whether one can extend the principles
of the continuous BTS to allow strong truthfulness in the multi-task setting when observations
are real-valued. Such a result is likely to provide a great insight into how much heterogeneity
91
Chapter 4. Multi-task peer consistency mechanisms
one can allow in multi-tasks settings. We conjecture that, under the multi-task state model
CMTSM , there is no strictly proper mechanism that allows deviations from the homogenous
population condition CHP when observations take real values. We expect that this result could
be proven in a similar fashion as Theorem 7 from the previous chapter. Notice that the claim
in this case is much stronger than that of Proposition 6.
Since the strong truthfulness implies strict properness, the results related to the elicitation of
real-valued observations could also explain why the existing strongly truthful mechanisms for
the homogenous population condition CHP , such as log-PTS or the mechanism of [KSM+15],
require a large number of phenomena. Namely, by examining the structure of the existing
strictly proper mechanisms for the homogenous population condition CHP , we expect that
any strictly proper mechanism designed for the same belief constraint, but real-valued obser-
vations, might need to sample any number of phenomena with strictly positive probability.
Finally, notice that the incentive properties of this and the previous chapter, i.e., strong truth-
fulness and strict properness, rely on agents being rational and responding to incentives. In
contrast, if there is a large enough coalition of malicious agents who deliberately misreport,
these properties do not sufﬁce to incentivize other agents to report honestly, nor do they pre-
vent the center from learning a wrong aggregate. Therefore, in the next chapter we investigate
a setting where a few agents are trusted to provide truthful observations, so that the center can
use their reports to construct incentives for informed reporting and limit the negative impact
of malicious participants.
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line information aggregation
In the previous chapters, crowd participants are assumed to be rational agents who respond
to incentives provided by the center. This approach, however, reaches its limit of effectiveness
when a participant intends to be malicious and intentionally misreports values. Therefore, we
investigate a more rigorous approach in order to identify faulty or malicious agents — one
that is based on the reputation system framework. Notice that the agents are now assumed to
interact with the center over a longer period of time. This fact enables us to track the quality
of the information that agents provide via reputations, and hence discard information that
comes from low quality agents.
5.1 Formal setting
Figure 5.1 depicts the particularities of our setting. The center plays a role of an aggregator
that aims to estimate the state of a time evolving phenomenon based on the information
provided by a group of agents. At the beginning, the center has only prior information about
the observed phenomenon. After some time, the center receives a report and merges it with
the current estimate of the phenomenon using a pre-speciﬁed aggregation procedureM , thus
producing a new estimate. This process repeats until a trusted agent reports her observation,
after which the center can evaluate the reports of the crowd participants. We consider this
to be one period of sensing and we denote it by t . The sensing process then continues in the
same manner until the period t = T ; we refer to T as sensing time.
Notice that we consider the case where the private information is noisy and trusted agents are
a sparse resource. This means that the center cannot only use the reports of trusted agents
to properly monitor the phenomenon, but rather it needs to support their observation with
that of other agents. As an example scenario, one can consider sensing of an environmental
phenomena, such as air pollution, where it is reasonable to assume that the center can place a
few of its accurate sensors on, for example, public transportation, but to obtain a ﬁner grained
sensing resolution, it uses crowd participants.
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Center
Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3
Trusted 
 agent
Report
Update
Evaluate
reports
Estimate 1 Estimate 2 Estimate 3
Figure 5.1 – Elicitation with online information aggregation
5.1.1 Aggregation model
In the considered setting, the center’s goal is to construct and publish an estimate E about
the current state of a time-evolving phenomenon, using the currently available set of obser-
vations. We are particularly interested in a real-time updating where estimate E is updated
after receiving each observation using an aggregation model M . We keep a general form
of aggregation modelM , where the input is deﬁned by a ﬁnite set of reported observations
{Y1,Y2, ...}, while the output is an estimate E .1 Estimate E can contain different information
about the phenomenon. For example, in case of pollution sensing, which is a spatially dis-
tributed phenomenon, the estimate could contain the probability distribution functions over
possible observations at different points of interest.
Since we want to keep a possibility of having a very general aggregation modelM , we consider
it as a black box. This implies that after receiving a report from agent a, the center should
decide whether to publish a new estimate Enewa obtained by incorporating the report Ya into
the existing estimate Eolda or to keep the existing estimate as its output. The rationale behind
this is that the estimate updating should be computationally efﬁcient. If, for example, a new
output would be a linear combination of Enewa and E
old
a , a proper updating procedure for
obtaining Pnewa would have an exponential time complexity in the number of agents, as we
argue in the following sections.
1ModelM can also use other information in calculating estimates. For example, in community sensing, sensors
can report both their locations and measurements, which is useful for aggregation models based on spatial corre-
lations. Furthermore, modelM can incorporate agent speciﬁc information in its aggregation procedure, which
can be prior or elicited knowledge. For example, agents can report how conﬁdent they are in their observations, in
which case, modelM can weight reported observations according to agents’ conﬁdences.
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5.1.2 Population of agents
In the considered setting, the center trusts a certain number of agents that we refer to as the
trusted agents; these agents are assumed to report truthful observations. The center does not
know the character of other agents, i.e., whether they are malicious or not. Non-malicious
agents are considered to be strategic — rational agents that aim to maximize their payoffs —
or honest, while malicious agents do not respond to incentives and their goal is to lower the
quality of produced estimates. In the group of malicious agents, we can also put faulty agents
that are not intentionally malicious, but do provide inaccurate data. Furthermore, notice
that malicious agents might report accurately in some sensing periods in order to deceive
the center. This means that the decision on how to use the agents’ reports in the information
fusion process should be done by monitoring the behaviour of the agents over the whole
sensing time T .
As for the previous chapters, we denote agent a’s observation by Xa , and we consider it to
be a random variable that takes values in X . The agents are assumed to provide only their
information report Ya , i.e., Ra ∈R =X .2 We focus on the payment mechanisms that reﬂect
agent a’s contributions to the quality of provided estimates, measured by scoring them against
a trusted report. Therefore, a payment function τG , which we deﬁne in the next subsection,
depends on agent a’s report and the report of a trusted agent. Moreover, it also depends on
the estimate published prior to the agent’s observation and the center’s aggregation modelM .
To simplify the description of our algorithm, we impose three conditions for agents: an agent
reports one measurement per time period, observations between two time periods t1 and t2
are statistically independent, and reports from different agents arrive stochastically one at a
time (i.e., without a speciﬁc order).
Strategy space. We make restrictions to the strategic space of malicious agents by assuming
that their reports do not have a signiﬁcant impact on the quality of the information provided
by non-malicious agents. As noted by [RS07], the restriction to myopic strategies is not a
trivial assumption, but still allows a large scope of possible misreporting strategies, including
strategies where malicious agents change their reporting behaviour over time.3 Furthermore,
it is likely that non-myopic strategies require complex implementation. For example, an
effective malicious strategy that is based on the report sequence would require information
about the start and end time of the sensing periods. Since each sensing period ends when
a trusted report is submitted, the center can easily obscure the starting point of a sensing
period by, for example, not immediately notifying agents of their reputation change. This also
2While in our formal model we assume that agents only report their observations, the main results of this
chapter are not dependent on the structure of the report. As already noted, more complex report structure can be
useful in making aggregation more accurate.
3Notice that such a strategy space is not trivially describable with heterogeneous reporting types (where each type
deﬁnes how to transform an observation to a report), because the reporting type of an agent might be dependent
on both time and the reporting types of other agents. For example, [RYZ+10] measure the performance of agents
(annotators) in binary classiﬁcation in terms of the sensitivity and speciﬁcity with respect to the unknown gold
standard. In our setting, a malicious agent can change her sensitivity and speciﬁcity depending on, for example,
the current estimate E or the sensitivity and speciﬁcity of other (malicious) agents.
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provides a justiﬁcation for the assumption of stochastic arrival of reports.
5.1.3 Quality score
We evaluate agents by their marginal contributions to the quality of produced estimates. More
precisely, consider an estimate Enewa obtained by fusing agent a’s report with an estimate
Eolda that preceded the report of agent a. Furthermore, let SE (E ,Xtrust ) be a general scoring
function that evaluates the quality of an estimate with respect to the report Ytrust = Xtrust of
a trusted agent, and let it be scaled so that it takes values in interval [−1/2,1/2] (see Chapter 2).
The score of agent a is then deﬁned by the gain Ga of the center when it fully incorporates the
agents’s report into the existing estimate Eolda :
scorea =Ga = SE (Enewa ,Xtrust )−SE (Eolda ,Xtrust )
It is easy to see that the score takes values in scorea ∈ [−1,1]. The score can further be
used to calculate (monetary) incentives given to the agent. In particular, we deﬁne payment
mechanism τG :X ×X →R as τG (Ya ,Xtrust ) def= scorea . Notice that we deliberately abuse our
notation by having three equivalent quantities, scorea , Ga and τG , in order to clearly specify
the meaning of the properties we investigate in this chapter.
5.1.4 Myopic impact
Following the approach from [RS07], we use the notion of agent a’s myopic impact. Since our
main method probabilistically decides whether to accept or discard agent a’s report, we adopt
a notion of expected myopic impact.
Deﬁnition 19. The expected myopic impact of agent a at time period t is deﬁned as:
Δ¯a,t =πupdate ·Ga,t + (1−πupdate) ·0=πupdate ·Ga,t
where πupdate is the probability of incorporating agent a’s report into the existing output.
Furthermore, we deﬁne the total myopic impact as Δ¯a =∑Tt=1 Δ¯a,t .
The intuition behind the deﬁnition is straightforward. Whenever the center accepts to fuse
agent a’s report into the existing estimate, the agent’s impact is equal to the center’s infor-
mation gain: Ga,t = SE (Enewa ,Xtrust )−SE (Eolda ,Xtrust ). Otherwise, when the center decides
to discard agent a’s report, the agent’s impact is 0 because it does not change the center’s
output Eolda . Notice that the myopic impacts, Δ¯a,t and Δ¯a , are functions of Ga,t . Since Ga,t is a
random variable, we can associate expected values over Ga,t for both Δ¯a,t and Δ¯a , which we
denote byE(Δ¯a,t ) andE(Δ¯a), respectively.4
The property we want to achieve with a reputation framework is a bounded negative impact
4E(Δ¯a ) is the expectation over gains from all time periods.
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of any agent. That is, the total myopic impact of agent a should be bounded from below by a
value independent of sensing time T , i.e. Δ¯a >−O(1).
5.1.5 Information loss
Bounding the negative value of a myopic impact does not entirely guarantee that a reputation
system has a good performance. For example, a simple reputation system that discards all
the reports completely limits the negative inﬂuence of malicious agents, but in doing so, it
discards all the valuable information coming from non-malicious agents as well. Therefore,
it is also necessary to measure an information loss for potentially discarding reports of an
informed agent a.
Deﬁnition 20. Consider an agent a whose expected scores are strictly greater than a predeﬁned
parameter scoremin > 0, i.e.,E(scorea,t )> scoremin > 0. The expected information loss ILa
for an agent a is deﬁned as:
ILa =
T∑
t=1
[E(scorea,t )−E(Δ¯a,t )]
The rationale behind this deﬁnition is that an agent’s scores reﬂect her contributions — infor-
mation gains — that the agent would have made had it not been limited, while her myopic
impact reﬂects the agent’s real contribution. We deﬁne information loss only for agents that
in expectation provide positive contributions better than some predeﬁned threshold. The
information coming from other agents is not considered to be reliable, so we want to discard
it in the ﬁrst place.
5.2 Related work
A common approach to ﬁlter low quality information in crowd work is to batch process
the elicited data and apply machine learning or statistical methods to infer the true labels
(e.g.,[RYZ+10, KOS11, LPI12, KOS13, JSV14]). This approach, however, implies that the under-
lying phenomenon, whose state is being estimated, is not monitored in real-time but rather
periodically.
In contrast, we investigate an online information aggregation setting, where estimates should
be updated after receiving each input from the crowd participants. The setting relates to
the vast literature on regret-minimization algorithms (e.g., [LR85, ACBF02, CBMS07, LW94,
NRTV07, CBL06]), and is similar to the model of prediction with expert advice [CBL06], in
particular, to the one where expert advice is sequential [KS10, KS11]. More precisely, in our
setting, agents, who arrive sequentially, are experts that provide either adversarial (malicious)
advice or advice that can be considered to be stochastic. Notice that this differs from the
traditional expert algorithms (e.g., [LW94]) where experts arrive simultaneously. Furthermore,
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we evaluate agents by the inﬂuence they have on the aggregate, which contrasts a traditional
way of evaluating each expert independently and is closely related to prediction markets
[Han03, CP07, CV10]. Unlike prediction markets, we do not ask an agent for prediction but
rather her private information, which is then aggregated explicitly with the existing reports.
The closest learning algorithm to our work is the inﬂuence limiter [RS07]. The algorithm
uses a reputation based framework and is provably resistant to misreporting. It was pri-
marily designed for recommender systems, and, as we show later in this chapter, its direct
transformation to our setting has several drawbacks.
Apart from the online learning algorithms, our work relates to the extensive literature on trust
and reputation systems (e.g., [JI02, Del05, ZVdS12, XS15]), out of which we emphasize those
for sensing, since the main application of our technique is community sensing.
The standard approach of dealing with untrustworthy information in sensing is by using
reputation systems [MM02, BB03, GS04, BLB02, YS10, Che09], with the Beta reputation system
[JI02] being the most common way of assigning reputation scores. While in the literature
one can ﬁnd other ways of assigning reputation scores, such as using the Gompertz function
[HKH14], the classiﬁcation of whether a sensor misbehaves is typically based on a simple
thresholding principle: if the reputation of a sensor is lower than a certain threshold, the
sensor is denoted as misbehaving, otherwise, it is considered to be trustworthy. A thresholding
approach is common even among the techniques that do not necessarily use reputation
systems (e.g., [WLSH09]). While such a thresholding principle can cope with simple attacks
where malicious sensors report consistently wrong values, it fails to protect the center against
deceiving attacks, as we describe it later in the paper.
[VRJ13] and [RRCN09] take a different approach to fuse information from multiple sensors that
are not a priori assumed to be trustworthy. [VRJ13] tries to learn the parameters related to the
trustworthiness using a maximum likelihood method over the assumed (Gaussian) model with
unknown parameters. [RRCN09] proposes a two stage Bayesian multi-sensor fusion algorithm
that incorporates model of sensors’ trustworthiness. Neither of the two multi-sensor fusion
methods have provable guarantees on the loss of the system experienced when the majority
of sensors is untrustworthy and potentially malicious. As alternatives to reputation systems,
we also mention hardware solutions, such as trusted platform modules (e.g., [SW10, GJL+11]).
These approaches, however, require additional hardware on each sensing module, which
limits their applicability.
5.3 Traditional approach
Let us now describe the thresholding approach traditionally used in reputation systems. When
the center receives a report Ya,t of agent a, it fuses the report with the existing information if
agent a’s reputation is greater than a certain classiﬁcation thresholdΘ, and otherwise discards
it. The approach is depicted by Algorithm 1. FunctionUpdate(E ,Ya,t ) uses the existing set
of included reports (the set of reports that produced estimate E), adds to it report Ya,t , and
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Data: Initial reputation ρ0, thresholdΘ
begin
for Agent a do
ρa,1 ←− ρ0;
end
for t = 1 to t = T do
Compute prior estimate E ;
Publish E ;
for Agent a do
Receive a’s report Ya,t ;
Eolda ←− E ;
Enewa ←−Update(E ,Ya,t ) ;
if ρa,t ≥Θ then
E ←− Eanew ;
Publish E ;
end
end
Receive report Ytrust ,t = Xtrust ,t ;
for Agent a do
scorea,t ←− SE (Enewa ,Xtrust ,t )−SE (Eolda ,Xtrust ,t );
ρa,t+1 ←−RepUpdate(ρa,t , scorea,t );
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: Thresholding
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applies model M to obtain a new estimate. RepUpdate updates the reputation of agent a
using scorea,t , and has two conditions:
• if scorea,t has a strictly positive constant value, the reputation converges over time
towards its maximum value;
• if scorea,t has a strictly negative constant value, the reputation converges over time
towards its minimum value.
This simple reputation system can be considered to be a part of a large family of reputation
systems that use ﬁx thresholds to classify whether a certain agent misbehaves or not. These
reputation systems can cope with simple attacks where malicious agents report consistently
wrong values. For example, in case of pollution monitoring, they can limit the effectiveness of
the malicious strategy that consists of reporting low pollution values. However, they fail to
protect the system against deceiving attacks.
One particular deceiving strategy of a malicious agent could be to report informative values
when her reputation is below thresholdΘ, while report low quality information when her rep-
utation is above the threshold. The intuition behind this attack is that an agent reports useful
information only when the center does not use it, and when the center uses her information,
it deliberately misreports.
Proposition 7. Consider an aggregation modelM that allows arbitrary generation of gainsGa,t
related to agent a. Then there exists a sequence of gains such that the total myopic impact Δ¯a of
agent a in Algorithm 1 is negative and monotonically decreases with T , i.e., limT→∞ Δ¯a =−∞.
Proof. Consider a sequence of gains such that whenever ρa,t <Θ, gain Ga,t is equal to Ga,t =
g > 0, while ρa,t ≥ Θ implies negative gain Ga,t = −g < 0. In other words, πupdate = 1 for
Ga,t < 0 and πupdate = 0 for Ga,t ≥ 0. Since reputations converge to the maximum possible
reputation if scorea,t (i.e., Ga,t ) is ﬁxed to g > 0, we know that ρa,t will inﬁnitely often be
greater than Θ for T →∞. Therefore, Δ¯a is negative (because πupdate = 0 for Ga,t ≥ 0) and
limT→∞ Δ¯a =−∞ (because ρa,t ≥Θ inﬁnitely often).
5.4 Inﬂuence limiter
The inﬂuence limiter, when transformed to our setting, has the same skeleton structure as
the thresholding algorithm with the main differences in three components, which we point
out in this section. These components enable it to be provably resistant to any myopic-based
manipulation strategy (Theorem 4 and Theorem 7 in [RS07]). We show, however, that all of the
three components should be modiﬁed in order to obtain a practical algorithm. The structure
of the inﬂuence limiter is depicted in Algorithm 2.
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Data: Initial reputation ρ0
begin
for Agent a do
ρa,1 ←− ρ0;
end
for t = 1 to t = T do
Compute prior estimate E ;
Publish E ;
for Agent a do
Receive a’s report Ya,t ;
Eolda ←− E ;
Enewa ←−Update(E ,Ya,t ) ;
wa,t =min(ρa,t ,1) ;
E ←− (1−wa,t ) ·Eolda +wa,t ·Enewa ;
end
Receive report Ytrust ,t = Xtrust ,t ;
for Agent a do
scorea,t ←−MCQSR (Enewa ,Eolda ,Xtrust ,t );
ρa,t+1 ←− ρa,t +wa,t · scorea,t ;
end
end
end
Algorithm 2: Inﬂuence limiter
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Information aggregation. The standard version of the inﬂuence limiter has a deterministic
information fusion component. In particular, the inﬂuence limiter incorporates all of the
reports, but assigns different weights to different reports. In our scenario, this would mean
that when a report from an agent a is received, the new estimate Enewa is calculated and the
published estimate E is updated to:
E ←− (1−wa,t ) ·Eolda +wa,t ·Enewa (5.1)
Here, the weight is equal to wa,t =min(ρa,t ,1). The crucial part of the algorithm is how Enewa
should be calculated, i.e., the structure of theUpdate function.
In the inﬂuence limiter, a sensible updating function has to include the fact that all reports are
fused, but with different weights. Since aggregation modelM is assumed to be a black box,
one has to additionally ensure that the reports are properly weighted (limited) when updating
estimate E . For example, consider two reports Ya1 and Ya2 that arrive sequentially. Initially,
E should be set to M (). Once Ya1 is reported, the update of E , denoted by E1, is easy to
calculate: we simply make a linear combination of E andM ({Ya1 }), with weights 1−w1 and
w1 (see (5.1)).
The problem, however, arises when we update the current estimate E1 for report Ya2 . Namely,
the new update should be a linear combination of the current estimate E1 and the estimate
Enew2 that does not limit Ya2 , but does appropriately limit the reports that had arrived before
Ya2 . In our case, the limited report in E
new
2 would be Ya1 . Since Ya1 should in E
new
2 be limited
in the same way as in E1 (otherwise report Ya2 has inﬂuence on the limiting process of prior
information), we obtain that Enew2 is equal to E
new
2 ←− (1−w1) ·M ({Ya2 })+w1 ·M ({Ya1 ,Ya2 }).
Now, notice that for report Ya1 we only needed to query modelM once because there were
no prior reports. For report Ya2 , we needed to query model M twice. This can be easily
generalized; for example, for the third report Ya3 , we would need to query model M four
times to obtain estimates: M ({Ya3 }), M ({Ya1 ,Ya3 }), M ({Ya2 ,Ya3 }) and M ({Ya1 ,Ya2 ,Ya3 }). By
induction, it follows that:
Proposition8. The number of queries to a black box modelM of the inﬂuence limiter algorithm
in one time period t isΩ(2n), where n is the number of the reported values.
Scoring rule. The properties of the inﬂuence limiter are proven only for the quadratic scoring
rule (see Lemma 5 in [RS07]). In particular, the score scorea,t is calculated by using a function
MCQSR that evaluates the marginal contribution of an agent using the quadratic scoring rule.
For example, estimates E might contain the likelihood of possible reports of a trusted agent,
i.e., PrE (Xtrust ), which means that scoring function SE can be deﬁned as SE (E ,Xtrust ) =
SQ (PrE ,Xtrust ), where SQ is the quadratic scoring rule (see (2.2) in Chapter 2). Since our goal
is not to make restrictions on the form of model M , allowing general scoring techniques is
crucial in our design. For example, if a modelM is non-probabilistic, a quadratic scoring rule
is not applicable.
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Furthermore, the inﬂuence limiter uses a binary outcome in its scoring rule (this is a require-
ment of Lemma 5 in [RS07]). In our scenario, the report Ytrust = Xtrust of a trusted agent is not
necessarily a binary observation, so one needs to transform it into a binary variable in order
to apply it to the inﬂuence limiter. For example, if Xtrust takes values inR, the transformation
can be done by deﬁning a threshold and a binary variable equal to 0 if Xtrust is smaller than
the threshold, and 1 otherwise. An issue with this approach is that the evaluation process is
much less accurate. For example, if the threshold is equal to 30, then this scoring technique
would assign the same quality evaluations for both Xtrust = 35 and Xtrust = 50.
Reputation update. The reputation updating rule of the inﬂuence limiter is deﬁned by
ρa,t+1 ←− ρa,t +wa,t · scorea,t , and resembles the information fusion updating. This is not a
coincidence: a reputation change should reﬂect how much an agent inﬂuences the aggregate.
To lower the query complexity, we investigate a non-deterministic information aggregation
approach that allows general scoring rules based on non-binary outcomes. These changes
also imply a different reputation updating rule. All these structural differences point out that
the inﬂuence limiter is not trivially transformable to our setting.
5.5 Stochastic inﬂuence limiter
The stochastic inﬂuence limiter (SIL) is a version of the inﬂuence limiter reputation system
with an exponential reputation boosting. More precisely, its decision making rule is non-
deterministic and uses reputations (weights) that have a multiplicative updating rule.5
The exact description of SIL can be found in Algorithm 3, and it has the following steps. Initially,
agents’ reputations are set to ρ0 > 0. At time period t , upon the arrival of an agent a’s report,
the reputation system calculates estimate Enewa using functionUpdate(E ,Ya,t ), which adds
report Ya,t to the existing set of included reports (the set of reports that estimate E ) and applies
modelM to obtain a new estimate. In the next step, the algorithm decides whether the current
estimate should be replaced with the update or not. The decision is probabilistic — with
probability equal to ρa,tρa,t+1 , the center sets estimate E to E
new
a , while otherwise, it discards
agent a’s report. The ﬁnal step of the repetitive algorithm is to update the reputation of agent
a when the report Ytrust = Xtrust of a trusted agent is received. The reputation updating rule
assigns a new reputation to agent a by adding to the current reputation ρa,t the score of agent
a modulated by η ·ρa,t , where η is a learning parameter. Parameter η should not exceed 12 , but
its proper value depends on threshold scoremin that deﬁnes the minimum expected score
of an informed agent (see Deﬁnition 20). As it is shown in the following subsections, a good
value for ηwould be η=min(12 , scoremin). However, often the expected scoreE(scorea,t ) is
for high quality reports greater than variance Var (scorea,t ), in which case one can set η= 12 .
5This is similar to the approach of the randomized weighted majority algorithm [LW94, NRTV07], designed for
the standard expert setting (see Section 5.2).
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Data: Initial reputation ρ0 > 0, learning parameter η ∈ (0, 12 ]
begin
for Agent a do
ρa,1 ←− ρ0;
end
for t = 1 to t = T do
Compute prior estimate E ;
Publish E ;
for Agent a do
Receive a’s report Ya,t ;
Eolda ←− E ;
Enewa ←−Update(E ,Ya,t ) ;
if r and(0,1)< ρa,tρa,t+1 then
E ←− Enewa ;
Publish E ;
end
end
Receive report Ytrust ,t = Xtrust ,t ;
for Agent a do
scorea,t ←− SE (Enewa ,Xtrust ,t )−SE (Eolda ,Xtrust ,t );
ρa,t+1 ←− ρa,t · (1+η · scorea,t );
end
end
end
Algorithm 3: Stochastic Inﬂuence Limiter
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5.5.1 Query complexity
Since the deterministic information fusion rule of the standard inﬂuence limiter has an
exponential query complexity, we have applied a stochastic information fusion rule in the
SIL algorithm. Because of that, SIL has a signiﬁcantly lower query complexity, in particular, it
makes only a constant number of queries per report.
Theorem 13. The number of queries to a black box modelM of the SIL algorithm in one time
period t is O(n), where n is the number of reported values.
Proof. The SIL’s function Update is simple: it uses the set of reports that produced E , say
{Y1, ...,Yk } where E ←− M ({Y1, ...,Yk }), adds to it the report Ya,t of agent a and calculates
Enewa ←−M ({Y1, ...,Yk }∪ {Ya,t }). Therefore, SIL makes O(1) queries toM for i − th agent, thus,
for n agents in one time period t we have O(n) queries.
5.5.2 Bounded negative impact
An important characteristic of SIL is that the probabilistic decision making rule allows a
possibility of incorporating reports of agents that are not necessarily considered to be reliable.
To make the procedure sound, the probability of fusing a report of an agent with low reputation
is low. For example, an agent with reputation 0.1 can affect the current estimate, but only
with probability 0.10.1+1 . This way, one makes deceiving malicious strategies less effective. In
particular, their overall impact cannot be highly negative, meaning that the sum of an agent’s
contributions, which can be positive and negative, is bounded from below.
Theorem14. The total myopic impact Δ¯a =∑Tt=1 Δ¯a,t of agent a is in the SIL algorithm bounded
from below by:
Δ¯a >−1
η
·ρ0
where ρ0 is the initial reputation of agent a.
Proof. The expected myopic impact Δ¯a,t is equal to
ρa,t
ρa,t+1 ·Ga,t =
ρa,t
ρa,t+1 ·scorea,t . On the other
hand, for reputation ρa,T+1 we have:
ln(ρa,T+1+1)= ln(ρa,T · (1+η · scorea,T )+1)= ln((ρa,T +1) · (1+
ρa,T
ρa,T +1
·η · scorea,T ))
= ln(ρa,T +1)+ ln(1+η · Δ¯a,T )= ...= ln(ρ0+1)+
T∑
t=1
ln(1+η · Δ¯a,t )
≤ ln(ρ0+1)+η
T∑
t=1
Δ¯a,t = ln(ρ0+1)+η · Δ¯a
where we used the fact that ln(1+ x) ≤ x for x > −1. By noting that the updating rule for
reputations keeps the reputations positive, i.e., ρa,t > 0, we have ln(ρa,T+1+1)> 0, so Δ¯a is
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lower bounded by:
Δ¯a >−1
η
· ln(ρ0+1)≥−ρ0
η
where we again applied ln(1+x)≤ x for x >−1.
The consequence of Theorem 14 is that the direct damage of a group of m malicious agents
can be controlled by setting the agents’ initial reputation to a low value. Namely, the impact
Δ¯a,t of agent a at time period t is measured by her marginal contribution, so the total myopic
impact of all malicious agents over sensing period T is by Theorem 14 at least − 1η ·m ·ρ0 (i.e.,
the absolute value of the negative impact is at most 1η ·m ·ρ0). By choosing a small value of ρ0,
one can make the (negative) impact of malicious agents close to 0, regardless of the reporting
strategies they use and their reporting time frame. This also implies that, when averaged over
a longer sensing period, their negative impact is negligible.6
5.5.3 Bounded information loss
The SIL decision making procedure also induces a certain information loss due to the fact that
valuable information might be discarded. This is especially true for the initial sensing periods
where all agents have relatively low reputations, including the ones that are not malicious.
For example, if the reputations are set to ρ0 = 0.1, the probability of including a report from
an honest and informed agent is initially equal to 0.10.1+1 . Since only information that comes
from agents with large reputation scores has a good chance of being considered, informed
agents should build up their reputation quickly, which is indeed the case for the SIL algorithm
because the reputation increase is exponential. Namely, the increase in the reputation is equal
to η·ρa,t ·scorea,t , which for non-malicious agents with predominantly positive scores implies
an exponential reputation growth. Therefore, by using the exponential reputation boosting,
SIL is capable of limiting the negative inﬂuence of malicious agents, while not discarding too
many reports of non-malicious agents.
The following theorem formally shows that if an agent reports informed observations, i.e.,
her scores are positive in expectation and greater than scoremin , then there is a bound to the
amount of agent a’s information discarded by SIL.
Theorem 15. Consider an agent a whose reporting strategy does not depend on her reputation
ρa,t and that has expected scores strictly greater than threshold scoremin, i.e., E(scorea,t )>
scoremin > 0. Let parameter η be strictly greater than 0 and less than:⎧⎨
⎩
1
2 if V ar (scorea,t ))<E(scorea,t )
min(12 , scoremin) if V ar (scorea,t ))≥E(scorew,t )
6One can reach the same conclusion for a malicious agent with m distinct identities.
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Furthermore, let us denote: ga,t = ln(1+η · scorea,t ) ∈ [gmin,t ,gmax,t ] and ha,t =E(ga,t ). Then
the expected information loss ILa of the SIL algorithm is bounded from above by:
ILs =
T∑
t=1
(E(scorea,t )−E(Δ¯a,t ))< z ·
⎡
⎣ e− 12 ·d
1−e− 12 ·d
+
2 · ln ρ0+1ρ0
h
⎤
⎦
where z = max1≤t≤T E(scorea,t ) ≤ 1, h = min1≤t≤T ( 1t
∑t
τ=1 ha,τ) ≥ min1≤t≤T ha,t > 0 and d =
min1≤t≤T 1t
(
∑t
τ=1 ha,τ)
2∑t
τ=1[gmax,τ−gmin,τ]2
> h22 .
Proof. The proof requires two important inequalities from the probability theory.
Markov’s inequality states that for a random variable ρ, b ≥ 0 and monotonically increasing
function f (·)> 0, we have:
Pr (|ρ| ≥ b)≤ E( f (|ρ|))
f (b)
Hoeffding’s inequality states that for independent random variables ρ1, ρ2, ..., ρn that take
values in ρi ∈ [li ,ui ] and have total expectationE(∑i ρi )= ρ¯, we have:
Pr (
∑
i
ρi − ρ¯ ≥ t )≤ e
−2· t2∑n
i=1(ui−li )2
Pr (
∑
i
ρi − ρ¯ ≤−t )≤ e
−2· t2∑n
i=1(ui−li )2
Now we are ready to prove the statement.
The expected value of the myopic impact is:
E(Δ¯a,t )=E
(
ρa,t
ρa,t +1
· scorea,t
)
Since scores are stochastically generated (they are independent of reputation ρa,t ), we obtain
that:
E(Δ¯a,t )=E
(
ρa,t
ρa,t +1
)
·E(scorea,t )
Furthermore, Markov’s inequality gives us:
E
(
ρa,t
ρa,t +1
)
≥ Pr (ρa,t ≥ ρ0 ·bt ) · ρ0 ·bt
ρ0 ·bt +1
where we used: bt = e 12 ·
∑t
τ=1 ha,τ , ha,τ =E(ln(1+η · scorea,τ)). Let us also denote:
h = min1≤t≤T 1t
∑t
τ=1 ha,τ. Using ln(1+ x) ≥ x − x2 for x ≥ −12 , it follows that ha,t ≥ η ·
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E(scorea,t )−η2 ·E((scorea,t )2). Due to the conditions of the theorem, we know that η <
E(scorea,t ) orE(scorea,t )> 12 ·E((scorea,t )2) (when Var (scorea,t )<E(scorea,t )), which by
scorea,t ∈ [−1,1], implies that h > 0.
Now, notice that:
Pr (ρa,t ≥ ρ0 ·bt )= Pr (lnρa,t ≥ ln(ρ0 ·bt ))= Pr
(
lnρa,t ≥ lnρ0+ 1
2
·
t∑
τ=1
ha,τ
)
= Pr
(
lnρa,t −
t∑
τ=1
ha,τ− lnρ0 ≥−1
2
·
t∑
τ=1
ha,τ
)
≥ 1−Pr
(
lnρa,t −
t∑
τ=1
ha,τ− lnρ0 ≤−1
2
·
t∑
τ=1
ha,τ
)
= 1−pt
where we denoted the last term Pr (.) by pt . Since lnρa,t − lnρ0 is a sum of t independent
random variables ga,τ = ln(1+η · scorea,τ) (with 1 ≤ τ ≤ t) that are in expectation equal to
hs,τ =E(ga,τ), using Hoeffding’s inequality, we obtain:
pt ≤ e
− 2·(
∑t
τ=1 ha,τ)
2
4·∑t
τ=1[gmax,τ−gmin,τ]2 ≤ e
−
2·
( ∑t
τ=1 ha,τ
t
)2
·t
4·
∑t
τ=1[gmax,τ−gmin,τ]2
t ≤ e− 12 ·d ·t
where we put d =min1≤t≤T
(∑t
τ=1 ha,τ
t
)2
∑t
τ=1[gmax,τ−gmin,τ]2
t
, which is greater than d > h22 because η·scores,τ ∈
[−0.5,0.5] (and, hence, [gmax,τ− gmin,τ]2 < 2). The expected information loss (the difference
between the agent’s score and its impact) in round t is bounded by:
E(scorea,t )−E(Δ¯a,t )=E(scorea,t ) ·
(
1−E
(
ρa,t
ρa,t +1
))
≤E(scorea,t ) ·
[
1− (1−e− 12 ·d ·t ) · ρ0 ·bt
ρ0 ·bt +1
]
=E(scorea,t ) ·
[
1
ρ0 ·bt +1
+e− 12 ·d ·t · ρ0 ·bt
ρ0 ·bt +1
]
Therefore, over time period T , the information loss is in expectation upper bounded by:
z ·
[
T∑
t=1
1
ρ0 ·bt +1
+
T∑
t=1
e−
1
2 ·d ·t · ρ0 ·bt
ρ0 ·bt +1
]
where z =max1≤t≤T E(scorea,t ). We examine bounds for each of the terms in the bracket. We
have:
T∑
t=1
e−
1
2 ·d ·t · ρ0 ·bt
ρ0 ·bt +1
≤
T∑
t=1
e−
1
2 ·d ·t = e− 12 ·d ·
T−1∑
t=0
e−
1
2 ·d ·t
< e− 12 ·d ·
∞∑
t=0
e−
1
2 ·d ·t = e
− 12 ·d
1−e− 12 ·d
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where we applied
∑∞
t=0 x
t = 11−x for x ∈ (0,1). Furthermore, using the fact that bt = e
1
2
∑t
τ=1 hs,τ ≥
e
1
2 ·t ·h we obtain:
T∑
t=1
1
ρ0 ·bt +1
≤
T∑
t=1
1
ρ0 ·e 12 ·t ·h +1
≤
∫T
t=0
1
ρ0 ·e 12 ·t ·h +1
dt <
∫∞
t=0
1
ρ0 ·e 12 ·t ·h +1
dt
= 2
h
· ln ρ0+1
ρ0
which completes the proof.
The intuition behind this result is fairly simple. If an agent has mostly positive scores greater
than scoremin , it will boost up her reputation rather quickly to the values where her reports
are practically no longer limited. Notice that the bound on the total information loss does not
(directly) depend on time (i.e., does not monotonically increase with time), which means that
the information loss averaged over a long sensing period T becomes negligible. Furthermore,
the bound multiplicatively depends on parameter z that represents an agent’s expected score:
the better the agent is, the more quality information the center looses when it discards the
agent’s reports. The second multiplicand in the bound describes how quickly an agent can
boost up its reputation, which depends on how informative the agent is: the more useful the
agent’s reports are, the higher its score is, and thus the greater its reputation increase is. This is
captured by parameters h and d , which are related to the performance of an agent through
random variable ga,t = ln(1+η · scorea,t ). Notice that by Theorem 15, we can set z = 1 and
d = h22 in order to obtain a looser upper bound that does not require estimates of z and d .
Theorem 14 and Theorem 15 provide guarantees on the performance of the SIL algorithm
that depend on initial reputation ρ0 and learning parameter η. The bounds of the theorems
indicate that the value of the initial reputation ρ0 should be such that it limits the negative
impact of malicious agents, while not discarding too much information from non-malicious
agents. Since for a longer sensing period accurate agents have enough time to build up their
reputations, the initial reputation ρ0 can be set to a relatively small value so that the SIL
algorithm is more robust against malicious reporting strategies.
A proper value for the learning parameter, on the other hand, depends on how informed
good agents should be and whether the qualities of their reports are allowed to have a high
variance. If the center considers that informed agents are only those that consistently report
good information, i.e., those who have positive expected scores with low variance, then η can
be set to 12 . On the other hand, if the center considers that informed agents are all those that
are expected to provide good information, i.e., those that have expected scores strictly greater
than scoremin , then a good value of η is min(scoremin ,
1
2 ). Notice that the bound on negative
impact is inversely proportional to η. Therefore, low values of η should be avoided.
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5.5.4 Helpful reporting
Finally, we analyze the incentive component of the SIL algorithm. The important property
of agents’ scores, which deﬁne payments τG , is that they incentivize non-malicious agents
to provide reports that maximize the information gain of the center. Notice that the most
useful information is not necessarily the true observations. This is due to the presence of
malicious agents, as well as the possible imperfections of aggregation model M . In other
words, a strategic behaviour is often desirable.
Theorem 16. If an agent a maximizes her expected payoff E(τG (Ya ,Xtrust )) = E(scorea,t ),
then she also maximizes her expected impactE(Δ¯a,t ).
Proof. The myopic impact of agent a, Δ¯a,t , is proportional to her score: Δ¯a,t = ρa,tρa,t+1 ·Ga,t =
ρa,t
ρa,t+1 · scorea,t . Hence, an agent a that aims to maximize her expected score, is also incen-
tivized to submit a report that maximizes her expected impact.
5.6 Application to community sensing
We consider a community sensing scenario where the center aggregates crowdsensed in-
formation in an online manner, from both public and private sensors, to provide real time
estimates of air pollution over a certain urban area. In this scenario, the center controls a
few accurate sensors that provide spatially or temporally sparse measurements (e.g., very
accurate particle sensors are slow; similarly NO2 can be sensed chemically but it’s again slow
and expensive), so to properly monitor the localized features of air pollution, it complements
its own measurements with those obtained by crowd-participants who own ubiquitous sensor
devices.
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Figure 5.2 – Community sensing scenario with online information fusion
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The model of the information fusion process that we consider in this section is depicted in
Figure 5.2, and it follows the formal model of this chapter. At the beginning, the center has
only prior information about air pollution over an urban area. After some time, the center
receives a report from a crowd-sensor and merges it with the current pollution map using
pollution (aggregation) modelM . Clearly, apart from its measurement, the sensor also reports
its location, which we do not explicitly emphasize in the further text. Moreover, pollution
modelM is assumed to capture correlations among measurements taken at different locations
well. The described process repeats until a trusted sensor reports its measurement, after which
the center can evaluate the reports of the crowd-sensors. The crowd sensing process then
continues in the same manner.
One of the main challenges in the described scenario is how to cope with untrustworthy
information. For example, a factory owner who wants to hide her own pollution traces could
install sensors that misreport values of pollution. Clearly, incentive schemes alone cannot
provide quality control that would solve the problem of participants with ulterior motives.
Reputation systems provide such a guarantee: bad reports lead to low reputation, which limits
the inﬂuence of the later reports. Therefore, we investigate the application of the stochastic
inﬂuence limiter in the considered setting and compare its performance to the performance
of the Beta reputation system with the thresholding principle, which is a state of the art
reputation system for sensing.
5.6.1 Simulation setup
Considering that in a real dataset one cannot identify upfront the strategies adopted by differ-
ent sensors, we simulate different malicious strategies to experimentally validate our approach.
Our pollution sensing scenario is based on the testbed from Chapter 4, section 4.5.2, but now
sensors’ measurements are not discretized. In total, the dataset contains approximately one
month of hourly measurements - the larger sensing periods can be simulated by looping over
the dataset several times, which we do 12 times to obtain the sensing time of T = 12 ·4 ·7 ·24
hours. Our main reputation system is SIL with the initial reputation set to ρ0 = 0.1.
Pollution Model
We use a probabilistic air pollution model that is based on Gaussian process regression, as
described in [RW05]. For any point of interest (in our case 116 locations), the pre-trained
Gaussian Process (GP) model produces a probability distribution function over the possible
levels of pollution from the reports of sensors placed at different locations. This posterior
distribution is a normal distributionN (μ,σ), with parameters μ and σ derived from the GP
model. We are interested in predicting the value of pollution level measures by a trusted sensor
at its location, so we denote the corresponding prediction by p(Xtrust ).
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Performance Measure
We measure the quality of the aggregates of modelM by how well they predict the measure-
ment Xtrust of a trusted sensor. Since model M outputs a normal distribution N (μ,σ) for
a point of interest (x, y), we apply scoring rule (2.3) (see Chapter 2) on probability density
function p of the form p(x)= 1
2πσ2
e−
(x−μ)2
2σ2 to obtain:
SE (p,Xtrust )= 1
2πσ
e−
(Xtrust−μ)2
2σ2 − 1
4σ

π
(5.2)
The score takes values in [− 1
4σ

π
, 1
σ

π
( 1
2
− 14 )], and can be further scaled so that scorea,t ∈
[−1,1]. In our case, no speciﬁc scaling was needed.
Sensors
We consider 40 mobile crowd-sensors and 1 trusted mobile sensor that are at each time period
placed at one of 116 available locations. The 40 crowd-sensors are either honest (25% of them)
or malicious sensors (75% of them). Malicious sensors report according to one of the following
four strategies. In the Vary strategy, sensors build up their reputations by reporting honestly
for the ﬁrst 1000 iterations, and from then on, they report only a low level of pollution. In the
Deceive strategy, sensors report honestly when their reputation is below 0.5; otherwise, they
report a low level of pollution. Vary and Deceive is a mixed strategy where malicious sensors
ﬁrst build up their reputation by reporting honestly for 1000 iterations, and from then on, they
use the Deceive strategy. Cover is a strategy that mimics a situation where malicious sensors
try to boost up their reputation when it is not important for them to misreport, and then,
on speciﬁc events, they report wrong values. In our case, malicious sensors boost up their
reputation for 1000 iterations. Then they report honestly whenever the pollution is below 35
ppb of NO2 or their reputation is lower than 0.5; otherwise, they report a low level of pollution.
The low level of pollution in the above strategies is deﬁned as 10 ppb of NO2 plus a Gaussian
noise with 0 mean and the standard deviation equal to 5.
Theoretical Bound
By Theorem 14, it follows that 0.75 ·40= 30 malicious sensors can cause an immediate damage
of at most 2 ·30 ·0.1= 6 score units (units used in (5.2)). To calculate the bound from Theorem
15, one needs to decide on parameter η and estimate parameters z, h and d . We set η = 12 ,
and approximate z, h and d , by investigating averages of scorea,t , log(1+ 12 · scorea,t ) and
maxa log(1+ 12 · scorea,t )−mina log(1+ 12 · scorea,t ) over time t . Assuming that the scores of
honest sensors are similar in most of the sensing periods, these averages lead to the estimates:7
7If k << T sensing periods have signiﬁcantly different values from the average values, to achieve a higher
precision, one can exclude these k periods when estimating the upper bound from Theorem 15 and simply add to
the calculated bound k ·maxτ∈kPer iodsE(scorea,τ).
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z ≈ 0.002, h ≈ 0.001 andd ≈ 0.005, fromwhichwe can estimate the upper bound fromTheorem
15: 10.39. By multiplying the estimate by the number of honest sensors (i.e., 10), we conclude
that the total information loss should be no more than 103.9 score units. Notice that the
bounds from Theorem 14 and Theorem 15 have different meanings: the bound from Theorem
14 describes how much a malicious sensor could intentionally shift the result, while the bound
from Theorem 15 describes an implicit damage whose nature is not controlled by a malicious
sensor. Nevertheless, it follows from the bounds that the quality degradation should not be
more than 109.9 score units in total. This can be averaged over time, so that at each time step
t , we have an average degradation of at most 109.9t score units. The average goes to 0 as time
increases implying a no-regret property in terms of sensors’ myopic impact.
Baseline: Beta Reputation System
In the Beta reputation system, we quantify the behaviour of a sensor using two parameters,
α and β, which represent the parameters of the beta distribution B(α,β)8. In the setting we
analyze, the parameters can be updated as follows (e.g., see [JI02]). If the marginal information
gain Ga,t = scorea,t of updating the current pollution map with a sensor a’s report is positive,
parameterαa,t is updated toαa,t+1 =αa,t+Ga,t . Otherwise, parameterβ is updated toβa,t+1 =
βa,t +Ga,t . The reputation of sensor a is at time t calculated as the mean of beta distribution
B(αa,t ,βa,t ), i.e., ρa,t = αa,tαa,t+βa,t . In other words, the reputation of sensor a characterizes the
fraction of the positive impact that the sensor had on the system. The decision on whether to
include the report of sensor a is based on its reputation and determined using the thresholding
principle. We set the initial values of α and β parameters to 0.01 and 0.1, respectively, with
thresholdΘ= 0.5.
Evaluation Metric
We deﬁne a measure of an average regret that evaluates the quality of the aggregates produced
by the center with respect to the aggregates obtained by fusing the reports of honest sensors.
More precisely:
AvgRegrett =
Scorehonest ,t −Scorecenter,t
t
where Scorehonest ,t is the total score (until the time period t ) of the aggregates obtained from
the reports of honest sensors, and Scorecenter,t is the total score of the center (with a particular
reputation system) until the time period t . Both scores are calculated using the quadratic
scoring rule, as described in the previous subsections, applied on the pollution map published
prior to the report of a trusted sensor. Therefore, the regret is measured in the same score
units as the theoretical bound computed in subsection ’Theoretical bound’.
8Notice that α and β are parameters of the distribution, not the scaling parameters deﬁned in Chapter 2
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(a) Vary (b) Deceive
(c) Vary and Deceive (d) Cover
Figure 5.3 – Average regrets (times 10) for different strategies (single simulation run)
5.6.2 Simulation results
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the performance of the SIL algorithm and the Beta reputation system
in terms of the average regret for four different misreporting strategies. Along with those
results, we put the theoretical estimate of the upper bound on the regret of SIL algorithm
(109.9t ), which is truncated to 0.1 for large values. The Beta reputation system is able to limit
the negative inﬂuence of malicious sensors that use the Vary strategy. However, in the Vary
strategy, malicious sensors misreport in a simple and consistent way. For the other three
misreporting strategies, the Beta reputation system experiences an average regret that is
clearly away from 0, and in two of the cases, the regret is increasing, which means that the
total negative impact of malicious sensors is not bounded. The SIL algorithm is much better
in dealing with malicious sensors: its average regret over a longer sensing period for all of the
malicious strategies is close to 0, as expected by the theoretical results. Finally, the strategy
independent upper bound on the SIL’s regret is often below the regret of the Beta reputation
system.
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(a) Vary (b) Deceive
(c) Vary and Deceive (d) Cover
Figure 5.4 – Average regrets (times 10) for different strategies — the ﬁgure shows the mean and
the 95% conﬁdence interval of 50 simulation runs
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we discussed a problem of having malicious agents in online information
fusion. We designed a novel reputation system, called the stochastic inﬂuence limiter (SIL),
that has a manageable complexity and puts an upper bound on the total negative impact that
malicious agents can have on the fused result, regardless of their reporting strategy. This is in
contrast to the standard reputation systems which do not provide any theoretical guarantees
and for which the total negative impact of malicious agents can increase over time.
Due to its theoretical guarantees, we advocated the use of the SIL algorithm in the community
sensing. We empirically conﬁrmed that the theoretical results hold in a realistic air pollution
sensing scenario, and showed that in an average-case simulation, SIL outperforms a state of
the art reputation system for sensing, whose performance is often worse than the worst case
performance of SIL.
115
Chapter 5. Reputation-based incentives for online information aggregation
The most interesting direction for future work would be to investigate under which conditions
the SIL mechanism provides guarantees when the evaluation is based on a peer consistency
approach. We expect that in this case, a majority of agents’ population should provide accurate
information. Furthermore, a payment mechanism needs to incentivize strategic agents to
report honestly even when a fraction of agents is dishonest, which is not possible for an
arbitrary population statistics. Namely, the presence of malicious agents changes the character
of belief conditions necessary to achieve properness of peer consistency techniques. For
example, the self-predicting condition, i.e., the belief condition under which the robust peer
truth serum is proper, might no longer hold when a fraction of agents is dishonest.
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Ensuring the accuracy of reported information is a major challenge for using crowds as part
of intelligent systems. In this thesis, we focused on two aspects important to achieve a good
quality control:
• incentivizing rational participants to acquire and report accurate information;
• ﬁltering out low quality reports from participants that do not respond to incentives.
Incentive mechanism design
Instead of ﬁxed rewards, participants should expect the highest rewards when they report
accurate information. Such mechanisms can be appropriately scaled so that only participants
who provide positive contributions proﬁt from participating in the elicitation process. This is
important for two reasons:
• to improve the accuracy of reported information, and thus complement ﬁltering mecha-
nisms such as gold tasks and reputation systems;
• to make participant self-selection help the mechanism by discouraging participants
that do not contribute useful results.
We focused on an incentive mechanism design in which the center cannot directly verify the
obtained information. Therefore, it has to compare reports in order to reward the participants
— agents. Two elicitation settings were investigated, a single-task setting and a multi-task
setting, which differ in the number of phenomena (tasks) that agents observe (solve).
For the single-task setting, in which agents observe a single phenomenon, we showed that an
additional report is needed whenever the agents’ beliefs are not highly constrained and the
center does not know them. We designed several Bayesian truth serum (BTS) mechanisms
that from each agent elicit targeted information and prediction report regarding what the
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other agents have reported. The most general mechanism, the divergence-based BTS, allows
agents to have different belief systems as long as their beliefs are more similar when they
observe the same value than when their observations are different. In the limit case when
observations take real values, a version of the divergence-based BTS for continuous domains
(the continuous BTS) is strictly proper if agents have a common belief system, and we show
that this condition cannot be further relaxed under reasonable constraints on the agents’
belief systems.
Unlike the single-task setting, the multi-task setting allows agents to have different beliefs,
but it assumes that the observed phenomena are a priori similar. The multi-task mechanisms
presented in the thesis achieve this result by appropriately sampling reports from different
phenomena in order to calculate the statistics used for scoring an agent. Depending on the
scoring technique, it is further possible to make truthful reporting the highest paying strategy
proﬁle.
Future directions
While the aforementioned mechanisms have proven theoretical properties in their own do-
mains, and some of the mechanisms even offer experimental evidence of their superiority over
their predecessors, there is still a lack of understanding on how to exactly implement these
mechanisms in practice and how to make them robust enough for general use. An appropri-
ate implementation choice is often tied to the application domain, especially considering
the fact that some of the mentioned mechanisms are designed for speciﬁc scenarios, e.g.,
crowdsourcing.
Since data exchange systems are increasingly dealing with multi-dimensional information
structures, one of the important future directions would be to apply peer consistency tech-
niques in the elicitation of complex information. In order to examine consistency of peer
reports, an elicitation process might have to rely on domain speciﬁc knowledge or, alterna-
tively, be able to automatically discover relevant features of the elicited information. While
some of the existing techniques provide relatively stable incentives even for large observation
spaces (e.g., see [SAFP16]), there is still a need for proper incentives in a more general formal
setting, for example, the one that includes a non-binary participation (effort) choice.
Furthermore, most of elicitation mechanisms either belong to the gold standard or the peer
consistency mechanisms. At ﬁrst glance, it does not seem sensible to use a hybrid approach as
there is a gold standard, but an argument for doing so is more obvious when we go beyond a
single shot elicitation scenario. Namely, in a scenario where participants repeatedly interact
with the center, the center would require a large number of gold standard evaluations to
frequently provide proper rewards to the participants. Therefore, by using a hybrid incentive
mechanism, one can make agents’ strategies converge towards truthful reporting in natural
game playing dynamics (e.g., regret minimization) while minimizing the number of gold
standard evaluations. This would also strengthen the incentives provided by multi-task peer
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consistency techniques, making them potentially resilient to a wider range of misreporting
strategies, e.g., to the one discussed in [GWL16].
Finally, the existing mechanisms usually model participants as risk-neutral rational agents
that maximize their rewards. While this model is fairly reasonable when dealing with, for
example, intelligent software agents, it fails to capture different risk attitudes and bounded
rationality of human participants. One of the relevant future steps would be to enrich the
existing models by incorporating the aspects of behavioral game and economic theories. Such
an approach has already been proposed for a speciﬁc scenario of designing optimal contests
[EG15], but it is yet to be seen how behavioral mechanism design should be applied in the case
of peer consistency mechanisms.
Information aggregation
To ﬁlter the low quality information coming from malicious participants, we designed a
reputation system that has provable guarantees on the amount of negative impact that a
malicious participant can have on the learned outcome. The novel reputation system, called
the stochastic inﬂuence limiter (SIL), has two components that differentiate it from the tradi-
tional reputation system design: its reputation updating procedure and stochastic information
fusion component. The former component has a form of exponential reputation boosting,
while the latter one fuses reports probabilistically with the probability of fusion being depen-
dent on the reputation of a participant. Consequently, SIL also discards some information
coming from informed participants, but we show that the amount of discarded information is
bounded from above. As an example of practical application, we considered sensing in which
the center is in control of a few trusted sensors that periodically report their measurements,
but supports these measurements with the community of sensors. We showed that the SIL
algorithm outperforms a baseline algorithm often used in sensing.
Future directions
While our work addresses the issue of adversary participants, it is restricted to the settings
where a mechanism can accurately evaluate the inputs provided by the users once the full
aggregate is obtained. The next step is to remove the requirement of trusted information
source and make an evaluation procedure based on peer consistency methods instead. In
particular, the idea would be to construct an online information fusion process that is capable
of limiting the negative inﬂuence of adversary participants but does not require trusted
information to evaluate the inﬂuence of a participant on an aggregated result. Clearly, some
constraints are needed either in terms of the percentage of adversary participants, as discussed
in similar approaches [KOS13], or in terms of the strategy space of adversaries, as studied in
the multi-task peer consistency mechanisms. Nevertheless, the empirical results in [PS06]
show that it is possible to extract the correct information from crowds using a peer consistency
score, even when the majority is wrong. This indicates that a combination of the stochastic
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inﬂuence limiter and multi-task peer consistency mechanisms has great potential in resolving
this issue.
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A Appendix
A.1 Predictemo game: contest with subjective information
We follow the design of the optimal contest for simple agents, introduced in [GR14], where
agents strategize on participation due to the cost that they experience from participating in the
contest. In the considered application, the cost of participating models privacy costs that the
users experience by playing the Predictemo game, as they provide their identities along with
their emotions. The privacy costs are expected to be the same for each participant, which, in
the contest model of [GR14], means that the agents have a homogenous cost of participation.
Assuming that the participants do not strategize on the quality of their contributions, the
contest that maximizes participation provides m equal rewards to the ﬁrst m participants,
where m depends on the participation cost and the budget V of the contest designer. We
explore this approach in a repetitive scenario where the contest is run over a longer period of
time. This enables us to eliminate the need of knowing the participation cost, and instead learn
the optimal choice of m over time. Furthermore, by applying a BTS type of mechanism (co-BTS
from Section 3.5.2 of Chapter 3), we assign a proper quality scores to reported information,
which discourages the rational participants from falsely reporting their emotions. As already
mentioned, the users of the Predictemo application also provide their coarse-grained locations.
However, the reports contain only the information about the closest building to the location
of a user, so we assume that this type of information is not misreported.
Optimizing the participation
We consider a contest design in which, at each time step t , participants report their subjective
information to a contest designer. A participant can report several reports during a time period
t , each report being scored with the co-BTS mechanism against another agent that reports at
approximately the same time. Due to the fact that co-BTS rewards agents using a zero-sum
reward structure, an agent effectively needs to outperform her peers in order to have a good
relative score. At the end of the period, agents are ranked in decreasing order by their total
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score, and ﬁrst m participants are rewarded with V /m, where V is the budget of a contest
designer. The number m is a time dependent variable, chosen by the designer, and takes
values from {1, ...,mmax }. The maximum value mmax should be such that V /mmax represents
a lower bound on a reward that covers the cost of participation. Notice that this bound does
not need to be tight, so the center does not need to know the exact value of the cost.
We model the number of participants at a certain time step t ∈ {1, ...,T } as a random variable
Nm that takes value inN. In particular, we assume that Nm is a random sample of a Poisson
distribution whose parameter λm depends on the number of the rewarded agents m. With this
in mind, we would like to select m that leads to the greatest expected number of participants,
i.e., that has the associated Poisson distribution with the greatest mean λm .
The problem of ﬁnding the optimal m in an online manner belongs to a general class of the
multi-armed bandit problems (e.g. [ACBF02]), that investigate explore-exploit tradeoffs in
online learning processes. We apply the KL-UCB algorithm [GC11] as it allows the objective
quantity, in our case participation rate, to be distributed according to a Poisson distribution.
The algorithmic description of our approach is shown in Algorithm 4, and we call it KLUCoBits
to indicate that it is based on the KL-UCB algorithm with the co-BTS evaluation procedure.
The algorithm follows the steps explained in the above paragraphs, incorporated into the
KL-UCB algorithm. The ﬁrst m steps of the algorithm sample participation rate for different
choices of m. Afterwards, the algorithm makes a more appropriate choice of m using proce-
dure KL_UCB_SelectM() that implements the arm choice function of KL-UCB, as explained
in [GC11]. For each possible choice of m, the procedure takes into account the obtained
participation rates for the considered m, but also the number of times the choice was made in
order to achieve a good explore-exploit tradeoff.
A.1.1 Predictemo game
The Predictemo game represents an implementation of the KLUCoBits contest design in
eliciting emotions across EPFL campus. Once logged in, a user chooses another player and
challenges the player to play the Predictemo prediction task. As pointed out in Section 3.5.2 of
Chapter 3, each player in the prediction task provides one of 20 possible emotions and the
prediction about what the other player will report.
At the end of each period, m best users are rewarded with V /m points. m is selected upfront,
before each period, and is known to players, as well as V . Users of the Predictemo application
can access a simpliﬁed description of the KLUCoBits reward mechanism from the login page,
or from their user proﬁles when they are logged in. The description outlines the basic concepts
of the reward mechanism. It states that V points are periodically given to m best users in
equal split, where users are ranked by the relative quality of the predictions they provide. The
quality of a prediction is said to be measured by how accurate the prediction is plus how
hard it was to predict the correct emotion, while the score that affects the ranking of a user is
122
A.1. Predictemo game: contest with subjective information
Data: Time horizon T > 0, budget V , max number of rewards mmax
begin
for t = 1 to t =mmax do
m = t ;
Publish the number of rewards m and their value V /m;
Evaluate reports of agents using co-BTS;
when period t ends do
Get participation rate Nm,t ;
Rank agents according to their total co-BTS scores;
Reward ﬁrst m agents with V /m;
NumM [m]= 1;
TotalN [m]=Nm,t ;
endwhen
end
for t =mmax +1 to t = T do
m =KL_UCB_SelectM(NumM ,TotalN , t );
Publish the number of rewards m and their value V /m;
Evaluate reports of agents using co-BTS;
when period t ends do
Get participation rate Nm,t ;
Rank agents according to their total co-BTS scores;
Reward ﬁrst m agents with V /m;
NumM [m]=NumM [m]+1;
TotalN [m]= TotalN [m]+Nm,t ;
endwhen
end
end
Algorithm 4: KLUCoBits: multi-step contest with subjective information
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explained as the difference between the qualities of the user’s prediction and the prediction of
her opponent in the considered prediction task.
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Figure A.1 – Report frequency
The preliminary version of the Predictemo application was deployed for a period of three
weeks. A reporting period t was set to be three days, having in total T = 7 full periods, or
equivalently, 21 days. We rewarded m best players of the Predictemo game with V = 60 points
at each time step t . m was chosen according to KLUCoBits from the set {1,2,3,4}. In this time
horizon, a player could collect points and exchange 60 points for a gift card worth 20 CHF.
In total, there were 15 EPFL students using the Predictemo application in the non-anonymous
(game) mode. Out of 89 submitted reports, 34.8% were anonymous reports, and the rest
(65.2%) were reports from the users whose identity is known. As shown in Figure A.1, the
participation rate ﬂuctuated throughout the reporting time horizon T , but on average was
higher at the end of the 3 week period.
The preliminary version of the application offers basic insights into students’ emotional states,
such as the location at which users are more likely to report their emotions or the types of
the most frequent emotions, as shown in Figure A.2. The most interesting direction for future
work would be to link the reported emotions to the EPFL courses, and see how the reported
information compares to the traditional opinion polls that ask students to evaluate the quality
of the courses.
A.2 Geometric sequence
This section provides useful properties of geometric sequence 1+x+x2+ ...+xn−2, x ∈ (0,1).
Its closed form is:
1−xn−1
1−x = 1+x+x
2+ ...+xn−2 (A.1)
Another property that we will use is the derivative of the geometric sequence:
d
dx
(1+x+x2+ ...+xn−2)= d
dx
(
1−xn−1
1−x
)
= (1−x
n−1)− (n−1) · xn−2 · (1−x)
(1−x)2 (A.2)
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(a) Emotion distribution
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(b) Location distribution
Figure A.2 – Distribution of reports
Next, we show that expression (1+ r · x) · (∑n−2i=0 (1−p − x)i ), where 1 > p > 0, r ∈ (0, 1p ) and
x ∈ (0,1−p), has a maximal non-negative derivative at x = 0.
Lemma 9. Consider function f (x)= (1+ r ·x) · (∑n−2i=0 (1−p−x)i ), where p ∈ (0,1), x ∈ (0,1−p)
and r ∈ (0, 1p ). If there exists x ′ ∈ (0,1−p) such that
d f
dx (x
′)≥ 0, then maxx d fdx (x)=
d f
dx (0).
Proof. We can rewrite function f (x) as:
f (x)= (1+ r · x) · (
n−2∑
i=0
(1−p−x)i )= (1+ r − r ·p− r · (1−p−x)) · (
n−2∑
i=0
(1−p−x)i )
= (1+ r − r ·p) ·
n−2∑
i=0
(1−p−x)i − r ·
n−1∑
i=1
(1−p−x)i
= r · (1− (1−p−x)n−1)+ (1− r ·p) ·
n−2∑
i=0
(1−p−x)i
The derivative of f (x) is equal to:
d f
dx
(x)= (n−1) · r · (1−p−x)n−2− (1− r ·p) ·
n−2∑
i=1
i · (1−p−x)i−1
= (1−p−x)n−2 ·
(
(n−1) · r − (1− r ·p) ·
n−2∑
i=1
i
(1−p−x)n−1−i
)
Now, suppose there is x ′ ∈ (0,1−p) such that d fdx (x ′) ≥ 0. Since x ∈ (0,1−p), the necessary
condition for that is:
(n−1) · r − (1− r ·p) ·
n−2∑
i=1
i
(1−p−x ′)n−1−i ≥ 0
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Therefore, we obtain:
d f
dx
(x ′)= (1−p−x ′)n−2 ·
(
(n−1) · r − (1− r ·p) ·
n−2∑
i=1
i
(1−p−x ′)n−1−i
)
≤ (1−p−x ′)n−2 ·
(
(n−1) · r − (1− r ·p)
n−2∑
i=1
i
(1−p)n−1−i
)
≤ (1−p)n−2 ·
(
(n−1) · r − (1− r ·p) ·
n−2∑
i=1
i
(1−p)n−1−i
)
= d f
dx
(0)
A.3 Dasgupta&Ghosh mechanism
We have seen that RPTS reduces to a simple score when statistic xa is calculated based on only
one phenomenon in addition to the phenomenon being observed by agent a. The form of
score (4.14) is similar to the Dasgupta&Ghosh mechanism introduced in [DG13]. In fact, they
are equivalent.
To see this, we ﬁrst need to describe the basic structure of the Dasgupta&Ghosh mechanism.
Let us assume for simplicity that an agent a and her peer pi have only one common phenom-
enaΦi that they observe (see [DG13] for how to transform the mechanism when this does not
hold), and that they both observe m additional phenomena. Notice that now we have a larger
batch of phenomena and each agent observes multiple of them. By carefully rearranging
terms in the Dasgupta&Ghosh mechanism, we obtain that the mechanism is equivalent to:
1Ya,i=Ypi ,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
agreement A
− ∑
z∈X
∑
Φ j =Φi
1Ya, j=z
m
∑
Φk =Φi
1Ypi ,k=z
m︸ ︷︷ ︸
statistic B
= 1Ya,i=Ypi ,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
agreement A
− ∑
Φ j =Φi
∑
Φk =Φi
1Ya, j=Ypi ,k
m2︸ ︷︷ ︸
statistic B
where Ya, j is agent a’s report for phenomenonΦ j , and summation ΣΦ j is over the phenomena
observed by agent a (equivalent notation is used for agent pi ). Therefore, the total score is
equal to:
∑
Φi
[
1Ya,i=Ypi ,i −
∑
Φ j =Φi
∑
Φk =Φi
1Ya, j=Ypi ,k
m2
]
=∑
Φi
⎡
⎢⎣1Ya,i=Ypi ,i − 1m
m∑
l=1
∑
Φl∈{Φl−a,Φi }
1Ya,i=Ypl ,l
m
⎤
⎥⎦
where {Φl−a,Φi } is a group of m phenomena not observed by agent a and they are obtained
from the previous step by rearranging the terms in the equation. This can be thought of as if
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the Dasgupta&Ghosh mechanism scores a report Ya,i with:
1Ya,i=Ypi ,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
agreement A
− 1
m
m∑
l=1
∑
Φl∈{Φl−a,Φi }
1Ya,i=Ypl ,l
m︸ ︷︷ ︸
statistic B
Now, since Ya,i and Ypl ,l are statistically independent (because agent a has not observedΦl ),
part B of the score is in the expectation equivalent to x′a(Ya,i ) (see Section 4.4.2). Therefore,
the mechanism deﬁned by (4.14) and the Dasgupta&Ghosh mechanism are equivalent, which
means that the Dasgupta&Ghosh mechanism is a special case of RPTS obtained in the limit
case when xa is calculated from only two phenomena. Moreover, the equivalence implies that
the Dasgupta&Ghosh mechanism requires non-correlated (categorical) observation values for
the honest reporting strategy proﬁle to result in a maximum payoff.
A.4 Detailed simulation results for RPTS and log-PTS
This section provides the detailed simulation results of the RPTS and log-PTS mechanisms
in the community sensing simulation setup of Section 4.5.2 (Chapter 4), for the decreasing
population of sensors.
Table A.1 – Average payoffs — RPTS (100 sensors, 13 peers)
Strategy mean min max median 1st quartile 3rd quartile
honest 0.138 -0.107 0.584 0.095 0.037 0.175
collude 0.051 -0.025 0.252 0.031 0.007 0.06
colludeLow 0 0 0 0 0 0
colludeExtraHigh 0 0 0 0 0 0
random -0.507 -0.658 -0.185 -0.517 -0.579 -0.459
randomAll -0.002 -0.051 0.05 0.0 -0.016 0.01
Table A.2 – Average payoffs — RPTS (80 sensors, 11 peers)
Strategy mean min max median 1st quartile 3rd quartile
honest 0.126 -0.126 0.569 0.087 0.035 0.168
collude 0.044 -0.023 0.216 0.029 0.011 0.057
colludeLow 0 0 0 0 0 0
colludeExtraHigh 0 0 0 0 0 0
random -0.513 -0.669 -0.276 -0.529 -0.577 -0.469
randomAll 0.0 -0.065 0.066 0.0 -0.018 0.017
127
Appendix A. Appendix
Table A.3 – Average payoffs — RPTS (60 sensors, 9 peers)
Strategy mean min max median 1st quartile 3rd quartile
honest 0.126 -0.098 0.589 0.089 0.032 0.17
collude 0.043 -0.042 0.206 0.029 0.008 0.062
colludeLow 0 0 0 0 0 0
colludeExtraHigh 0 0 0 0 0 0
random -0.52 -0.664 -0.228 -0.523 -0.576 -0.469
randomAll 0.0 -0.08 0.069 -0.004 -0.018 0.018
Table A.4 – Average payoffs — RPTS (40 sensors, 7 peers)
Strategy mean min max median 1st quartile 3rd quartile
honest 0.098 -0.112 0.522 0.068 0.013 0.161
collude 0.035 -0.031 0.239 0.02 0.0 0.052
colludeLow 0 0 0 0 0 0
colludeExtraHigh 0 0 0 0 0 0
random -0.535 -0.697 -0.308 -0.536 -0.586 -0.493
randomAll 0.0 -0.018 0.117 -0.003 -0.027 0.033
Table A.5 – Average payoffs — log-PTS (100 sensors, 13 peers)
Strategy mean min max median 1st quartile 3rd quartile
honest 0.025 -1.281 0.302 0.042 -0.02 0.104
collude 0.01 -0.352 0.109 0.015 -0.01 0.034
colludeLow 0 0 0 0 0 0
colludeExtraHigh 0 0 0 0 0 0
random -0.847 -1.718 -0.452 -0.808 -0.997 -0.658
randomAll -0.329 -0.5 -0.178 -0.332 -0.38 -0.279
Table A.6 – Average payoffs — log-PTS (80 sensors, 11 peers)
Strategy mean min max median 1st quartile 3rd quartile
honest 0.014 -1.178 0.3 0.039 -0.03 0.09
collude 0.007 -0.283 0.12 0.012 -0.01 0.027
colludeLow 0 0 0 0 0 0
colludeExtraHigh 0 0 0 0 0 0
random -0.874 -1.425 -0.366 -0.858 -1.038 -0.694
randomAll -0.479 -0.701 -0.232 -0.473 -0.55 -0.409
128
A.5. Web interfaces for the peer grading task in Section 4.5.1
Table A.7 – Average payoffs — log-PTS (60 sensors, 9 peers)
Strategy mean min max median 1st quartile 3rd quartile
honest -0.021 -1.389 0.277 0.011 -0.06 0.078
collude -0.004 -0.254 0.09 0.003 -0.015 0.023
colludeLow 0 0 0 0 0 0
colludeExtraHigh 0 0 0 0 0 0
random -0.887 -1.524 -0.465 -0.836 -1.026 -0.715
randomAll -0.759 -1.111 -0.406 -0.745 -0.846 -0.659
Table A.8 – Average payoffs — log-PTS (40 sensors, 7 peers)
Strategy mean min max median 1st quartile 3rd quartile
honest -0.069 -1.862 0.269 -0.006 -0.1 0.046
collude -0.016 -0.345 0.123 -0.0003 -0.025 0.017
colludeLow 0 0 0 0 0 0
colludeExtraHigh 0 0 0 0 0 0
random -0.994 -1.607 -0.563 -0.992 -1.139 -0.823
randomAll -1.224 -1.767 -0.773 -1.195 -1.364 -1.077
A.5 Web interfaces for the peer grading task in Section 4.5.1
This section provides ﬁgures of the web interfaces for the second question of the peer grad-
ing assignment and for the tutorials about the constant reward mechanism and the RPTS
mechanism.
(a) The correct solution to the quiz question and
a student’s solution
(b) Input form for corrections of the student’s
solution
Figure A.3 – Peer grading task - the second question
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(a) Explanation of the constant reward mecha-
nism
(b) Explanation of the RPTS mechanism
Figure A.4 – Tutorial about the reward mechanisms
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